GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2004

The Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
of Intellectual Property Regimes
F. Scott Kieff
George Washington University Law School, skieff@law.gwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kieff, F. Scott, "The Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Intellectual Property
Regimes" (2004). GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works. 561.
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/561

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

(Working Draft)
THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT:
A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES
F. Scott Kieff *
© 2004. F. Scott Kieff. All Rights Reserved.

Abstract
Contemporary debates over intellectual property (“IP”) generally
evidence positions that appear to line up at opposite ends of the same axis, with
one side arguing for more rights for IP owners under each major regime – patent,
trademark, and copyright – and the other side arguing for fewer. Approaching
from what some may see as a “more” IP view, this paper offers the
counterintuitive suggestion to consider abolishing one of these IP regimes –
copyright, at least with respect to the entertainment industry, which represents
one of that regime’s most commercially significant users. This realization is in
fact consistent with the underlying view because the view is not accurately seen as
even being directed to the “more” or “less” debate; and instead is focused on
means as much as ends. In keeping with this means-directed approach, the paper
provides the first comprehensive analysis of IP regimes using the set of tools from
the field of new institutional economics. In so doing the paper offers the first
normative case for IP that connects the path breaking literature on the theory of
property rights generally with the seminal theories of the firm, transaction costs,
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and agency costs. Underlying this paper’s stark departure from both the “more”
and “less” bodies of the IP literature is the realization that the institutional
structure of the present copyright regime may make the social costs of the present
copyright regime too high, for at least the entertainment industry, while at the
same time preventing it from providing the coordination benefits an IP regime
normatively should provide. Building on this, the paper begins to explore for the
first time whether the recent patent and trademark regimes have institutional
structures that may allow them to provide these coordination benefits better, and
with lower social costs. The paper thereby suggests how the patent and
trademark regimes of yesterday may obsolete the copyright system of today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of IP theory and
comparative outline of IP regimes using the set of analytical tools from the field
called new institutional economics (“NIE”), which is often associated with the
path-breaking work on institutions by Robert Fogel and Douglass North, for
which they were awarded the 1993 Nobel Prize in economics, as well as the pathbreaking work on transaction costs, agency costs, and the theory of the firm by
Ronald Coase, for which he was awarded the 1991 Nobel Prize in economics.1 In
so doing, the paper offers the first theory of IP that connects the literatures on
these seminal theories of the firm, agency costs, and information costs with the
literature on the emergence of property rights generally.2
1

For more on the Nobel Prize to Fogel and North, see “The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1993,” available on-line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/. For more on the Nobel Prize to Coase, see “The
Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991,” available on-line
at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/. The term NIE, itself, was coined by Oliver
Williamson, in OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975) at 1, and the field of NIE owes a great deal to the path-breaking work of
many important scholars in addition to Williamson, who elucidated the pervasive impact of
transaction costs across a range of settings from markets and firms to other organizational
structures and politics.
2
Although it is of course recognized that this paper will not be the only comprehensive
treatment of IP theory from the perspective of NIE, and that the paper is not the first to explore IP
implications of particular aspects of the NIE literature, the approach offered here is significantly
more comprehensive than prior efforts. Indeed, the more comprehensive approach taken in this
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Many of the tools NIE uses to conduct comparative institutional analyses3
have played a central role in the scholarly debate within property theory about the
shifts that occur over time among property regimes, generally.4 And there
certainly have been many shifts in recent time that have occurred within the field
of IP.5 Yet, the case for or against formal property rights for IP, in particular, has
largely escaped the attention of the NIE literature, until the present endeavor.6
paper is particularly timely given the recent surge in interest in highlighting particular aspects of
the interface between IP and NIE. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) (exploring the importance of IP rights for firms), Mark Lemley, Ex Ante
versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (framing debate
about IP rights in terms of timing); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004) (exploring the problems associated with pricing above
marginal cost for IP); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the
Boundaries of the Firm (Working paper, June 24, 2004) (available on-line at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195) (connecting IP and the theory of the firm); Clarisa Long,
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465 2004 (exploring information
costs). Indeed, this paper can also be seen as building upon the important foundational essay by
Robert Merges on the interface between NIE and IP. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND L. REV 1857 (2000) (seventeen-page essay
elucidating some important lessons from NIE for IP but unlike the present effort not exploring in
depth each of the problems studied by NIE and not connecting integrating them into an
overarching theory of IP).
3
For a detailed discussion of these tools see infra Part II.
4
See, e.g., Symposium, The Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002)
(including Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property
Rights, at S331, Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the
Optimal Value of an Asset, at S339, Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, at
S359, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, at S373, Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the
Evolution of Property Rights, at S421, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, at S453, Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys
and Contracts, at S489, Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public
Roads, at S515, David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, at
S545, Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights
in the United States, at S589, Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American
Bison, at S609, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition
between Private and Collective Ownership, at S653).
5
See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG A. NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE
NEWMAN, AND F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6-42 (2nd ed. 2001) (reviewing
history of changes to patent law); WILLAIM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1-120
(1994) (reviewing history of changes to copyright law); ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 1-12 (6th ed. 2002) (same); CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 15-27
(6th ed. 2003) (same); BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL, ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
1-5 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing history of changes to trademark law); FRANK I SCHECTER, THE
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRADEMARK LAW (1925) (same).
6
To be sure, several important works explore the case for property rights in IP using
approaches other than NIE. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINVENTING PROPERTY (1993)
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Prior work by the present author has explored the comparative institutional
economics of using property rights protected by property rules7 for patents and
trademarks to facilitate the commercialization of inventions and embodiments of
goodwill, respectively.8 This commercialization approach is (mistakenly)
sometimes characterized as simply representing one of two sides within a larger
debate over intellectual property in which views generally line up at opposite ends
of the same axis, with one side arguing for more rights for IP owners under each
major regime – patent, trademark, and copyright – and the other arguing for
fewer.9
What is striking in view of this perception in the literature that the
commercialization theory is a “more property” perspective is that when properly
understood its NIE approach leads to the counterintuitive suggestion to consider
abolishing one of these intellectual property regimes – copyright, at least with
respect to the entertainment industry, which represents one of the most
(applying Hagel’s personhood theory as an approach); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (reviewing philosophical approaches); Jeremy
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property,
68 CHI. KENT L. REV. 841, 866 (1993) (same); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, What
Property Is, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 0405 (2004) (offering a “unified value” approach to property generally). In addition, as discussed
more fully in part III, some more recent scholars have made important contributions by starting to
focus on particular components of the NIE literature, such as information costs, interactions with a
firm, and marginal cost pricing, and some aspects of the distinction between ex ante and ex post.
But as also discussed more fully in Part III, none of these projects embraces the set of tools from
the field of NIE.
7
The label “property rule” is used here as it is used in the classic Calabresi-Melamed
framework under which an entitlement is said to enjoy the protection of a property rule if the law
condones its surrender only through voluntary exchange. The holder of such an entitlement is
allowed to enjoin infringement. An entitlement is said to have the lesser protection of a liability
rule if it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay some court-determined compensation. The
holder of such an entitlement is only entitled to damages caused by infringement. See Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). But see, Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus,
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE. L.J. 1335 (1986) (offering a “reinterpretation of
the Calabresi-Melamed framework” under which property rules and liability rules merely
represent two pieces of a broader “transaction structure” in that they are two different approaches
for setting forth “conditions of legitimate transfer”).
8
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (comparative institutional analysis of patent-enforcing rules)
[hereinafter “Kieff, Commercializing Inventions”]; F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering
Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L.REV. 55 (2003)
(comparative institutional analysis of patent-obtaining rules) [hereinafter, “Kieff, Registering
Patents”].
9
See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the
Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 163, n.10 (2002) (collecting sources on “the larger
debate about patent scope”).
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commercially significant bodies of copyrighted works.10 This suggestion is in
fact consistent with the underlying view because the view is not accurately seen
as being even directed to the “more” or “less” debate; and instead is focused on
means as much as ends. That is, the question explored here is not merely whether
any particular IP regime should give more or less protection; but rather how well
the regime operates to achieve its desired goals and what those goals are in the
first place. As explained more below, underlying this paper’s stark departure
from both the “more” and “less” bodies of the IP literature is the realization that
aspects of the institutional structure of the present copyright regime makes the
social costs of the present copyright regime too high, for at least the entertainment
industry, while at the same time preventing it from providing the coordination
benefits an IP regime normatively should provide. In contrast, the institutional
frameworks recently used for the patent and trademark regimes may allow them
to better provide these coordination benefits, and with lower social costs. The
paper thereby opens the door to the exploration of a new industrial organization
model for the entertainment industry under which the patent and trademark
regimes of yesterday may obsolete the copyright system of today.
This paper also stands in sharp contrast to prior efforts to re-evaluate the
case for IP from first principles. For example, the leading work by Stephen
Breyer, which despite having spawned much of the recent literature on the weak
property side of the debate, reaches a decidedly ambivalent position: “[H]e is
unable to conclude that copyright should be abolished, but he argues that its
extension is unnecessary and would be harmful.”11 Similarly, the most recent
work on copyright by Richard Epstein, which was presented at the same
conference as this paper, generally supports the present institutional framework of
copyright law and concludes that when balancing the costs of exclusion versus
governance “we could conclude that a sensible system of copyright is not such a
bad trade-off after all.”12 In contrast with those efforts, the comparative
10

To some extent, the use here of the term “property” is somewhat imprecise, which is
good in providing a short hand introduction to help frame the central theme of the paper, and bad
in failing, like all short hand expressions, to capture the full complexity of the situation. The
approach in this paper may be fairly characterized as an effort to show how using the taxonomy of
property provided by Henry Smith, patent and trademark function more like exclusion forms of
property while copyright functions more like a governance form, but all three might be seen as
property. See, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002). See also Adam Mossoff, What is Property?
Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZONA L. REV. 371 (2003) (reviewing theories of
property).
11
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
12
Richard Epstein, Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright, University of Chicago Law
School John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 204 (2d Series), at 40 (citing Richard
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institutional analysis of this paper reveals how while the patent and trademark
regimes basically work well in general, the copyright system on balance does not.
Particularly in light of new technologies, the marginal benefits of the copyright
regime may be too small to justify its use given the availability of patent and
trademark regimes, while at the same time the costs of the copyright regime may
be too great.
Perhaps more importantly, this paper elucidates why this seemingly
radical suggestion makes sense by elucidating the important lessons from the field
of NIE that can be used to best shape the institutional framework for any IP
regime. That is, the paper offers a comprehensive theory of IP using the set of
tools from NIE. Put simply here for introductory purposes,13 the paper elucidates
a goal IP can achieve effectively and efficiently. Through a survey of the NIE
literature, the paper shows that while IP regimes should not be expected to be
effective in achieving a reward function or in providing direct incentives for
specific inventive or creative efforts, they should be expected to be effective in
facilitating coordination among complementary users of the subject matter
protected by the regime. But to achieve this goal efficiently they must be
designed to mitigate various social costs including transaction costs, coordination
costs, and public choice costs. Taking these lessons, the paper then outlines the
general nature of the economic costs and benefits of the particular features that
distinguish the relative performance of the different institutional approaches
offered by the IP regimes of patent, trademark, and copyright.
In brief, concerning benefits, the commercialization costs associated with
major copyright-based industries today, such as publishing, film, and television,
are largely those associated with reputation and business networks (because of
technological change other commercialization costs for these industries are less).
Trademark law works well to allow some coordination and some pricing above
marginal cost of the type necessary to facilitate commercialization of goods and
services facing such reputation and network costs. Indeed, if the result in the
recent Dastar decision had not occurred or were statutorily reversed, even
copying by competitors could be prevented through actions for false advertising.14
And major advances in these industries, although likely rare, are eligible for
patent protection (a new projector, a new chord, etc).15 Thus, patents and
A. Epstein, Let “The Fundamental Things Apply:” Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (2002)).
13
For more on the lessons of NIE for IP see infra Part III.
14
See F. Scott Kieff, Contrived Conflicts: The Supreme Court vs. The Basics of Intellectual
Property Law, 30 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1717, 1722-26 (2004) (discussing Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23, 123 S.Ct. 2041 (2003) (holding Lanham Act does not
prevent unaccredited copying of uncopyrighted work)).
15
See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 728-828 (discussing statutory subject matter).
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trademarks may provide effectively the coordination benefits needed by these
industries.16
Concerning costs, the present copyright system is so complex and so
rapidly changing that it simply fails to facilitate the private ordering that IP
regimes can and should deliver. The copyright statute is essentially a set of large
collective bargaining agreements struck through a discourse focused on metering
out an amount of reward as a direct incentive for particular creative efforts that is
“just right,” and that as a result probably work for the groups who negotiated
them based on the needs of those groups at that time but they do not easily fit new
technologies and markets, let alone the needs of all those players who were not at
that table at the time of the negotiations. At bottom, the costs associated with the
system – such as for example transaction costs, coordination costs, and public
choice costs – are simply too large, and are an affront to private ordering.17
Put simply, the complexity of modern copyright may prevent the system
from achieving the coordination benefits IP rights can deliver, which patents and
trademarks generally do deliver. In addition, the same complexity of modern
copyright causes the costs of the system to be remarkably high. One conclusion is
that the case today for copyright itself may simply fail. Put differently, the insight
explored in this paper shows that the best way for copyright to become even more
obsolete in view of patent and trademark is for copyright to become even more
complex than it already is.
In either case, the paper opens the door to the study of a new industrial
organization model for the entertainment industry based on patent and trademark,
rather than copyright. Far from offering the final word on this model, the paper
elucidates why it might be rational for individuals in the entertainment industry to
consider using it individually (which some implicitly may have begun to do
already), and for policy makers to consider encouraging its use more broadly.
This paper proceeds in Part II to review the core analytical tools and
lessons of NIE. Part III applies these tools to study the normative law and
economic case for the positive law IP regimes, in general. Part IV outlines a
comparative analysis among the institutions of the patent, trademark, and
copyright regimes and begins to ask whether a sketch of a new industrial
organization model for the entertainment system could operate using patents and
trademarks instead of copyrights, while exploring some likely objections to the
model and suggesting areas of future research. Part V concludes.

16

This is so even though the subject matter that is protected by each regime is different.
For more on the social costs of copyright see infra Part IV.A. For more on what is meant
by the term “private ordering” as used here see infra note 163.
17
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II. A REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS EXPLORED THROUGH NIE
The field of NIE pays particular attention to the economic significance of
institutions, as distinct from other factors, such as technology, capital, or labor.18
As described in North’s Nobel Essay:
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.
They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.19

NIE emphasizes the use of comparative institutional analyses to look at the
different characteristics of institutions and what impact they have on individuals
and organizations over time.20 The comparative institutional analysis approach of
NIE teaches us to ask not only what we want, but also which mix of formal and
informal institutions will work better in achieving our set of goals.
The approach makes both conceptual and practical sense. Engaging in a
comparative institutional analysis makes conceptual sense because the perfect
institution, like the perfect anything, simply is not achievable. Every real
institution will have some problems. For this reason, institutional choices should
not be about a singular search for perfection but rather about which sets of
problems and benefits are best suited to tolerances and needs. Put differently, it is
better to compare the particular costs and benefits of actually available options
than merely to identify problems with any one option and seek to perfect it. This
18

For a good introduction to NIE, see JOHN DROBAK & JOHN NYE, FRONTIERS OF THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1997) (volume of papers honoring Douglass North and his
contribution to the field of NIE). See also THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND
INSTITUTIONS (1990) (survey of NIE, or as Eggertsson refers to it: “neo-institutional economics”);
Philip Keefer & Mary M. Shirley, Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development,
in CLAUDE MENARD, INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2000) (collecting sources).
19
Douglass
C.
North,
Prize
Lecture,
available
on-line
at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/ /north-lecture.html. As Coase points out, the field
of NIE differs from the older field known as “institutional economics” because NIE does more
than merely highlight the economic impact of institutions as compared with capital, labor, and
technology. NIE also develops a research agenda devoted to characterizing this impact. That is,
NIE does not just note that institutions matter, or that law matters, NIE endeavors to elucidate how
institutions matter. See Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72
(1998).
20
For detailed explorations of NIE, see EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER,
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (2003) (reviewing field and collecting sources) and MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARDS A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001) (applying game theory to comparative
institutional analysis and NIE).
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is a theory of the “second-best.”21 The search for perfection is what Demsetz
calls the “nirvana” fallacy;22 and as Voltaire noted, it is through such searches that
“the perfect is the enemy of the good.”23
To be sure, this is not to say that any particular institution, existing or
otherwise, should not be studied critically or that everything should be left alone.
Such complacency ignores the countervailing sage warning by John Dewey that
“the better is too often the enemy of the still better.”24
At bottom, a core lesson of NIE is that even when there is consensus about
what the goals of a particular institution should be, the particular choices that are
made about the details of the institutional framework will have different important
implications for a number of problems operating on a number of levels.25 On the
individual level, these problems include, inter alia, those of incentives, rent
dissipation, information costs, and behavioralism.26 On the interpersonal level,
these problems include, inter alia, those of transaction costs, agency costs, and
coordination and private ordering.27 On the institutional level, these problems
include, inter alia, enforceability of laws and norms, market failures, the
differences between dynamic and static efficiency or between ex ante and ex post
considerations, monopoly effects, government failures and public choice, as well
as public goods problems and the tragedies of the commons and anticommons.28

21

See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2000)
(applying second-best analysis in antitrust context); Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic
Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567
(1979) (same); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An
Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (1998) (overview of second best theory); Andrew P.
Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case
Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 170-76 (1998) (application to
administrative law); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (example of early path-breaking work using second-best
approach); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
699 (1977) (same).
22
Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1
(1969) (critiquing the so-called nirvana approach in favor of a comparative institution approach).
23
VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (“le mieux est l’ennemi de bien:” literally,
“the best is the enemy of the good,” or colloquially, “the perfect is the enemy of the good”).
24
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 315 (1992) (citing John J.
McDermott, ed, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY 652 (Chicago, 1973)) (“To the economists’
plea that ‘the perfect is the enemy of the good,’ we might oppose Dewey’s suggestion that ‘the
better is too often the enemy of the still better.’”).
25
For a somewhat more detailed discussion of each of these problems see infra Part II.
26
See infra Part II.A.
27
See infra Part II.B.
28
See infra Part II.C.

KIEFF

NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT

11

Because different institutional choices will have different implications –
positive and negative – for these different problems, NIE teaches why it makes
sense as a conceptual matter to pay attention to means as well as ends.29 What is
more, because institutions are essentially endogenous – we can change them if we
want30 – a comparative institutional analysis makes great sense as a practical
matter as well.31
To be sure, each of the problems considered in association with NIE is the
subject of its own debates and sub-fields within the law, economics, and political
science literatures; and therefore a full discussion of each is beyond the scope of
this article.32 Nevertheless, because each refers to phenomena that may be
understood by a general audience, it is discussed more fully below to provide at
least some introduction to its relevance to the debates over IP in particular. In
addition, while the below discussions of these problems are grouped for
presentation purposes by the level at which they are most evident, and with the
recognition that in some respect these groupings are inevitably imperfect, most of
these problems can be seen to operate on more than one level.

29

For a short and accessible overview of these various problems in the context of NIE see
Oliver E. Williamson, The Institutions of Governance, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 75 (1998) (collecting
sources)). See also Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 595 (2000) (same).
30
The term “we” is used here in its broadest sense to refer to people, in general. Often,
even groups of people are unable effectively to have particular government agencies or other
institutions fully incorporate their views. Indeed, this is one of the problems explored in NIE
under the topic of “public choice.” For more on public choice, see infra Part II.C.3.
31
To be sure, some institutions are harder to change than others. For example, re-writing
statutes may not change the behavior of courts, and may also not have the desired effect on norms.
In the end, the mix of institutions that may be best may depend in part on the institutions that are
presently at play. Put differently, path dependency may also be relevant to the comparative
institutional analysis. In addition, the field of NIE extends far into the realm of political science,
where the process of institutional change is well studied.
32
Indeed, debate continues over even the field of NIE itself, and in particular its relation to
other fields such as “Law and Economics,” and “neoclassical economics.” For a collection of
views on the debate over the proper characterization of the field of NIE in relation to the
disciplines of economics and law, including debates over the particular problems explored by NIE,
see, generally, Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics,
149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 73 (1993)[hereinafter Posner, NIE Meets L&E];
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Costs Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., (1993); Ronald H. Coase, Coase on Posner on Coase, 149
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 96 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Reply, 149 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 119 (1993). This paper is agnostic about these debates
and indeed takes as positive the contributions of the many important scholars whose work serves
as the basis on which the field, by any name, has been built, while endeavoring to highlight each
of the important themes that have emerged from these debates in the subsections that follow.
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A. Problems at the Individual Level
Several of the problems explored by NIE are most evident when
considering actions or decisions at the level of the individual.33 These include,
inter alia, the problems of incentives, rent seeking, information costs, and
behavioralism. Importantly, one of the essential insights that can be taken from
the field of NIE is that these problems are not unique to individuals acting in
markets, and indeed also extend to individuals acting in hierarchies, such as firms
or governments.34 That is, these are problems shared by all individuals, private
and public.
1. Incentives
A basic and consensus lesson of economics is that because individuals35
have complex agendas, or preferences, and only limited resources available to be
deployed to achieve the diverse items on these agendas, they must, and do, make
choices about which agenda items to pursue before others. The point here is not
that people are perfectly rational in making such choices; but only that they must,
and do, indeed make such choices, at least implicitly.36 To be sure, as explored
by Gary Becker in the path-breaking work extending economic analysis to new
areas of human behavior and relations for which he was awarded the 1992 Nobel
Prize in Economics,37 “no approach of comparable generality has yet been

33

The term “individual” is used here in its broad sense to refer to an entity that is acting as
an individual, thereby including not only a single person, but also a group of people when acting
as a group, such as a firm or government agency.
34
Leading scholars who have studied these effects in what many might view as the private
sector – studying interactions within and among firms and in other financial or business settings –
include Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. Leading scholars who have studied these effects in
what many might view as the public sector – studying interactions between voters and elected
officials, within and among government agencies, and in other political settings – include James
Buchanan, Randy Calvert, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. Many leading scholars made
path-breaking contributions to both sides, including Kenneth Arrow (information, regulation)
Milton Friedman (regulation, price), and George Stigler (economics of information and economics
of regulation). For an excellent bibliography on NIE see, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at
497-538.
35
For the broad definition of individual used herein see supra note 33.
36
See generally, Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000)
(reviewing limits of rational choice theory).
37
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1992, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1992/press.html.
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developed that offers serious competition to rational choice theory.”38 Yet, the
point here is not to take sides in the debate about whether rational choice theory
fully captures the behavioralism models or whether they are appropriately
considered somehow distinct.39 Instead, the point is simply to note that
consideration of incentives, agendas, and resources does make sense because
people themselves really do consider them, as Becker noted when borrowing an
aphorism from fellow Nobel Laureate George Bernard Shaw about the general
tendency individuals have to try to make the most out of their lives: “[e]conomy is
the art of making the most of life.”40
An important implication of incentive analysis is that a given individual’s
agenda is likely to be complex, and for example might include the goals of
accruing money, fame, relaxation, or other things. Such an individual will
regularly make decisions that effectively set priorities among these different
goals. As some items on the agenda appear to that individual to be less likely to
be achieved, the individual will tend to shift focus, or re-prioritize, towards other
items on the agenda. For example, if it appears harder to obtain some
hypothetical goal A than some other hypothetical goal B, then investment in
achieving A relative to B will decrease. The complex interaction among agendas,
resources, information, and decision-making helps explain why actual incentive
effects may be different than hypothesized. The true set of relevant parameters
may not have been accurately perceived, may have changed, or both.
Even when a particular incentive effect is accurately predicted, the exact
outcome it induces may be different than expected because of the many of the
other problems discussed below. In addition, one problem associated with
incentives getting too strong, which therefore may be thought of essentially as a
side effect, is the problem of rent seeking, or rent dissipation, as discussed below.
The essential lesson when considering incentives for purposes of this
discussion is that the mere identification of a potential incentive effect does not
indicate a great deal about its net impact in a real-world situation. Important
implications of this lesson will be discussed below in the context of agency
costs,41 coordination and private ordering,42 public and private institutions,43 and
IP theory.44
38

Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, in THE
ESSENCE OF BECKER, 633, 650 (Ramon Febero & Pedro Schwartz, eds. 1995).
39
For more on behavioralism limitations to rationality see infra Part II.A.4.
40
See Press Release supra note 37 (citing Becker quoting Shaw). See also, Gary S. Becker,
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 38, at 3
(Becker quoting Shaw).
41
See infra Part II.B.3.
42
See infra Part II.B.4.
43
See infra Part II.C.
44
See infra Part III.
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2. Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation
Rent is the benefit that is gained by engaging in a certain activity. Private
rents are those accruing to the individual. Public rents are those accruing to
society as a whole.
One problem associated with rents is that private and public rents may be
different. For example, what an inventor gets for herself often is less than what
her invention generates for society.45 The potential differences in both magnitude
and sign between public and private rents can lead to private incentives to engage
in a given rent-generating activity to be either too little or too big than would be
socially optimal. As another example, an inventor may develop something only
slightly better than available options in a way that turns out to cause waste
overall.46 Because this particular problem of rents also can be thought of as the
problem of externalities, it is discussed in more detail in the section on
externalities below.47
A related problem associated with rents is that they may provide
incentives for an individual to engage in efforts designed to gain private rents but
that may turn out ultimately to dissipate social rents. This is the problem of rent
dissipation. Rent dissipation itself can take at least two forms. One type of rent
dissipation involves over investment in the race to obtain the rent. Another type
of rent dissipation involves investment in alternative but socially undesirable
techniques to win that race.
The most common way to conceptualize the over investment type of rent
dissipation is in the context of a race towards a common prize. If the community
is characterized by a prize having a known value and an uncoordinated group of
individuals who are each seeking the prize, then each individual might rationally
elect to spend up to just less than the value of the prize to get it, which would
mean that as a group they are spending more in aggregate than the value of the
prize.48 In the context of innovation, the effect has been demonstrated by
45

See STEVEN SHAVELL AND TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6956, 1999)
(suggesting a system of government-sponsored cash rewards instead of or in addition to a system
of patents as a tool for improving the match between the private and public rents associated with
an invention).
46
A.K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977) (showing how it may be profitable for the one firm to
come to market to get the customers but yet total industry profits can decline by more than
consumer welfare increases).
47
For a discussion of externalities, see infra Part II.B.1.
48
If the value of the prize is X and the group of individuals is Y in number then each
individual might rationally elect to spend up to just less than X to obtain the prize, say some
amount equal to X minus a small discount, say or (X- ). Yet, if all individuals spend that
amount, then the community has spent the amount equal to [(X- ) x Y] to obtain something worth
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economic models of multiple firms seeking the same invention in a race to patent,
which show that investment overall may be too great.49 Nevertheless, this type of
rent dissipation may be less of a problem in reality than in theory for a number of
reasons, especially when it comes to the subject matter covered by IP, as
discussed in more detail in the discussion of the prospect and rent dissipation
theories of IP.50
The most common way to conceptualize the improper alternative
investment type of rent dissipation is also in the context of a race towards a
common prize, but this time where some types of racing are viewed by society as
good (or fair) and others are viewed as bad (or unfair). In the context of sports,
for example, the use of practice sessions is often viewed as good while the use of
performance-enhancing drugs is often viewed as bad. In the context of regulated
markets, the use of innovation is generally considered to be a good form of
competition (making better products or services) while the use of agency capture
is generally considered to be a bad form of competition (getting the government
to differentially regulate a competitor). Because this type of rent dissipation can
also be thought of as the problem of public choice, it is discussed in more detail in
the section on public choice below.51
A central lesson to be taken from the NIE literature on rent dissipation for
purposes of this discussion is that rent dissipation is a problem that must be
considered when shaping institutions like IP. Different institutional frameworks
can have different implications for rent dissipation. As discussed in more depth
below within the context of IP theory, concerns about rent dissipation can be
addressed by a properly shaped IP regime; but concerns about rent dissipation can
not totally drive the shaping of such a regime.52

only X. The rub is that the expression [(X- ) x Y] will be greater than X itself as long as X and Y
are positive numbers greater than one and is a positive number less than one. Put simply, the
amount spent in that community as a whole to obtain the prize is greater than the amount the
community as a whole got by obtaining the prize, which would be a waste of resources.
49
See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395 (1979)
(model showing overinvestment under appropriate conditions). P. Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980) (same).
50
For a discussion of these theories, see infra Part III.B.
51
For a discussion of public choice, see infra Part II.C.3.
52
See infra Part III (discussing limits of the so-called rent dissipation theories of IP but
pointing out how properly shaped IP regimes can nevertheless mitigate rent dissipation effects).
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3. Information Costs
There are a number of significant problems associated with information
and these are generally referred to collectively as information costs.53 In order for
individuals to even make the many decisions associated with acting through either
the market or political processes, they must be able to obtain and use information
appropriately. The importance of considering the difficulties in obtaining and
using information when studying decision-making was elucidated in the pathbreaking work by Herbert Simon, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in
economics in 1978.54
The problems of finding information in the first place – often called search
costs – were elucidated in the path-breaking work by George Stigler,55 which
formed part of the foundation for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in
economics in 1982.56 In the same work, Stigler elucidated various tools for
decreasing search costs, including, reputation and advertising.57 Stigler also
elucidated the problem of using information in his work on statistical inference.58
As nicely summarized by Oliver Williamson, four other distinct problems
associated with information were elucidated in the path breaking works by
Kenneth Arrow, some of which formed part of the foundation for which he shared
the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972:59
The ways in which information influences economic organization include (1) the
“fundamental paradox” of information: “its value for the purchaser is not known
53

For an excellent survey of information and uncertainty see Jack Hirshleifer & John G.
Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 1375,
1404 (1979) (collecting sources).
54
See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Q. J. ECON., at 241
(1955) (“the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational
behavior that is compatible with the access to information and computational capacities that are
actually possessed by … man.”). See also, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of
Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1978 (available on-line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1978/press.html).
55
See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961)
(elucidating the importance of information search costs and various methods for decreasing them
including, for example, reputation and advertising).
56
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences
in
Memory
of
Alfred
Nobel
for
1982
(available
on-line
at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1982/press.html.
57
See Stigler supra note 56.
58
See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 22, J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964) (using
statistical inference techniques to examine oligopoly).
59
See Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences
in
Memory
of
Alfred
Nobel
for
1972
(available
on-line
at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1972/press.html) (noting Arrow’s work on “decision
theory”).
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until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost;”
(Arrow [1971, 152]); (2) information asymmetry: “the critical impact of
information on the optimal allocation of risk bearing is not merely its presence
or absence but its inequality among economic agents” (Arrow [1969, 55]); (3)
appropriability: “It really calls for some explanation, why the firm that has
developed the knowledge cannot demand a greater share of the resulting profits”
(Arrow [1962, 355]; and (4) the distinction between hidden action and hidden
information problems (moral hazard and adverse selection, respectively) (Arrow
[1985, 38-48]).60

The problem of the information paradox reveals important reasons why it
can be difficult for parties to negotiate over information itself and so is discussed
more fully below in the section on public goods.61 The problem of information
asymmetry reveals important reasons why it can be difficult for parties to
negotiate over many types of goods and services. As elucidated in the path
breaking work on information asymmetry for which George Akerlof, Michael
Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics,62 the
information asymmetry problem includes the problem of adverse selection,63 yet
there are tools available for mitigating this problem including signaling64 and
screening.65 Each of these problems is also closely related to the problems

60

Williamson supra note 32, at 112 (citing KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RISK-BEARING, at 152 (1971); Kenneth Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues
Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in Joint Econ. Comm., 91st
Cong., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System 47-64, at 55
(Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter “Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity”]; Kenneth
Arrow, Comments on Case Studies, and Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources of
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY II: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS (Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Res. eds., 1962) 355, 609; Kenneth Arrow, The
Economics of Agency, in JOHN PRATT & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS (1985)
at 38-48).
61
See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 1050-51 (1997) (discussing difficulties in negotiating in connection with Arrow’s
information paradox); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 81-82 (1994) (same). For more on the Arrow
Information Paradox and the problem of public goods see infra Part II.C.4(a).
62
See, Press Release: The 2001 Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences
in
Memory
of
Alfred
Nobel,
available
on
line
at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/press.html.
63
See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (elucidating the classic example of the adverse selection
problem known as the “lemons problem”).
64
See, e.g., A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973) (showing
how education can serve as a form of signaling for productivity in the job market).
65
See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976)
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associated with transactions generally and so are also discussed more fully below
in the section on transaction costs.66
The problem of appropriability is closely related to the problem of
externalities because one way to view appropriability is as a form of positive
eternality. As a result, appropriability is discussed more fully below in the section
on externalities.67
The problem of information asymmetry also relates to the problems of
hidden action and hidden information and the distinction between them, which
arise whenever one is endeavoring to regulate the behaviors of another. As a
result, these are discussed more fully below in the section on the theory of the
principal/agent interaction and in the section on the theory of government.68
A central lesson to be taken from the NIE literature on information costs
for purposes of this discussion is that IP rights can operate directly to mitigate
some information problems – like the Arrow Information Paradox.69 Another
lesson is that IP rights can operate indirectly to mitigate many of the other
information problems. IP rights can achieve this effect through the transactions
required to negotiate over an IP right to exclude better than the alternatives of
government regulation through use of liability rules or direct government
provision through subsidy.
4. Behavioralism
The term “behavioralism” refers to all of the ways in which human beings
are not perfectly rational in decision making and instead are said to be only
boundedly rational in that they suffer cognitive biases, framing effects, employ
heuristics, etc.70 While some scholars, such as Posner, have suggested that
(elucidating how an uninformed party can give informed parties incentives to reveal pertinent
information about themselves, a method referred to as “screening”).
66
For a discussion of transaction costs see infra Part II.B.2.
67
For a discussion of externalities see infra Part II.B.1.
68
For a discussion of agency costs see infra Part II.B.3. For a discussion of government see
infra Part II.C.3.
69
See infra Part III (discussing IP theory).
70
For an excellent recent review of behavioralism literature see, e.g., Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203
(2003) (collecting sources). As noted by Troy Paredes, “Explaining and understanding these
deviations from perfect rationality make up the core of [the field known as] behavioral law and
economics.” Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 434-444 (2003) (collecting sources) (citing
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sustein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1995); Russell Korobkin, A MultiDisciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutional
Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 36; Jennifer Arlen,
Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765 (1998)).
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decision-making under conditions of behavioralism can be thought of as same
thing as perfectly rational decision making in a world of positive information
costs,71 other scholars, such as Williamson, suggest behavioralism really refers to
something more complex.72 As explained by Williamson, the problems of
behavioralism include the problems of situations that simply are impossible to
think through,73 the problems of misconception, like short-sightedness and
incorrectly assessing probabilities, the problems of being rushed to make
decisions,74 and the limitations of language.75 At bottom, according to
Williamson, an especially productive way to conceptualize the problems of
behavioralism is taught by Simon as the “idea of the mind as a scarce resource.”76
Regardless of precise etiology, the problems of behavioralism have a
number of manifestations. Decision-making processes reveal strategies that,
using the terminology of Simon, seek to “satisfice” rather than “optimize;” or in
the more modern parlance, employ “heuristics,” as explored more recently in the
work by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Paul Slovic,77 which formed part
of the basis for which Kahneman shared the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.78
Other manifestations include risk and loss aversions,79 and various cognitive
biases such as primacy and recency,80 framing,81 anchoring,82 and overoptimism,
Cf, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551 (1998) (commenting on the behavioralism literature in general and in particular Jolls et al.
supra); Becker supra note 38.
71
Posner, NIE Meets L&E, supra note 32, at 80. This view of behavioralism is consistent
with the types of information costs described earlier as the costs of obtaining and processing
information. See supra notes 54-58, and accompanying text.
72
Williamson supra note 32, at 109-110.
73
Id. (citing Herbert Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND
ORGANIZATION, 161 (C.B. McGuire & R. Radner, eds., 1972)).
74
Id. (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36
J. LAW & ECON. 453 (1993) (problems of being rushed to make decisions)).
75
Id. (citing MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (1962)).
76
Id. (citing Herbert Simon, Rationality as Process and Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON.
REV., 1, 12 (1978)).
77
Paredes supra note 70, at 435-36 (citing Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99, 262-64 (1955); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE
DECISION MAKER 1-2 (1993); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982)).
78
See, Press Release: The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel 2002, available on line at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/press.html.
79
For the basic exploration of methods for measuring risk aversion see KENNETH J. ARROW
ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1965); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and
in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA, 122 (1964).
80
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1169-70 (2003) (“psychologists have found that when individuals are asked to
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overconfidence, and egocentricism.83 One central lesson on behavioralism from
NIE is that because it impacts individuals regardless of whether they are in the
private sector or the public sector, and whether they are acting as individuals or in
groups, the mere identification of behavioralism as a problem does not alone
indicate whether decision-making should be left to individuals or not.
A final dimension of the behavioralism problem that certainly strikes at
the individual level but essentially is driven by interactions among individuals is
the problem known as “groupthink.”84 There are several components to the
groupthink problem. One involves the heuristic individuals use to avoid having to
re-think problems that they think already have been thought through sufficiently
by trusted others, thereby creating what Cass Sunstein describes as an
“information cascade.”85 Presumably, the opposite effect is also seen, whereby
the heurist is one of mistrust, not trust, and so the information content takes on the

memorize a long sequence of words, they are more likely to remember the first few words (the
“primacy” effect) and the last few words (the “recency” effect) much better than the words in the
middle of the list”) (citing EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER & STANLEY E. NYBERG, HUMAN MEMORY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND THEORY 60-71 (1982) (reviewing research on primacy and
recency effects in memory)).
81
For empirical evidence of framing effects see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1983) (framing effects observed in decisions
involving lotteries and other risky monetary payoffs); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing Effect of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (same).
82
Rachlinski supra note 80 at 1171 (“When making numeric estimates, individuals will
tend to rely heavily on reference points and then adjust from these reference points”) (citing
Tversky & Kahneman supra note 81 1128-30 (explaining anchoring and the related process of
adjustment)).
83
Rachlinski supra note 80 at 1172 (defining “overoptimism, which consists of
overestimating one’s capabilities; overconfidence, which consists of overestimating one’s ability
to predict outcomes; and egocentricism, which consists of overstating the role that one has played
in events in which one has participated”). See also Paredes supra note 70, at 481 (“Some of the
most well-known sources of these deviations from rationality include loss aversion, framing, the
representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, overoptimism, and overconfidence.”)
84
See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Is CEO Overconfidence the
Product of Corporate Governance?, at 60, n. 227 (2004) (discussing groupthink in the context of
corporate governance and as a contributing factor to CEO overconfidence) (working paper, copy
on file with author) (citing IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982) and Marleen O’Connor,
The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003)).
85
See id., at 12 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683-691, 720-23 (1999) (describing the problem as one of
“informational cascades” through which a view cascades through a pool of individuals as each
individual adopts the view of those believed to be better informed); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
CONFORMITY AND DISSENT, U. CHICAGO LAW & ECONOMICS, OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 164
(available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=314880)).
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opposite sign.86 Put differently, a related component, also explored by Sunstein,
is that individuals may appear to change or even actually change their views and
behaviors in response to perceived peer pressure.87 As Troy Paredes points out,
going along may be a particularly attractive strategy, if little else.88 What is more,
once group think has set in, there may be a lock-in effect, as pointed out by
Arrow:
[Social and political] agreements are typically harder to change than individual
decisions. When you have committed not only yourself but many others to an
enterprise, the difficulty of changing becomes considerable…89

At bottom, groupthink can have important implications for the way norms
operate, as discussed below.90
Finally, an additional component of the groupthink effect is tied to the
phenomena of fashion. Sometimes a particular behavior, view, slogan, manner, or
appearance is desired in its own right, as an affirmative expression of a discrete
fashion preference – a fashion statement.91 And, as evidenced by the cyclical
nature of changes over time in width of neck ties or length of skirts, fashion is
fickle and so the fashion effect may be either to conform to the groupthink or to
deviate from it. That is, an individual might either adopt or eschew groupthink as
an affirmative fashion statement. Put differently, sometimes the culture is in
fashion and sometimes the counter-culture is in fashion. Implications of fashion
can be particularly important for the IP regime of trademark law,92 as well as for
the way consumption patterns evolve in the entertainment industry.93

86

To be sure, this opposite component of the effect can be seen to be encompassed by the
elucidation from Timur and Sunstien, but its express statement here is made simply to make its
existence clear.
87
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 85 at 723-725.
88
See Paredes supra note 84, at 13.
89
KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION, (1974) at 128.
90
See infra Part II.C.1.
91
The desirability of a slogan as a fashion statement in and of itself is tied to a controversial
issue in trademark law relating to marks that are desired in and of themselves, unconnected to a
good or service. For more on this see infra Part IV.A.
92
See infra Part IV.A (discussing trademark law).
93
See infra Part IV.B (discussing role of norms in payment systems in the entertainment
industry).
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B. Problems at the Inter-Individual Level
When individuals interact with each other, another set of problems
explored by NIE become most evident.94 These include, inter alia, the problems
of externalities, transaction costs, agency costs, and coordination. As with the
problems on the individual level discussed above, these problems at the interindividual level also are common across all settings: public and private, and when
individuals are both atomistic, such as strangers interacting across an open
market, and within hierarchies, such as firms or governments.95
1. Externalities
The term “externality” generally is used to refer to some cost or benefit
that is external to a given economic decision-making system in that it is not
factored into the decisions made by that system. Some definitions in the literature
seem to define the term in relation to individuals, in that an externality is seen as
something external to the decision-making of an individual.96 Other definitions in
the literature see the term as referring to something external to the decisionmaking process of the entire market.97 Both uses can be somewhat misleading,
especially in law and policy discussions, because if the decision-making process
is working perfectly, then nothing will be completely external to the individual or
the market.98 This, of course, is one of the insights of the path-breaking work by
Ronald Coase that contributed to his being awarded the Nobel Prize in economics
in 1992, and that was labeled by Stigler as the “Coase theorem.”99

94

See supra note 33 (pointing out that the term “individual” is used here to refer to both a
single person, and a group of people when acting as a group, such as a firm or government
agency).
95
See supra note 34 (pointing out that these effects are present in diverse settings).
96
See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 423 (3rd ed. 1992) (“When the
actions of one agent directly effect the environment of another agent, we say that there is an
externality”) (emphasis in original).
97
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 297, 617 (1989)
(“Such costs or benefits are called externalities because they are ‘external’ to the market.” “In this
chapter we study externalities – the effects of production and consumption activities not directly
reflected in the market”) (emphasis in original).
98
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 71 (6th ed. 2003) (“Even if
‘externality’ is defined as external to the market process or decision rather than to the [individual],
it is still a potentially misleading usage since if transaction costs are low the market may operate
efficiently despite the apparent presence of externalities.”)
99
See supra note 1 (discussing Nobel Prize to Coase). See also, RONALD COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157 (1988). (“I did not originate the phrase, the ‘Coase
Theorem,’ nor its precise formulation, both of which we owe to Stigler.”); GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE THEORY OF PRICE, 113 (3d ed. 1966) (coining the term “[t]he Coase theorem” writing that it

KIEFF

NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT

23

But the real power of the Coase Theorem is not that the problem of
externalities is illusory because decision-making in the real world is perfect.100
Real decision-making, like everything else in the real world, is not perfect.
Instead, the Coase Theorem teaches that the problem of externalities is entirely
reciprocal and that the tough questions facing any real decision-making process
are essentially how to best determine what the “correct” decision is, and how best
to implement it.
A brief review of the historical context of the Coase Theorem elucidates
the point. In the early 1900’s the economist Arthur Pigou wrote about factory
chimney soot as a problem of externalities imposed on others in the environment
around the factory and argued that the proper use of taxes or subsidies could be
used by the government to encourage such individuals to properly account for the
benefits and harms they project on those around them.101 According to Pigou,
“resources devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys” provide an
“uncompensated service,” or what some would call a positive externality, while
smoke “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community,” or provides what
some would call a negative externality.102
Coase was responding to Pigou by showing that government taxes or
subsidies were not needed to ensure the perfect amount of externalities because
under appropriate conditions, such as zero transaction costs, etc., a well defined
allocation of entitlements among those impacted – in the case of the soot, either a
right to emit it or a right to be free from it – would ensure that they traded with
each other to achieve the same perfect result sought by Pigou.103
Coase continued by pointing out that of course the world is not perfect and
therefore not all potential exchanges will occur, due to the presence of transaction
costs and other imperfections.104 As a result, he urged that there be consideration
of overall net costs and benefits to the alternative initial allocations, including the
costs of any subsequent transactions that might be needed, with an eye towards
ensuring that that the entitlement to the resource be allocated in such a way that

“asserts that under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal” and citing Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
100
See generally COASE supra note 99, at 157-186 (1988) (responding to a number of
common misperceptions regarding the Coase Theorem).
101
See generally, ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 166-68 (1920). See
also, ARTHUR C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912).
102
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, supra note 101, at 160-61.
103
See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 105-6.
104
Id. at 115 (and noting that because of transaction costs “the initial delimitation of legal
rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates”).
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the resource itself would most likely end up at its highest and best use.105 The
essential policy implication on this point is therefore to compare carefully real
costs and benefits of available institutional arrangements – such as different
entitlement allocations, enforcement rules, or taxes and subsidies.106
For example, Coase’s work laid an important part of the foundation for the
later work by Harold Demsetz on the emergence of property rights as a tool for
internalizing positive externalities.107 Demsetz argued that property rights emerge
when the benefits of internalization outweigh its costs – when the good of
concentrating benefits and costs on owners so they deploy resources more
efficiently outweighs the bad of the transaction costs associated with recognizing
those rights.108 As Demsetz pointed out
Because of the lack of control over hunting by others, it is in no person’s interest
to invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of the game. Overly intensive
hunting takes place. Thus a successful hunt is viewed as imposing external costs
on subsequent hunters – costs that are not taken into account fully in the
determination of the extent of hunting and of animal husbandry.109
***
The resulting private ownership of land will internalize many of the external
costs associated with communal ownership, for now, an owner, by virtue of his
power to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards associated
with husbanding the game and increasing fertility of his land. 110

Put differently, with the lack of property rights, “the underuse of animal
husbanding and land management resources (skills and labor) led to near
105

Id. at 132 (arguing that we should ask “whether the gain from preventing the harm is
greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which
produced the harm”).
106
Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-Colored Glasses: A Property Rights View of Natural
Resource Economics, Distinguished Fellow Address presented to Australian Agricultural and
Resource Economics Society, 13 February 2004, at 8 (copy of manuscript on file with author)
(“Following Coase’s lead, we need to carefully examine the institutions”). As a qualitative
example, consider that the costs of using a government tax or subsidy approach include public
choice costs, and administration costs, while the costs of using an entitlement delimitation
approach include transaction costs and enforcement costs.
107
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356
(1967) (explaining the emergence of property rights in land among Labradorian Indians as a
response to over hunting: “an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, can generally count
on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding the game and increasing fertility of his land”).
For more on the emergence of property right see infra notes 173-178, and accompanying text.
108
Id. at 353 (noting that property rights did not emerge among those living on the southwest
plains because the benefits would have been less since there were no animals of commercial
importance comparable to the furry animals of the north whose pelts were tradable and because
the costs would have been more since the animals that were there tended to wander more).
109
Id. at 351.
110
Id. at 356.
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exhaustion of animal resources (food and clothing) . . . [while the presence of
property rights] provided incentives for individuals to make more use of the one
set of resources so as to not waste, and indeed to replenish, the other.”111 Thus,
one lesson on externalities is that the use of appropriate property rights can be an
effective tool for avoiding what otherwise might be externality problems.
Importantly, as discussed in more depth below, property rights can also do much
more than internalize externalities.112
A second lesson on externalities is that the words “positive” and negative”
are both reciprocal.113 That is, in the case of the negative externality of soot, for
example, the factory’s neighbor would see a potential interference with the right
to use the air as a reservoir free from emissions while the factory side would see a
potential interference with the right to use the air as a reservoir in which to place
the emissions. In this sense, there is no such thing as “an externality,” in the
singular, because externalities only come in pairs. What this means for the
externality analysis is that it must be studied from both angles, with the
understanding that otherwise the attractiveness of different institutional responses
may likely turn on the angle from which the problem is viewed.
A third lesson on externalities is that in the real world many externalities
turn out to be irrelevant to efficient allocation of resources.114 For example, in the
case of positive externalities, such as the pleasure a visually aesthetic garden
brings to many of those passersby who happen to see it regardless of whether they
contributed to its upkeep, the keeper of the garden has clearly managed to fund its
creation and maintenance without reaping specific contributions from those
passers by.115 Put differently, the positive externalities the passersby enjoy have

111

Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 718, n.95.
See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing property rights generally, including their role in
facilitating coordination).
113
See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 122 (“If we are to discuss the
problem in terms of causation, both parties cause the damage.”). See also, Anderson, Donning
Coase-Colored Glasses, supra note 106, at 3 (“Coase emphasized that because one use precludes
the other, the costs are reciprocal.”); A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 53, 60 (1996) (describing one of the core ideas presented by Coase to be that “the
problem of social cost [or externalities] is, at least to an economist, a reciprocal problem.”).
114
See, DAVID D. HADDOCK, IRRELEVANT INTERNALITIES, IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES,
AND IRRELEVANT ANXIETIES, Northwestern University School of Law, Law & Economics
Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 03-16 (2003) (available on-line at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=437221) (providing examples and models and citing James M.
Buchanan, & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
115
For other examples of such irrelevant positive externalities see Bernstein & Nadiri,
Interindustry R&D Spillovers, Rates of Return, and Production in High-Tech Industries, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 429 (1988) (finding that, in recent years, social rates of return significantly exceeded
private rates of return in five high-tech industries).
112
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not prevented the good from being produced.116 To be sure, the possibility of
capturing some benefit from these users of the garden may be a factor a garden
planner might consider when making decisions about how to fund the garden
creation and maintenance processes; but those gains would have to be weighed
against the costs of such metering techniques. As a result, many such
externalities are found in the real world effectively to be irrelevant to decisionmaking because a sufficiently small number of individuals having sufficiently
great interest in the externalities are able to engage in sufficient private ordering
for the appropriate amount of the desired activity to take place.117 Put simply, the
point is that in many cases things that generate positive externalities would be
made anyway, whether that positive externality is fully internalized to the
producer or not.
2. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are particularly important to the field of NIE because
“transaction-costs economics is the original centerpiece of what Williamson …
called the New Institutional Economics.”118 There has since been substantial
empirical support for the validity of the transaction costs implications of NIE, as
elucidated by Paul Joskow and others.119
The term “transaction cost” generally refers to all the costs associated with
contracting among individuals, including the hassle those parties experience in
finding and dealing with each other, the costs of lawyers and other professionals
to arrange the deals, and the bargaining process itself. Transaction costs also can
be thought of as including information costs.120 The term encompasses the costs

116

In economic terminology, these uses are said to be “inframarginal,” as opposed to
“marginal,” Haddock, supra note 114, at 24 (“Transaction cost for collective goods—even those
demonstrably enjoyed by millions—are chronically overestimated in policy discussions. Only one
or a few strong demands often determine both actual and ideal provision, and even two million
demands are irrelevant if inframarginal.”).
117
Id., at 1-2 (citing Buchanan & Stubblebine supra note 114).
118
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 176 citing Williamson supra note 1, at 1.
119
See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of
Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 33 (1983); Paul L. Joskow, Asset
Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG.,
95 (1988). See also Howard A. Shelanski and Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 335 (1995) (survey of
empirical evidence on transaction-costs economics assessing roughly 100 references on empirical
research in transaction-cost economics published before 1993).
120
See, Armen A. Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment, 7 W.
ECON. J. 109 (1969). See also, Stigler, supra note 55 (noting that acquiring and processing
information about potential exchange opportunities are costly).
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of successful transactions – such as time and money – as well as the costs of
failed transactions – such as lost opportunities.
Transaction costs became a focus of study in the NIE literature when they
essentially were discovered by Coase in his path-breaking work on the theory of
the firm, in which he pointed out that when making the decision about whether to
make or buy it must be considered that moving activities into a firm can save on
the transaction costs associated with conducting those activities in the open
market.121 As summarized by Coase in later work:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal with and to
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on.122

Put differently, these can be viewed as a set of six types of transaction costs:
search, inspection, contracting, execution, control, and enforcement.123 In
addition, because each of these activities hinges on interactions among
individuals, the term transaction costs is taken to encompass the problems on the
individual level discussed earlier, including information costs and
behavioralism.124
The path-breaking work by Williamson adds to this set the transaction
costs of asset specificity and opportunism, both of which become most relevant
after individuals have begun to interact with each other. Williamson explains that
asset specificity refers to the problem that arises when an asset cannot be redeployed from its present use to some alternative use without a decline in
value.125 He defines ex post opportunism to be “[s]elf-interest seeking with guile,
[including] calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise
confuse.”126
121

Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For a review of
modern transaction costs literature see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE (1996).
122
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 15.
123
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 291.
124
See supra Parts II.A.3-II.A.4.
125
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 52-56 (1985)
(reviewing history of scholarship on asset specificity, collecting sources, and pointing out that
“[a]t least four types of asset specificity are usually distinguished: site specificity, physical asset
specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets… [and that t]he importance of asset
specificity to transaction costs economics is difficult to exaggerate.”).
126
WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 121, at 378. See also
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 47-52, 64-67
(exploring in detail various types of opportunism within the context transaction cost economics
and collecting sources).
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Importantly, there is both a good and bad side to transaction costs. While
on the bad side, they are costs, on the good side, they are the costs that are
associated with the very specialization and division of labor that generally are
thought to be good things.127 That is, the availability of transactions to obtain
from others the goods and services beyond those an individual is most interested
in or most adept at providing itself facilitates each individual’s ability both to
have and to hone those specialized skills and tastes, as well as to bear
individualized distributions. The link between specialization and transactions
allows even large numbers of individuals to achieve complex tasks by
coordinating with each other directly or indirectly.128
In addition, given such individualism in the form of diverse skills and
preferences, transactions, and their concomitant costs, have other important
beneficial side effects that often are overlooked. First, transaction costs are
associated with the privately beneficial exchanges among individuals that are
essential for achieving private gains from trade.129 Second, transaction costs are
associated with the publicly beneficial socialization that occurs as individuals
come to interact with each other.130 The socialization effect occurs because for
127

John J. Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American
Economy, 1870 –1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 95 (Stanley L
Engerman & Robert E. Gallmann, eds.) (Studies in Income and Wealth, No. 51, 1986). The
connection between division of labor and transaction costs, including the inevitable limit that
transaction costs places on the extent of the division of labor, was articulated earlier by Adam
Smith. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q. J. ECON. 33, 35 (1968) (empirical
evidence of transaction costs in the market of the New York Stock Exchange and quoting Adam
Smith: “As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor, so the extent
of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the
extent of the market.”).
128
For more on coordination see infra Part II.B.4.
129
See, ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 184
(1991) (pointing out that societies tend to develop institutions – such as norms in the case he is
studying – that “minimize the members’ objective sum of (1) transaction costs and (2) deadweight
losses arising from failures to exploit potential gains from trade.”). See also, Coase The Problem
of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 10. (noting that the principal condition that must be satisfied for
individuals to maximize wealth by engaging in an exchange is that the transaction costs of the
exchange must not exceed the gains from trade.); Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free
Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 113
(1998) (“[H]umans interact to capture potential gains from trade – the knowledge for this
interaction is bounded by transaction costs. The gains from trade (a positive-sum game) result
because people place different values on goods and services and because people have different
abilities to produce those goods and services. Because of these differences, trade has the potential
to make the parties exchanging goods and services – of lower value to each respectively – better
off.”)
130
See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Value Judgments in Economics, in THE ESSENCE OF
FRIEDMAN 3, 3-8 (Kurt R. Leube, ed., 1987) (discussing the “role of the market as a device for the
voluntary cooperation of many individuals in the establishing of common values” and concluding
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transactions to achieve gains from trade it must be the case that individuals having
diverse resources and preferences learn enough about each other’s resources and
preferences to exploit them, and this process of learning about each others’ values
is part of socialization. Third, the bargaining process – for both consummated
transactions and for failed ones – inherently elicits important information about
not only the particular transaction being negotiated, including intensity of
preferences and budget constraints, but also relative values compared to other
available transactions. That is, transaction costs can mitigate information costs.
Because these beneficial effects of transactions are often totally absent from
discussions of the transactions that must occur around an IP right’s right to
exclude, an important lesson of NIE is that these effects must be considered when
evaluating IP.
The net impact of those employed to facilitate transactions, such as
lawyers and other professionals, is similarly ambiguous. Often they are portrayed
as a large component of the negative side of transaction costs.131 Yet, because
they help the transactions occur,132 they also can be seen as part of the positive
side of transactions costs to the extent that the transactions themselves are a good
thing.
Another important lesson of transaction costs economics is that, all-in, the
likelihood and extent of the pernicious impact of many types of transaction costs
that “[i]n many ways, this is the basic role of the free market in both goods and ideas – to enable
mankind to cooperate in this process of searching for and developing values.”).
131
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 62-63 (1982) (“Let me start with two important elements of
transaction costs in the acquisition setting: information costs necessary to identify the opportunity;
and mechanical costs – for example, lawyers’, accountants’, and investment bankers’ fees –
necessary to effect the transaction and cope with regulatory or other barriers (including defensive
tactics by the target).”).
132
See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1110-12
(exploring Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer and citing
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (describing lawyers as “transaction cost engineers”); Bernard Black &
Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1923
(1996) (pointing out that in addition to lawyers “savvy investors and issuers” also help facilitate
transactions); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 58 (2000) (also
using term “transaction cost engineers” for lawyers)). See also, Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley
Lawyer as Transaction Costs Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 241 (1995) (further exploring
Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer and, in addition to
Gilson, also citing Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon
Valley: A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 562 (1989) (“[t]he Silicon Valley lawyer not only
works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer -- a legal engineer ... his job is to
solve problems, to take a principle, a task and engineer it legally”)).
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is generally worse in what are known as thinner markets as compared with thicker
markets, where thinner and thicker refer to the amount and diversity of resources
and participants, including their diverse evaluative techniques and preferences.133
The intuition behind this lesson is essentially that thickness increases the chance
some individual in the market will find it profitable to arbitrage what otherwise
would be a gap in information flow by finding and acting on that information, to
offer an attractive option for what otherwise might be a hold-up problem, etc.
To be sure, there is reason to think that some types of transaction costs
may be worse in markets that are thicker, in at least some sense. For example, the
behavioralism logic behind the problem of groupthink suggests that as the group
gets bigger the problem gets worse.134 Of course, to the extent that thicker is
taken to mean not only bigger but more diverse, then the problem of group think
may also decrease with market thickness.
A somewhat related lesson of transaction costs economics is that, all-in,
the likelihood and extent of the pernicious impact of most transaction costs is
generally worse in political markets than in economic markets.135 As pointed out
by North when contrasting the two:
economic markets throughout history, and in the present world, are frequently
very imperfect, beset by high transaction costs, and defined by institutions that
produce incentives to work against economic efficiency.
Political markets are far more prone to inefficiency. 136

Although in part due to transaction costs, the many problems raised by political
markets are explored in greater depth below in the discussion of public choice.137
3. Agency Costs
The term “agency cost” generally refers to all the costs associated with the
inevitable divergences in the interests among two individuals in situations in
133

The so-called efficient market hypothesis (also known as “EMH”) is based on the view
that in a perfectly thick market, assets will be perfectly priced. The basic theoretical foundation
for the EMH was laid by Paul Samuelson and Benoit Mandelbrot. See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof
That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41, 48 (1965);
Benoit Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and Martingale Models, 39 J.
BUS. 242, 248 (1966). Empirical support was added by Eugene Fama. See Eugene Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 392 (1970).
134
For more on groupthink see supra note 84, and accompanying text.
135
For an in-depth treatment of the topic see Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory
of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355 (1991).
136
Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON., 11, 18 (1993).
137
For more on the problems of government and public choice see infra Part II.C.3.
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which one individual (known as an agent) acts on behalf of the other (known as a
principal). As summarized by Michael Jensen and William Meckling:
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the
aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the
agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take
certain actions which would hard the principal or insure that the principal will be
compensated if he does take such actions . . . . In most agency relationships the
principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary). And in all there will be some divergence
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the
welfare of the principal. 138

Thus, agency costs can be seen to include the costs of the agent’s looting,
shirking, other inadvertent deviations from instructions, and bonding, and the
costs of the principal’s unmet reasonable expectations, monitoring, and enforcing.
In part, agency costs can be seen as particularized versions of the many
problems discussed earlier. For example, the divergence in interests between
agent and principal implicate the problems of incentives – a core component of
agency costs is triggered by the drive to get the agent’s incentives aligned with
those of the principal.139 Similarly, many of the information costs explored
earlier, including moral hazard and adverse selection, have formed a big part of
the agency costs literature.140 For example, as elucidated in the path breaking
work by James Mirrlees, which formed part of the basis for which he shared the
1996 Nobel Prize in Economics,141 the moral hazard problem can be mitigated by
a properly designed incentive scheme.142 And of course the interactions needed
for an agency relationship are merely one category of the transactions explored in
the earlier discussion of transaction costs.143
Two particular aspects of the agency problem have special prominence in
IP. The first concerns hierarchy in general. The second concerns innovation in
particular.
138

Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON., 305, 308 (1976) (emphasis in original).
139
See supra Part II.A.1(discussing incentives).
140
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing agency costs). See also FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra
note 20, at 186-232 (exploring models of moral hazard and adverse selection in the context of
agency costs).
141
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1996/press.html.
142
See, e.g., John A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an
Organization, 7 BELL J. ECON. 105 (1976).
143
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing transaction costs).
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Hierarchy is itself one of the core areas of study within the field of NIE.
More particularly, the contrast between interactions among individuals through a
market on the one hand and interactions among individuals within a hierarchy
such as a firm or government on the other hand lies at the core of the early NIE
literature by Coase on the theory of the firm.144 On the one hand, moving
interactions within a hierarchy can avoid or mitigate many of those transaction
costs associated with exchanges in the context of an open market.145 On the other
hand, integration within a hierarchy has limits because of the decreasing returns to
management due to several factors, including agency costs, such as those
involving the agency relationship between owners and managers and those
involving the agency relationship between managers and labor.146
As demonstrated through models of both the private and academic sectors,
agency problems can be particularly acute when the agent is tasked to innovate
because the process of innovation is itself particularly fraught with uncertainty
and because information about an innovator’s efforts is likely to be especially
asymmetrical as between a technologically trained innovator and a nontechnologically trained manager.147 To be sure, relational contracting like that
among individuals within a hierarchy is just one typical form of incomplete
contracting for which there are well studied strategies to mitigate agency costs.148
Yet, the general uncertainty of allocating credit for innovation within a hierarchy
combined with the problem of potential expropriation by control groups of the
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See generally, Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 121 (elucidating tension in
theory of the firm between transaction costs avoidance and decreasing returns to management).
See also Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998)(“It is
commonly said, and it may be true, that the new institutional economics started with my article
‘The Nature of the firm’ (1937).”).
145
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing transaction costs).
146
See, generally, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 336-342 (discussing the limits
of integration elucidated by WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 125, at 138-142).
147
See, Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305
(1989) (modeling agency costs in innovation and identifying attributes that make it comparatively
more difficult as a production activity in which to solve ordinary principal/agent problems
compared to ordinary production processes because of greater ex ante uncertainty, and asymmetric
information about the innovator’s efforts). See also, Wallace Huffman & Richard E. Just, Setting
Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory, 82 AM. J. AG. ECON.
828 (2000) (applying principal agent theory to model different funding approaches for basic
scientific research in the field of agriculture).
148
Williamson notes the general importance of repeat play, reputation effects, and other
private enforcement techniques he collectively calls “private ordering” as tools for mitigating
problems such as agency costs and asset specificity. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 163-68).
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reward associated with innovation operate synergistically to particularly impair
incentives for innovation within a hierarchy.149
4. Coordination and Private Ordering
Another implication of specialization and division of labor150 is that often
many diverse actors must interact with each other for a particular activity to be
achieved effectively.151 In the context of IP, for example, the process of bringing
a new invention to market after that invention has been made – a process called
commercialization – often requires the coordination of inventors, financiers,
labor, management, advertisers, and marketers.152 For such coordination to take
place, each of these individuals must both identify and interact with each other, at
least indirectly.153
On the other side of the coin, the ability to achieve coordination among
large numbers of individuals further supports the ability for each individual to
have particular skills and tastes beyond what is achieved with the mere
availability of pair-wise transactions.154 That is, without the ability to coordinate,
in the case of an invention for example, the inventor hoping to achieve
commercialization would need to simultaneously serve as financier, production
labor, management, advertiser, and marketer.155
149

FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 336-37 (highlighting Williamson’s discussion
of the problems of “causal ambiguity” and “general office instruction” (expropriation) leading to
impaired incentives to innovate and citing WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 141-42)).
150
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing transaction cost implications of
specialization and division of labor).
151
For more on the general link among specialization, division of labor, and coordination,
see generally, Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs,
and Knowledge, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 38, at 609.
152
See generally, Kieff supra note 8 at 707-712 (discussing role of patents in
commercialization of inventions).
153
Id. To be sure, the interactions may be transitive, in that each individual might not
directly interact with each other in a pair-wise fashion, but each does interact on the same broadly
defined endeavor. That is, assuming individuals A through E are needed for commercialization to
take place, individual A may not directly interact with each of the other individuals B through E,
and individual B may not directly interact with individuals A and C through E, and so forth, but
each of the individuals will be interacting with the same invention commercialization process and
with a least a subset of the group comprising A through E, which means that in effect each
individual is interacting with each other at least by transitivity.
154
See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text (discussing role of transactions between
individuals in supporting individualized skills and tastes).
155
The recognition of this problem was indeed one of the motivating factors behind the
present U.S patent system, which focuses on the importance of coordination to achieve invention
commercialization. See, Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the AntiMonopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 177 (Mar., 1942) (discussing incentive aspects of
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For IP, coordination can be particularly important because the subject
matter protected by IP ideally is not yet the subject of successful
commercialization, or perhaps not even known yet.156 As Frank Knight
recognized, such uncertain and risky endeavors have a particularly strong need for
coordination:
When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it
takes ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the
productive groups is no longer a matter of indifference or mechanical detail.
Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is imperative.157

To be sure, this is not a call for the strong form of centralized control, such as
government. After all, coordination, or “centralization” as Knight calls it, can
occur through different institutional arrangements and the availability of each
ultimately provides an important set of options for use in different cases. As Eirik
Furubotn and Rudolf Richter note: “collective action, but not necessarily state
action is needed.”158 Quoting Arrow, they continue:
[M]any other departures from the anonymous atomism of the price system are
observed regularly. Indeed, firms of any complexity are illustrations of
collective action, the internal allocation of their resources being directed by
hierarchical controls.159

Coordination may occur among individuals who are linked to each other
through some social group such as family, friendship, or ethnic or religious
identity. While coordination among those within a social circle such as a family
does have some advantages of mitigating information costs and transaction costs,
it also has some disadvantages – what Stephen Haber calls the problems of “crony
capitalism”160 – including asset specificity and the non-fungible nature of the
attributes that underlie the social connection, such as familial relationship.161 As
patent system and noting that one of its most important components “applies to the inventor but
not solely to him, unless he is his own capitalist”). See also infra Part IV.A (discussing the
commercialization theory of the patent system).
156
For more on the positive law rules for obtaining IP rights see infra Part IV. The basic
reason these rules must operate in this way is to protect the reasonable investment backed
expectations of third parties. See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 (exploring normative
case for positive law rules for validity).
157
FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, 268 (1965).
158
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 64.
159
Id. (citing Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity, supra note 60, at 62).
160
STEPHEN HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2002) [hereinafter “HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM”].
161
For discussions of the information cost and transaction cost benefits see, e.g., Barak D.
Richman, Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New
York, (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business, Discussion Paper No. 384, 2002);
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Troy Paredes explains within the context of corporate and securities laws: “when
laws are in place, parties can rely less on personal and family relationships when
transacting, allowing them to engage in transactions with strangers.”162
The NIE literature also is replete with work exploring the tension between
achieving coordination within a hierarchy such as a firm on the one hand or
among individuals in an open market who only interact via private ordering on the
other hand.163 As Williamson notes when describing what is referred to as the
“marvel of the market,” “[o]f special importance to Hayek was the proposition
that the price system, as compared with central planning, is an extraordinarily
efficient mechanism for communicating information and inducing change.”164 But
he also noted that this requires spontaneous cooperation and coordination, in
contrast with the “kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate,
purposeful,” which is referred to as the “marvel of internal organization.”165 Put
differently,
Markets are characterized by high-powered incentives, which help to keep
bureaucratice costs in check and support strong autonomous adaptation.
Hierarchy, by contrast, has much weaker incentives and greater bureaucratic
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law In The Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, And Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). For discussion of the problems
relating to fungibility and asset specificity see HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM, supra note 160.
162
Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing
U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2004) (also noting
that “Strong legal protections for shareholders expand the available pool of capital for businesses
and entrepreneurs and facilitate contracting by shoring up shareholder rights.”).
163
The term “private ordering” is used more broadly in this paper than it is in some of the
NIE literature. Williamson, for example, often uses the term “private ordering” to refer to the
various informal mechanisms to privately enforce contractual relationships as compared with
formal legal process. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM,
supra note 125, at 163-68. (suggesting that repeat play and reputation can serve as “private
ordering” tools for enforcement). Here, the term is used to refer to all private interactions entered
into voluntarily by individuals as compared to those coerced by a hierarch, such as cooperation
directed by management among different divisions within a firm or tax transfers directed by law
among members of a state. For uses of the term private ordering as it is used here see, e.g., Henry
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 983 (2004)
(using the term “private ordering” to refer to private voluntary exchanges, not to private
enforcement); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (using the term “private
ordering” in the context of individual choice and freedom of contract); Richard A. Epstein, All
Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 569 (1991) (“Within the context of Eastern
Europe, property and economic protections are critical to the ability to turn nations and economies
around from central planning to private ordering”).
164
Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON., 36, 47 (1993) (citing Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV., 519, 524-27 (1945)).
165
Id. (citing CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, 4 (1938)).
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costs but has superior ability in cooperative adaptation respects. If different
transactions have differing needs for autonomous and cooperative adaptations,
which they do, then the cost effective response is to align markets and
hierarchies in a discriminating way.166

As Coase elaborated, “[t]he main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”167 But as
Williamson points out, such transaction cost market failures are only failures to
the extent “that they involve transaction costs that can be attenuated by
substituting internal organization for market exchange.”168 Indeed, in recognition
that not everything can be done as well inside a firm, Williamson asked: “Why
can’t a large firm do everything a collection of small firms can do, and more?”169
According to Williamson,
selective integration, whereby integration realizes adaptive gains but
experiences no losses, is not feasible. Instead, the transfer of a transaction out of
the market into the firm is regularly attended by an impairment of incentives,
and this type of difficulty will tend to be particularly severe where innovations
are important.170

At bottom, as elucidated earlier by Coase, the choice of whether to coordinate
within a firm or among individuals in a market essentially involves a balance
among the competitive benefits and transaction costs of the open market on the
one hand against the transaction-cost-saving benefits and agency and management
costs of hierarchy on the other hand.171
Finally, coordination can be facilitated through the use of focal points. As
Randy Calvert has pointed out, “[r]ecognizing or creating focal points is one
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Williamson, supra note at 164, at 49.
Coase, supra note 121, at 390.
168
Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114 (1971) (exploring relative advantages of “once and
for all contract,” series of short term contracts, and outright vertical integration, as alternative
options for firms).
169
Williamson supra note 195 at 131. This problem is sometimes cited as the “Williamson
Puzzle.” See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). The problem is
also explored in Coase, supra note 121, at 394 (“Why is not all production carried on by one big
firm?”) (citing Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Preface to the Re-Issue, London
School of Economics Series of Reprints, No. 16 (1933)).
170
Williamson supra note 195, at 161. (included in the problems he identifies is the decrease
incentive to innovate because of sharing with other divisions within the new merged firm).
171
See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text (exploring tradeoff between market and
firm).
167
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important way in which the players can successfully coordinate.”172 This type of
focal point coordination can be achieved using property rights. The classic work
by Harold Demsetz on the emergence of the institution of property rights focuses
on their role in internalizing benefits and costs.173 Yet, within the field of IP,
earlier work by the present author has explored the role of property rights as focal
points in facilitating coordination among complementary users of an asset.174
Later, Demsetz also highlighted this coordination function of property rights
when discussing the increased specialization of labor that has occurred over time:
Difficulties in stipulating and enforcing agreements so as to encourage and
facilitate productivity-increasing cooperation between different owners come
into play here.175
***
The legal institutions that define private ownership and guide exchange
arrangements must become operative if the complexity that is inherent in
specialization is to be productive.176

Indeed, recent empirical work by Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky
confirms such a coordination effect for IP rights.177 Thus, the use of property in
this coordination sense can be seen as navigating between the Coasian poles of
open market on the one hand and internal to a firm on the other hand.178
At bottom, a central lesson from NIE here is that property rights in IP can
provide an important option for facilitating coordination. In this sense, property
rights are options to achieving such coordination within families, firms, and
government.179
C. Problems at the Institutional Level
Each of the problems explored above manifests itself in different ways
depending on the particular set of institutional arrangements under which
individuals are operating. The NIE literature has explored extensively several
paradigmatic institutions including, inter alia, laws, norms, markets,
172

Randy Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation,
Coordination, and Communication, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: OLD TOPICS, NEW
DIRECTIONS 216, 244 (J.S. Banks and E.A Hanushek eds., 1995).
173
See supra notes 107-111, and accompanying text (discussing work by Demsetz).
174
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 67-68 (citing Demsetz, supra note 173).
175
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II, supra note 4, at S657.
176
Id. at S664-5.
177
See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 2.
178
See supra notes 144-146, and 163-171, and accompanying text (exploring tradeoff
between market and firm). For more on property rights see infra Part II.C.4.
179
See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing property rights generally). See also infra Part III
(discussing property rights in IP).
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governments, and property rights. Each institutional arrangement has been shown
to offer strengths and weaknesses, the major lessons of which are highlighted
below.
1. Laws, Norms, and Problems of Enforceability
As mentioned at the outset of the article, the field of NIE views
institutions to be “the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction… [including] formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct),
and their enforcement characteristics.”180 As evident from the definition, an
important characteristic of institutions is their ability actually to constrain
behavior; and of course different institutions exert this effect differently.
Much of the work in NIE looks at different approaches to formal legal
regimes and compares their overall impact with respect to the many problems
explored in the discussions above. Some view this work as the component of NIE
that includes the traditional law and economics literature, which some in the NIE
literature call “legal studies.”181 Comparative institutional analyses of IP law
regimes that take into account the problems explored thus far are presented in
greater depth in Parts III-IV below. For purposes of the discussion here, it is
sufficient to note that while the enforcement characteristics of law traditionally
have been the focus of study, important recent work including that by Cass
Sunstein has focused on the expressive function of law.182 Under this view, law
matters not only because of its ability to shape behavior through coercion, but also
through its ability to communicate in a way that ultimately shapes norms.183
This leads to another central component of NIE, which looks at the
different approaches to informal rules, often called norms, and compares their
overall impact with respect to the many problems explored in the discussions
180

North, supra note 19.
See, Eirik G. Furubotn & Rudolf Richter, Editorial Preface to Symposium Edition: The
New Institutional Economics, Recent Progress; Expanding Frontiers, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON., 1, 2-4 (1993) (reviewing “legal studies” as literature within the field of NIE
and citing early major works such as RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972)
and GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1971)).
An important recent component of this literature directed to the field of IP itself, but offering a
different perspective than the present piece in that it does not directly most of the major lines of
thought in NIE that are outside of the domain of classical law and economics, includes WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW (2003).
182
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021,
2035 (1996).
183
Id. at 2051-52 (concluding that law has an expressive function which operates through
norms).
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above. Indeed, Williamson argues that the focus on positive law regimes reflects
a type of “legal centrism” that fails to account adequately for dispute resolution
and enforcement activities that occur without the formal legal system, what he
terms “private ordering.”184 Norms can be thought of in at least two ways: as
“prescriptive norms,” also called “normative norms,” which refer to beliefs about
what people should do, and as “descriptive norms,” or “regularities,” which refer
to how people tend to behave.185 Indeed, thus far the only significant connection
between the literatures of IP and NIE has centered on the role of norms.186
Much of the NIE literature on informal, or non-legal ordering has focused
on enforcement and dispute resolution. One example is the important work by
Lisa Bernstein on relational contracting within homogeneous communities, which
has focused on what it calls “private ordering” as a mechanism by which
individuals in the market can interact with lower administrative costs than with
formal legal institutions through the use of more informal institutions for
enforcement and dispute resolution such as norms, reputation, etc.187 Similarly,
184

See, WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 2021 (discussing “legal centrism”); See also supra note 163 (explaining Williamson’s use of the
term “private ordering” is more narrow than the use in this paper).
185
For a recent discussion of these two types of norms within the context of IP see, e.g. F.
Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science - A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 693, 696 (2001). To be sure,
norms of each type may influence the other. What is more, when it comes to prescriptive norms
about how individuals should behave, they may be driven by either external, or internal pressures.
See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 162, at 1087-88 (“By ‘norms’ I do not mean those steps that
managers take to please the market or to avoid shame or a lawsuit, although sometimes ‘norms’ is
used broadly this way. Rather, I am referring to a sense of right and wrong – a sense of duty and
responsibility – that directors and officers internalize and enforce on themselves simply because it
is the right thing to do”) (citing, inter alia, Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate
Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant Take? 10 (UCLA School of Law, Working
Paper No. 02-11, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679 (“In lay terms, corporate
insiders act like fiduciaries not only because they fear external sanctions, but also because they
have internalized a sense of obligation or responsibility toward others ....’); Edward B. Rock,
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1104,
1013 (1997) (“All of us internalize rules and standards of conduct with which we generally try to
comply. We do this not only because we may fear some sanction, formal or informal, but also
because doing so is important to our sense of self-worth, because we believe that doing a good job
is the right thing to do.”)).
186
See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (exploring the role of norms in
establishing private institutions to coordinate IP transactions); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1999);
Kieff, supra note 185.
187
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (showing how some
communities opt for informal private enforcement mechanisms for contractual relationships
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important recent work by Barak Richman comes closer to the theory of the firm
literature and focuses on the importance of the private enforcement and dispute
resolution techniques as means for ensuring not just lower administrative costs,
but also better contractual enforcement, and enhanced transaction certainty.188
The view of property rights offered in this paper differs from both of these
perspectives by seeing private ordering in the more general sense than simply
private enforcement.189 Instead, private ordering is seen as the set of interactions
among individuals that are more reliable because they are enforced in some way,
whether by private informal institutions, such as norms, or by formal legal
institutions, such as the coercive power of the state.
This view is consistent with traditional liberal views of the rule of law and
role of government as the monopoly over the coercive powers – such as force – to
back property rights and contractual arrangements because such backing enhances
the overall market economy by enhancing individual liberty to elect to deploy
one’s resources in whatever way best suits that individual.190 While important
recent work by Richman has shown that private enforcement mechanisms may,
under appropriate conditions such as small and homogenous communities,
provide even more transactional security at a lower administrative cost than
public enforcement,191 the point here is that having the option of public
instead of formal legal approaches because the administrative costs can be lower). Bernstein’s use
of the term “private ordering” to refer to private enforcement is consistent with the use by
Williamson, which is narrower than the use in this paper, which encompasses all private
interactions voluntarily entered. See supra note 163 (contrasting Williamson’s use of the term
“private ordering”). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319
(2002) (similar use of the term “private ordering” to refer to private enforcement or regulation).
188
Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, at 4 (working paper, forthcoming as 104 COLUM. L. REV. __ (2004)
(available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=565464) (“This paper argues that concerns over
transactional assurance and contractual enforcement, not administrative costs, drive merchant
communities to private ordering (and to vertical integration as well).”)
189
See supra note 163 (discussing this more general use of the term “private ordering”).
190
See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) (elucidating the importance to economic growth of the reliable enforcement
of property rights and contracts by formal public legal institutions); DOUGLASS C. NORTH &
ROBERT P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1973) (putting property rights at the
center of the explanation of economic performance); Avner Greif & Eugene Kandel, Contract
Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in ECONOMIC
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM (Edward P. Lazear, ed.,
1995) (same). See also, Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Principles of a Liberal Social Order, in THE
ESSENCE OF HAYEK, (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube, eds., 1984) (providing general
discussion of the theory of liberal government including its use of coercive powers to enforce
law).
191
Compare, Richman, supra note 188, at 24 (contrasting benefits and costs of, inter alia,
private and public enforcement mechanisms under different conditions).
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enforcement is a benefit to those under other more generalized or diverse
conditions. What is more, the option of public enforcement also helps allow such
arrangements to be struck reliably without creating as much risk of asset
specificity and opportunism that are associated with bringing such transactions
entirely within a firm.192
2. Markets and Market Failures
One consensus lesson of economics, NIE and otherwise, is that markets
are not perfect and they do fail. Indeed, each of the problems explored in the
sections above and below can be, and often is, viewed as a type of “market
failure.”193 Nevertheless, as suggested in the introductory discussion of a theory
of second-best, the mere identification of market failure does not in and of itself
justify a call for resolution because it is the all-in comparative analysis among
truly available options that should drive policy.194 Put differently:
Traditional economics ascribes departures of actual market organizations from
the idea type of perfect markets to monopolistic practices. The approach of
[NIE], on the other hand, holds that because of transaction costs, and thus
informational problems, such departures may serve economizing purposes.195

For example, rules limiting competition, such as those limiting access to the stock
exchange can have many positive, or efficiency-promoting, effects: “The
exchange organizes not only the conclusion of contracts but also all associated
transaction activities (from search to enforcement)….”196 To be sure, this does
192

See supra notes 125-126, and accompany text (discussing asset specificity and
opportunism).
193
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 553-58 (1979) (exploring various market failures
including externalities, monopoly, and information costs); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomnic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029
(1995) (listing information costs, transaction costs, and externalities – what they refer to as “free
riding” – as examples of market failure).
194
See supra notes 20-31, and accompanying text.
195
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 291 (citing WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125) and citing Coase, Industrial Organization: A
Proposal for Research,” VICTOR R. FUCHS, POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59 (NBER, 1972) (“One important result of this preoccupation with
monopoly is that if an economist finds something – a business practice of one sort or other – that
he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.”).
196
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 302 (citing other examples such as “the
evolution of ‘privately ordered’ medieval trade organizations as explored in [the following
works:]” Avner Grief, Reputation and Coalitions on Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST., 857 (1989) (among long-distance Jewish traders in the Mediterranean
during 11th century called the Maghribi); Roger Milgrom, et al., The Role of Institutions in the
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not mean that all market failures should be embraced. Rather, the general point is
that when thinking about market failures it is essential to keep track of the real
costs and benefits of all available options. In addition, there are two more specific
points that need to be kept in mind when thinking about the ways markets work or
don’t work within the context of IP, as discussed more fully below.
(a) Ex Ante vs. Ex Post and Dynamic vs. Static Efficiency
While there is debate about exactly how rational or irrational individuals
are when they make decisions about whether and how to act there is consensus
that individuals do make such decisions and do plan.197 The term “ex ante” refers
to the time period before a decision is made about a given action. The term “ex
post” refers to any of the times afterwards. That is, the information and other
resources an individual has ex ante will impact the decision-making process.
This includes not only what is known, but what is expected. As a result,
there can be feedback between the ex ante and ex post worlds because individuals
interpret events in the world around them as having some predictive value for the
way events in the future will unfold. As elucidated by the path breaking work on
rational expectations by Robert Lucas, which formed part of the basis for which
he was awarded the 1995 Nobel Prize in Economics,198 individuals constantly
update and reinterpret information presently available to make best estimates
about the future.199 In game theory terminology, the point is that life is a multicycle game, not a single-cycle game, and individuals may use information from
past cycles of the game when making decisions about how to play future
cycles.200 Individuals may change their expectations about what may happen to a
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Campagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1
(1990) (law merchant system of the Champaign Fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries)). See
also, Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine
Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2004) (elucidating how antitrust enforcement
may interfere with environmental conservation and other goals).
197
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing incentives and their relationship to decisions).
198
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1995, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1995/press.html.
199
See, e.g., Robert E. Lucas, Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, 4 J. ECON. THEORY
103 (1972). See also, Sanford J. Grossman, An Introduction to the Theory of Rational
Expectations Under Asymmetric Information, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 541, 543 (1981) (describing
rational expectations equilibrium).
200
Games that are not static are sometimes said to have multiple cycles, rounds, or
iterations, or are said to repeat. For their pioneering work on game theory, John C. Harsanyi, John
F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994. See
Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
of
Alfred
Nobel
for
1994
(available
on-line
at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1994/press.html). For a general overview of game
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given state of affairs in the future based on what they perceive happening to
similar states of affairs in the present and past. If individuals perceive that
property rights and contracts are not being enforced, they may have less faith in
property rights and contracts being enforced in the future, all other things being
equal. As investment in such property rights and contracts becomes less
attractive, ordinary incentive analysis suggests that individuals will shift
investments towards other activities. Indeed, the literature on private ordering
places great emphasis on the role of ex ante predictability and certainty in
property and contract enforcement for facilitating efficient investment and other
decision-making over time, or in the dynamic sense.201
A problem with this dynamic approach is that can be in tension with other
more static approaches to efficiency, which may see resource distributions at any
point in time as sub-optimal. For example, a promise to make my car available to
you at a particular time if you elect to use it then may put me in a position when
that time arrives in which the car is not in use by anyone.202 In the static sense, at
that moment in time, it may indeed look as though the car is being allowed to go
to waste, which would be inefficient. Yet, if I am allowed to deploy the car to
other uses out of fear for the risk that it might go unused then your expectation
that it will be available for your use if you so chose will be dashed. What is more,
if you know this ex ante, then you may not even be willing to enter into the
contract to reserve the car in exchange for some other compensation, such as
money, or you will be willing to pay only a lesser amount. Thus, in the dynamic
sense, the future abrogation of the contract to provide the car, which presumably
would make both you and me better off, which is why we would elect to enter
into it in the first instance, is not a contract that we can consummate ex ante. As a
result, over time we cannot engage in as many productive exchanges as otherwise.
Put differently, there would be dynamic inefficiency.203
To be sure, it is recognized that recent important work by Ian Ayers and
Eric Talley, and by Jason Scott Johnston elucidates how, due in large part to many
theory see, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944) (first formal treatment of game theory as a part of economics);
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (more modern treatment of
game theory with focus on legal implications).
201
See generally, Paredes, supra note 132, at 1133-34 (“Legal certainty, which is part and
parcel of well-defined property rights, is a valuable asset that facilitates business and investing,
aside from how the law actually allocates rights and responsibilities”)
202
To be sure, this is a highly stylized example and in the real world every contract can have
detailed insurance, futures, and options components. Indeed, the availability of these provisions
provides justification for treating contracts among sophisticated parties as though they do indeed
speak to these issues, even when silent on their face.
203
See generally, David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for
Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1990) (showing how uncertainty in
enforcement discourages investment ex ante).
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of the behavioralism problems explored earlier,204 uncertainty in enforcement may
in some cases improve the ability to negotiate over property rights and contracts
by decreasing hold-out problems through a feed-back mechanism in which
uncertainty makes more credible the threat of infringement or breach ex post,
which may cycle back to decrease incentive ex ante for the rights-holder to hold
out in the first instance.205 Nevertheless, other recent empirical work by Rachel
Croson and Johnston shows that in other cases uncertainty degrades the ability to
reach dynamic efficiency.206 Indeed, other work by Ayres and Robert Gertner
elucidates the importance of at least some certainty – in that case what they term
“penalty default rules – because it will have the impact of bringing to light
information about potential negotiations and help avoid opportunism by one party
attempting “to get a larger piece of the smaller contractual pie.”207 At bottom, at
least in many cases private bargaining over property rights can be more efficient if
the right is clearly defined ex ante according to a predictable rule, rather than made
ex post by a judge applying a standard.208
The difference between ex ante and ex post, or dynamic and static
efficiency, also matters beyond the narrow setting of individual transactions
discussed above – although that is not irrelevant – because in many ways change
is desirable in and of itself. For example, as resources such as fossil fuels become
depleted, we must change to make use of alternative energy sources. Put simply,
innovation that occurs over time can improve the size of the pie for everyone by
making available more options. Thus, as Einer Elhauge has cautioned with
respect to certain forms of antitrust enforcement motivated by concerns for static
efficiency but that may negatively impact innovation:
204

See supra Part II.A.4 (exploring behavioralism problems).
Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027-1118 (1995); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining
under Rules versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256-281 (1995).
206
Rachel Croson & Jason Scott Johnston, Experimental Results on Bargaining under
Alternative Property Rights Regimes, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50, 67-70 (2000).
207
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 127 (1989).
208
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (1988). For a discussion of
the broader debate between legal systems based on rules and those based on standards, see
generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987) (describing basic
framework of the debate and collecting sources); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (exploring the costs implicated by the choice between
rules and standards and showing: rules typically are more costly than standards to create; standards
typically are more costly for individuals to interpret, both by individuals deciding how to act under
them and by government decisionmakers deciding how to apply them; and individuals are more
likely to act in accordance with the goals of rules as long as the individuals can determine how they
will be applied); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (reviewing more recent literature and collecting sources).
205
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Such innovations make consumers and society better off by giving them new
market options that are better (because they are cheaper or of higher quality)
than the market options they would have had without the innovation. This is the
most desirable form of market activity we can have. To condemn it is to
fetishize the ex post avoidance of static allocative inefficiency under given cost
and demand curves, and ignore the disastrous ex ante effects such a standard
would have on dynamic productive efficiency that either raises demand curves
by making the product more desirable or lowers cost curves by making the
product cheaper to make. Repeated economic studies indicate the latter is far
more valuable.209

Thus, the distinction between dynamic and static efficiency is particularly
important for IP because it is focused on innovation.
(b) Monopoly Effects
The problem of monopolies is another specific point that must be kept in
mind when thinking about the ways markets work or don’t work within the
context of IP. Because monopolies can create important inefficiencies, they have
been the subject of substantial attention by both lawyers and economists. Indeed,
the core purpose of antitrust law is “to root out unreasonable restraints of trade
and transactions that substantially lessen competition or tend to create
monopoly.”210 The central inefficiency associated with monopolies is the creation
of dead weight loss by the monopoly’s ability to set price above marginal cost, or
to have power over price.211 But, there are several reasons why the extent of this
inefficiency may not be the same in practice as it is in theory.
209

Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 275
(2003) (collecting sources). See also Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free,
Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003) (reviewing tension between static and dynamic
efficiency within the context of public goods and monopolistic competition).
210
F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual
Property, Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No.
275, at 7, forthcoming __ G.W. LAW REV. __ (2004) (generally exploring the interfaces IP law
shares with other regimes such as antitrust, and collecting sources including PHILLIP AREEDA &
LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES 174-250, 447-77, 785-806
(1997)). For a different take on the interface between IP and antirust see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST (2003).
211
This dead weight loss represents a collective loss of societal wealth, in that it is not
merely wealth that has been shifted from consumers to producers but rather wealth that is
altogether lost from producers and consumers collectively. The dead weight loss inefficiency
associated with power over price is depicted graphically, and its etiology is explained in a manner
targeted for a lay audience, in CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 60-66. To be sure, there are other
inefficiencies associated with monopolies, including, for example, the rent dissipating effects that
competition for monopoly profits may generate. See generally, Gordon Tullock, The Welfare
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (seminal work on rent-seeking
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First, monopoly is a term that relates to a market, not to any particular
good or service sold in that market. As Kenneth Dam has pointed out within the
context of IP, for example:
Indeed, it had become conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly.
Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another from
“manufacture use and sale” may give no significant market power, even when
the patent covers a product that is sold in the market. Indeed, without the
benefit of empirical research, it is entirely plausible to conclude that in the great
bulk of instances no significant market power is granted. We must bear in mind
that leading companies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and
yet many such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any
market.212

There often is a difference between a product or service market and an IP asset.
Consumers often buy computers that essentially involve the licensing of hundreds
of licensed IP rights – for hard drive, processors, DRAM, other chips, etc –
without acting as direct customers of any of the IP owners.
Put differently, while in a certain sense every property right can be
thought of as a monopoly, only those that convey effective control over an entire
market can have the troubling economic inefficiencies associated with
monopolies. For example, the owner of a hypothetical piece of real estate
Blackacre can exclude use of that particular parcel, but must compete with other
parcels of land in the market for land generally. Indeed, while the amount of real
estate in the world actually is limited by the surface area of the planet, unless it
turns out that the scope of human intellectual content is presently so close to the
limit of its full potential there is no reason to think that for IP the long run
monopoly impact of a given property right is likely to be any worse than for real
property; and instead it is likely to be much less.
Second, the economic inefficiency that is associated with a monopolist’s
power over price is not inevitable. More specifically, the inefficiency is tied to
the potential for a decrease in quantity (not an increase in price) as compared with
the perfectly competitive model. If the monopolist is able to engage in perfect
price discrimination, then the quantity produced will be the same as if there were
competition and while the price charged at least some consumers will be higher,
there will be no dead weight loss inefficiency.213 While perfect price

costs of monopoly). Yet, the rent dissipating effects of monopolies, like other rent dissipation,
depends on several factors. For more on rent dissipation generally, see supra Part II.A.2.
212
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.L. STUD. 247, 249250 (1994).
213
For those who are familiar with the graphical representation of the monopolist’s dead
weight loss triangle, an example of which is depicted in CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 65, price
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discrimination, like perfect anything, is not possible in the real world, the extent
to which the monopolist can engage in price discrimination may mitigate the
practical extent of the theoretical static inefficiency associated with monopoly
dead weight loss.214
3. Government, Government Failures, and Public Choice
Like markets, government institutions have many strengths and
weaknesses. One core role of government is to step in to provide services the
market would fail to provide efficiently because of economies of scale or scope,
or because of collective action problems, or positive externalities, with the
paradigmatic example of a service that meets each criteria being national
defense.215 Government also has the benefits of hierarchy explored earlier in the
discrimination allows the monopolist to convert what otherwise would be that dead weight loss
triangle into being producer surplus instead.
214
For a basic overview of the economics of price discrimination, see JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133-68 (1997). It is also recognized that in certain cases
efforts to engage in price discrimination may lead to decrease in efficiency. For example, recent
work by Wendy Gordon, Glynn Lunney, and Michael Meurer has shown that while price
discrimination by IP owners might lead in theory to more use in certain instances, in practice some
price discrimination strategies can result in less output than if such price discrimination were
prohibited, depending, in part, on the licensing arrangements employed to discriminate among
users). Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for
Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Copyright and the Supposed
Efficiency of First-Degree Price Discrimination (2002) (working paper); Michael J. Meurer,
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001). However, as
summarized by Richard Posner:
Perfect price discrimination would bring about the same output as
under competition, because no customer willing to pay the seller’s marginal cost
would be turned away. But perfect price discrimination is infeasible, and
imperfect price discrimination can result in a lower or higher output than under
competition, or the same output. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, MARKET
STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 494-96 (3d ed. 1990); PAUL A.
SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42-45 (1947); JOAN
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95 (1933). Many
economists believe that even crude discrimination is more likely to expand than
to reduce output, see, e.g., ROBINSON, supra, at 201; SCHERER & ROSS, supra, at
494-96; Peter O. Steiner, Book Review, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 882 (1977), but
there does not appear to be a firm basis for this belief. See Hal R. Varian, Price
Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 597, 629-33
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 925, 932 n.10 (2001).
215
See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) (setting forth
classical libertarian exposition of the role of the minimalist state as “limited to the functions of
protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts”).
For later refinement of the issue see ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-87 (1989) (“The
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discussion of the theory of the firm and its ability to save transaction costs.216
Others see government as also providing important distributive social justice
goals.217 Along these lines, the path breaking work by Amartya Sen that formed
part of the basis for which he was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics218
elaborates methods for aggregating values across different individuals and offers
important hope for improving welfare distributions through social choice.219
While there is of course an extensive literature beyond the scope of this article on
the theory of government, it is sufficient for the present purpose to highlight some
lessons on government from the field of NIE.
In addition to the many important strengths of government mentioned
above, just like markets, governments may also have weaknesses (government
failures). And just like for markets, each of the problems explored in the sections
above and below can be, and often is, viewed as a type of government failure.
For example, just as the transaction costs of the market include the costs of
bargaining over property rights and striking and enforcing contracts, as well as the
costs of professional lawyers and accountants to help with these processes, the
transaction costs of the political process include the costs of striking and
enforcing political deals, as well as the costs of professional lobbyists, and

libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate ....”). See also,
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25-32 (1962) (emphasizing that the role of the
government can be justified not as a tool for protecting rights in and of themselves but as a tool for
protecting rights as a method for solving collective action problems).
216
For more on transaction costs and the roles of hierarchy see supra Part II.B.2 (discussing
transaction costs including the transaction cost saving benefits of hierarchy) and Part II.B.3
(discussing the agency costs and other costs of hierarchy).
217
See generally, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (elaborating a view that
justifies a more expansive role of government to protect the disadvantaged). To be sure, there are
many important views on distributive and redistributive justice that are beyond the scope of this
article. Some of these relate rather closely to NIE. For example, one take on the views of
government by some including those in the critical legal studies movement is that it inevitably has
redistributive qualities to it and because those have been controlled by subordinating groups to the
detriment of subordinated groups they have inevitably redistributed from the subordinated to the
subordinating. For a recent take on anti-subordination see Christoper A. Bracey, Adjudication,
Antisubordination, and the Jazz Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV. 853 (2003) (exploring the
antisubordination principle and collecting sources). See also Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs
of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919 (1997) (pointing out that any theory of
government must provide for its funding and elucidating tax policy implications of various
theories of government). The NIE literature’s take on these perspectives is to elucidate the
problems of rent seeking and collective choice.
218
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1998, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1998/press.html.
219
See, e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
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political parties to help with these processes.220 In addition, it is often overlooked
that the transaction costs of government also include administrative costs, or the
costs of administering particular government processes.221 As another example,
while behavioralism problems can plague those negotiating over property rights
and contracts, they can also plague legislators, administrators, and judges.222 Put
differently:
Just as in the private sector, these governmental undertakings have to bear
search and information costs, the costs of decision making, the costs of giving
(official) orders, and the costs of measuring, monitoring, creating, and enforcing
the observance of official instructions.223

In addition, the information and transaction cost problems facing
individuals in government may be even greater than those facing individuals in
the market.224 As North points out, referring to one type of information costs –
the information needed to engage in exchanges – the intuition behind this lesson
is that in government it is “extraordinarily difficult to measure what is being
exchanged – promises for votes.” 225 According to North, when discussing
efficient markets: “[s]uch markets are scarce enough in the economic world and
even scarcer in the political world.”226

220

See generally, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 47-49 (summarizing political
transaction costs) (citing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 46 (1965).
221
These costs include the costs of obtaining the information needed to carry out these
processes, the costs of behavioralism by those charged with carrying out these processes, as well
as the transactions that occur when they are attempted to be carried out. In addition, just as
transaction costs of the market include the costs of transactions that are efficient but that fail, the
transaction costs of government administration include the costs of failed processes that should
have been successful.
222
Kieff, supra note 14, at 1730 (pointing out in the context of IP that government actors
also experience behavioralism problems most often discussed in the context of market actors and
that in addition they experience the public choice problems discussed in this Part, and citing
Paredes, supra note 70, at 461-2 (same, but in the context of securities law, and collecting
sources)).
223
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 47. See also, MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND
REVENUE, 12 (1988) (noting as political transaction costs “the costs of measuring, monitoring,
creating, and enforcing compliance”).
224
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 22 (“transaction costs associated with political
markets are high, and for this reason institutional inefficiency tends to persist”) (citing DOUGLASS
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 190 at
52).
225
North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 136, at 18.
226
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra
note 190 at 51.
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But there is another important information cost associated with
government. This is the problem of obtaining information about whatever
particular activity the government is acting upon in any given setting – legislative,
regulatory, or judicial, such as health, safety, the environment, efficiency, welfare,
or even what exactly the facts are in any given case. As Haddock points out,
“[o]ne crippling bureaucratic disadvantage is that many external costs and
benefits are subjective and thus knowable only to the demander or supplier, while
the links from production to consumption skirt formal markets where objective
proxies might be observed.”227 While instead the government certainly can
simply ask individuals what they want and feel in the hope they will reveal such
subjective information accurately, as Haddock notes “survey respondents do not
put their money where their mouths are, and often return either zero or
unrealistically high valuations with little variation across a wide range of
amenities, in addition to cross-amenity comparisons that are inconsistent,
intransitive, or sensitive to query order and wording.”228
These problems facing government including information costs and
transaction costs are several, and are generally known under the field of “public
choice,” or “collective choice.”229 As noted by Richard Epstein, “modern public
choice literature postulates self-interest to all political players, and asks how they
respond to the incentives created by the rules of the political game.”230
At bottom, in addition to those problems explored elsewhere in the paper,
public choice problems also include the particular difficulties government actors –
executives, legislators, regulators, and judges – have in determining exactly what
the public really wants the government to do. That is, public choice problems
include the general difficulties in assessing the information content of votes such
as their limited ability to fully reflect intensity of preferences, to be fungible, as
well as what are generally known as interest group politics, agency capture, etc, as
discussed below.
227

Haddock, supra note 114, at 9-10 (citing Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge
in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 529 (1945)).
228
Id. at 10, (citing Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000))
229
For an excellent review of the field see, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C.
Mueller ed., 1997); Dennis C. Mueller, PUBLIC CHOICE II 232 (1989); Maxwell L. Stearns, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1997); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988);
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988);
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An
Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988); Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
230
Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 652
(2004).
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Concerning intensity of preferences, while in a market the mechanism of
price provides a finely grained mechanism for expressing intensity of preferences,
votes in a political system do not convey similarly fine-tuned expressions of
intensity of preferences. In the U.S., for example, when an individual casts a vote
in a national election the individual is only able to elect whether to cast that vote,
or not. The individual cannot cast a smaller or larger vote. Indeed, this is why the
technique of cumulative voting is offered as alternative voting system mitigating
this effect. As Lani Guinier describes:
Under cumulative voting, voters get the same number of votes as there are seats
or options to vote for, and they can distribute their votes in any combination to
reflect their preferences. Like-minded voters can vote as a solid bloc or, instead,
form strategic, cross-racial coalitions to gain mutual benefits. The system is
emphatically not racially based; it allows voters to organize themselves on
whatever basis they wish.231

Concerning fungibility, while in the market the fungibility of money and
many other resources allows them potentially to be spent on various competing
uses, votes within the political system can only be spent on the few items on the
ballot at any given time and indeed efforts to make them more fungible by, for
example, offering them for sale, are strongly discouraged. As Kathleen Sullivan
has pointed out:
Literal vote-buying is regarded as a paradigm instance of undemocratic conduct.
We no longer countenance gifts of turkeys or bottles of liquor to voters on
election day, nor the counting of dead souls. These qualities of voting
distinguish the electoral sphere from the marketplace, where goods and services,
unlike votes, are fungible, commensurable, and tradable.232

Put simply, the increased fungibility of price over voting helps price develop
greater information about relative preferences than voting.
Finally, the institution of government is well known even to lay people to
be afflicted with the problems of interest group politics233 and agency capture. 234
231

LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 14-15 (1994).
232
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663, 671 (1997).
233
For more on interest group politics see Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups,
and Deadweight Costs, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 38, at 544 (presenting model of
competition among interest groups and showing that “an increase in the deadweight cost of
taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers, while an increase in the deadweight costs of subsidies
discourages pressure by recipients”).
234
For more on agency capture see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997).
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As described by George Stigler in the path-breaking work that formed in part the
basis for which he was awarded the 1982 Nobel Prize in Economics:235
Particular industries and occupations obtain from the state a variety of economic
privileges which are injurious to the vast majority of the population. Farm
subsidies, oil import quotas, tariffs, and occupational licensing are examples.
These small minorities achieve their effectiveness primarily because it is
uneconomic for the majority to oppose them.236

In part, therefore, the agency capture problem, also sometimes called
regulatory capture, is one of low incentives due to diffuse costs on the part of the
public on the one hand and high incentives due to concentrated benefits on the
part of the beneficiaries of the agency capture. In part this may be seen as a form
of rent dissipation by those seeking the government benefit. Indeed, this link
between what is essentially lobbying and rent seeking was first elaborated in the
path-breaking work by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock,237 which formed in
part the basis for which Buchanan was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in
Economics.238 The basic concept is that the “competition for government favors
… involves a wastage of resources in (unproductive) lobbying activities, bribes,
legal fees, and so on.”239
In addition, as elucidated in the path breaking work by Fred McChesney
and Hernando de Soto, to the extent the beneficiaries include the government
actors themselves, who might for example, enjoy enhanced political contributions
or political power (depending in part on whether they are elected or appointed),
then the problem can also be seen as one form of the principal agent problem in
which the official is the agent of the public and is pursing its own goals instead of
235

See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1982, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1982/press.html.
236
George J. Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 117, 125 in THE
ESSENCE OF STIGLER (Kurt R. Leube and Thomas Gale Moore, eds. 1986) (citing George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGM’T. SCI. 3 (1971)). See also,
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J.
97, 105 n.37 (2000) (collecting sources and describing two variants of capture: one they attribute
to the formation of “subgovernments” along the lines outlined by Stigler and another that is
slightly different in which the general public is seen to lose “interest in agency policymaking,
leaving only regulated interest groups to participate in the process”).
237
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962);
TOWARDS A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison &
Gordon Tullock eds., 1980). For more on rent seeking and rent dissipation see supra Part II.A.2.
238
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1986, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/press.html.
239
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 479.
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those of the public.240 Under this view, “the problem then, is how principals in
the form of … taxpayers can protect themselves against opportunistic behavior on
the part of their agents (the policy authorities).241 This problem is referred to as
the tollbooth view by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-DeSilanes, and Andrei Shleifer.242 What is perhaps more troubling, is that even
when those within an agency experience periods of underuse, there will be a
tendency for the agency to take on additional missions regardless of whether they
are socially desirable. As Milton Friedman, who was awarded the 1976 Nobel
Prize in Economics,243 explains:
The general rule is that government undertakes an activity that seems desirable
at the time. Once the activity begins, whether it proves desirable or not, people
in both the government and the private sector acquire a vested interest in it. If
the initial reason for undertaking the activity disappears, they have a strong
incentive to find another justification for its continued existence.
***
Again, let me emphasize, the problem is not that bureaucrats are bad people.
The problem, as Marxists would say, is with the system, not with the people.244

What is perhaps striking is that recent empirical study of entry regulation in 85
countries including the United States by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer confirms both the extent and
nature of the capture problem. As they point out:
240

See, Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation,” 16 J. LEGAL. STUD. 101 (1987) (elucidating that politicians and bureaucrats use
legislation, regulation, and their threat both to create rents and to extract them through campaign
contributions, votes, political favors, or even bribes). See also, FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (same, and
collecting sources); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1990) (same). For more on the
principal agent problem see supra Part II.B.3.
241
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 23.
242
Simeon Djankov, et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 3 (2002 (empirical
data showing existence and extent of the problem).
243
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1976, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1976/press.html.
244
Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem, Hoover Institution Essays on Public
Policy (1993), 1, 7-13:
This text leaves me two tasks: one easy, one difficult. The first task is to
demonstrate that government is the problem; that’s the easy task. The hard task
is to understand why government is the problem. Why is it that able, publicspirited people produce such different results according to whether they operate
in the political or economic market? Why is it that if a random sample of the
people who read this essay and are not present in Washington were to replace
those who are in Washington, our policies would likely not be improved? This
is the real puzzle for me.
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[Public interest theory of regulation would predict regulation to be associated
with] higher quality of goods, fewer damaging externalities, and greater
competition. Public choice theory, in contrast, predicts that stricter regulation is
most clearly associated with less competition and higher corruption.245

In concluding their report of the data showing decreased public benefits
and competition and increased corruption, they note that “[t]his evidence is
difficult to reconcile with public interest theories of regulation but supports the
public choice approach, especially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent
extraction by politicians.”246 Such rent extraction implicates both the cost of
rent-seeking caused by the option of a particular legal result,247 as well as any
improper restrictions on freedom of contract and exchange imposed by such a
law.248 In the final analysis, the central question to be explored when deciding
whether to put a particular activity under government control is the relative
“adaptive capabilities of institutions such as markets or hierarchies.”249
4. Property Rights and Common Tragedies
The final institution on which this paper places special focus is the
institution of property rights. As discussed earlier, property rights may provide
some of the coordination benefits of a firm without requiring the entire
institutional structure of a firm.250 By avoiding the degree of hierarchy associated
with a firm, property rights can have fewer of the costs associated with the firm.
For example, the degree of asset specificity and opportunism can be less because
the amount of lock-in or investment in the relationship can be less when
contracting over a property right than with the full process of joining a firm.251
Similarly, while contracting over the property right will require transaction costs,
the ability to strike those contracts on the open market gives more information
about opportunity costs and increases the number of potential evaluators, both of
245

Djankov, et al., supra note 242, at 4.
Id. at 35.
247
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL.,
TOWARD A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, 359-67 (1980) (exploring rent seeking effects).
248
JAMES D. GWARTNEY, ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995 (1995)
(comparative study of the effects of reduced economic freedom).
249
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 24 (internal citations omitted) (citing (Friedrich
von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (markets)) and (CHESTER I.
BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, 30th Anniversary Edition (1968) (hierarchies)).
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See supra notes 144-146, 163-171, and 173-178, and accompanying text (exploring
property rights in the context of the tradeoff between market and firm).
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See supra notes 125-126 and accompany text (discussing problems of asset specificity
and opportunism), and text accompanying note 192, supra (discussing the role of public
enforcement of property and contract rights in avoiding the need for a integration within a firm).
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which can mitigate some of the information costs discussed earlier.252 Indeed, as
Henry Smith has pointed out, property rights, including IP, can even be structured
so that they impose sufficiently modest information processing costs on third
parties who must evaluate and understand them enough to respect them by
avoiding infringement.253
At bottom, property rights achieve a type of private ordering via what may
be seen as a type of middle ground between the open market on one hand and the
hierarchy of the firm on the other hand. This view of the role of property rights
elucidates territory that although suggested by different lines of the literature has
thus far escaped direct attention. As a foil to the firm, much of the literature on
the open market has focused on contractual arrangements among individuals
without focusing on the specific rights over which those contracts will be struck;
indeed often simply assuming the existence of such rights. The view offered here
differs from that line in the literature in suggesting that the creation of specific
property rights – in this case IP rights – may help achieve some of the
coordination function that is usually ascribed to the firm, without the full
integration associated with the firm.
Finally, several special cases of property rights have attracted particular
attention in the literature. These include what are called public goods, the tragedy
of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons, which are each discussed
below.
(a) Public Goods and Commons
The subject matter protected by IP can be thought of as information, and
indeed when writing about patents Arrow described what is often known as the
inventor’s paradox or the Arrow Information Paradox, as mentioned earlier in the
discussion of information costs generally.254 The inventor’s paradox is due
largely to certain features that are shared by all forms of information in general.
Information is a special type of economic good, often called a public good, as
distinct from so called private goods, in that it is both nonrival (i.e.,
252

See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing information costs).
Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1108, 1114-15 (2003) (“If everyone in the world is expected to respect an owner’s
right to Blackacre, the content of that right cannot be too complicated or idiosyncratic without
placing a large burden on many third parties.”) (“the correlation between extensiveness of the
audience and mandated unintensiveness of legally significant communication holds in a variety of
areas beyond land law, including patent law, copyright law, and innovative forms of intellectual
property such as that suggested by the approach of the Supreme Court in International News
Service v. Associated Press”)
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See supra notes 60-61, and accompanying text (discussing the Arrow Information
Paradox, which is that “its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but
then he has in effect acquired it without cost”).
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inexhaustable) and nonexclusive. A good is considered to be nonrival if
consumption by one individual does not leave any less of the good to be
consumed by others.255 A good is nonexclusive if people cannot be excluded
from consuming it. National defense, television signals, and police protection are
generally considered to be further examples of public goods.256 The two
distinctive features of public goods – nonrival and nonexclusive – suggest that
public goods will tend to be under produced, or not produced at all because of
what some call a “free rider problem.”257
Free rider problems are not unique to public goods and indeed also can
occur anytime an asset is left open to common access. The generalized statement
of the problem of open access was elucidated in the seminal work by Garrett
Hardin on what he termed the “tragedy of the commons.”258
But the free rider problem for both public goods and for commons also
can be seen as merely an example of positive externalities, as discussed earlier.259
And as discussed earlier, there are a number of reasons to think that many
externalities turn out to be irrelevant.260 For example, in the case of an inventor
facing the inventor’s paradox and wanting to fund further development of the
invention, strategic trading in financial markets may prove sufficient.261 That is,
the price for goods that would be needed as production inputs for the invention
255

Put differently, a good is considered to be nonrival if for any given level of production,
the marginal cost of providing it to an additional consumer is zero.
256
For a more detailed discussion of public goods and the market failures associated with
them, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 46-49, 108-119, and 134141 (1988); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 617-641 (1989);
BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS 99-102, 556-585
(1988).
257
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER
SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185
(1992) (“Indeed, individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it, in
hopes of getting access as ‘free riders.’ The inability to exclude free riders distorts market signals
and is thought to result in inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods and
underproduction of them, relative to socially optimal quantities”). See also, MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43-52 (1971)
(elucidating how small, defined groups are the most likely to overcome the transaction costs and
free-rider problems raised by public goods);
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Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (elucidating
how unrestricted sharing of limited resources can lead to their over use and depletion). See also,
THE COMMONS, ITS TRAGEDIES AND OTHER FOLLIES, (Tibor R. Machan, ed., 2001) (providing
critical review of literature on the “tragedy of the commons”).
259
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing externalities).
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See supra notes 114-117 (discussing the irrelevance of inframarginal externalities).
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See, Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 572 (1971) (suggesting just such a strategy, but in
addition to reliance on patents).
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(like raw materials) would likely increase if the invention became a commercial
success while, conversely, the price for goods that would compete with the
invention but are more expensive would likely plummet. Indeed, after Stanley
Pons and Martin Fleischmann announced (erroneously) that had discovered cold
fusion, Forbes magazine reported:
It sounds too good to be true: an almost limitless source of clean,
inexpensive power from a scientific breakthrough which, if fully confirmed, will
be as important as the discovery of fire.
Two chemists working at the University of Utah have announced a
simple benchtop device which, they claim, produces a thermal output of 4.5
watts on an input of just 1 watt. The scientists, Stanley Pons and Martin
Fleischmann, believe the heat arises from nuclear fusion. Laboratories all over
the world have been rushing to confirm the experiment, with mixed results.
The Utah discovery is still a very long way from a commercially usable
device. But speculators can’t wait for scientific proof. They’re laying bets now,
in, for example, the commodity markets. Because the Utah device uses a
palladium electrode, palladium futures have vaulted. One company is making
some quick profits selling deuterium to experimenters.
Palladium is the most obvious way to play the cold fusion
phenomenon, but there are at least two other metals now known to have
potential importance to the process – titanium and lithium. The pure play on
titanium, Oregon Metallurgical (OREM), has skyrocketed. An analyst who
covers the stock lifted his buy recommendation as it roared through $15 – and as
I write this, it has crested at $24. This is speculation on a speculation: Ignore it.
Palladium and titanium are risky because cold fusion may not depend on either
one.
***
Maybe palladium is the secret – but maybe it isn’t. For investors who
are intrigued by the possibility of cold fusion but don’t want to bet too heavily
on it, I believe lithium is the best choice. We have ourselves followed this
course, because I am strongly convinced that lithium is the essential (and
commercially most promising) ingredient in the cold fusion process.
Why lithium? I believe lithium-6 is a source in the cell for tritium (just
as it is in the nuclear industry) and that the dominant fusion reaction occurs
between this tritium and deuterium. Lithium and its other isotopes, notably
lithium–7, are implicated in several alternative interpretations as well.
You can play lithium by investing in the stock of FMC Corp. (My firm
bought the stock for customer accounts at $33 on Apr. 11.) FMC is a diversified
chemical and machinery company that happens to own and produce lithium. It is
probably slightly undervalued, so it is thus a fair investment on its other merits.
If the cold fusion phenomenon sputters to a dead end – as it certainly could –
you would be left with FMC holdings with substantial value. One could not say
this of palladium futures.262
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Indeed, properly timed trades in palladium futures would have yielded substantial
profits even though it was ultimately determined that Pons’ and Fleischmann’s
cold fusion turned out actually not to work, which did not seem to be lost on at
least Pons:
B. Stanley Pons.... He has a wry sense of humor. Asked in Dallas if a cheaper
substitute metal for the rare palladium could be used to generate the same effect
in his experiment, he replied: “I refuse to say until I sell my futures.”263

To be sure, the trading of commodities futures is not the only tool for
making irrelevant the positive externalities of inventions and other information
goods.264 Direct government subsidy is another option, and indeed this is done in
the case of many areas of basic science.265 But this is not the only form of
government action that is available. In addition, subsidies only give individual
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Chris Black, Pons A “Little Nerdy” Maybe, But He Gives Great Parties, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, April 17, 1989. For more about market pricing behavior see BURTON MALKIEL, A
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1996).
264
Indeed, it may not be a legally prudent strategy for inventors to rely on this option. Nor
may it be socially desirable. After the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. O’Hagan applying the
misappropriation theory of insider trading, liability might attach to the trading of securities based
on information obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty, whether in the strict insider sense or not.
See U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (extending liability under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act to be predicated under “misappropriation theory”). For more on the
misappropriation theory see Richard W. Painter, et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading after
United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency,
and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 443 (2001). In the case of a scientist inventor trading on the basis of information about his
own invention the easy insider case before O’Hagan would be if the invention were made within
the scope of his employment and so the information might be viewed as being owed by his
employer and its use for the personal profit of the inventor would be trading on insider
information. But after O’Hagan, which expands the liability to include broader types of
misappropriation, the scientist inventor might be viewed to be breaching some kind of fiduciary
duty to the one funding the science – perhaps the government – or even to science at large in the
way other professionals are viewed as owing duties associated with professional ethics. To be
sure, this last view of a duty to science at large would require that the norms of science be
considered by a court to be so dictated by prescriptive norms. But there is at least some debate as
to whether the norms of science are so strongly prescriptive, or merely aspirational. Compare, Rai
supra note 186 (arguing the norms are both descriptive and prescriptive) with Kieff, supra note
185 (arguing that the norms are more aspirational).
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See, e.g, Michael Polanyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 61, 65 (1944)
(discussing the option of direct government subsidy). Indeed this is the option Pigou offered to
solve the problem of positive externalities and that Coase was criticizing responding in his famous
article on the problem of social cost. See supra notes 101-106, and accompanying text.
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rewards, which for many reasons may not be effective, and yet they fail to
facilitate coordination.266
Property rights can provide a middle ground between the two extremes of
atomized free market acting within the context of an open commons on the one
hand and total government production on the other hand.267 Michael Heller,
building upon earlier work by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, provides the
example of a hypothetical community called “Poach Pond” in which underfishing of the pond may occur if the rule were that any community member could
appropriate fish until the moment of consumption because people might prefer to
wait on shore and poach others’ catches rather than invest in fishing itself.268 As
Demsetz pointed out in his seminal work on the emergence of property rights,
property rights may serve as a tool for internalizing externalities.269 And as Coase
pointed out, this can be used as a tool in place of direct Pigouvian subsidy.270
Indeed, the free rider, tragedy of the commons, and positive externalities
problems each can be thought of essentially as an inverse of the problem of rent
dissipation, discussed earlier.271 Whereas the problems of free riding, commons,
and positive externalities, refer to cases in which individuals within a group
decide not to invest in a given activity for fear that others will benefit but not
compensate and as a result too little of the activity is produced, the problem of
rent dissipation refers to a case in which individuals within a group decide to
invest in a given activity for fear that others will do the same and win the race for
the common prize and as a result too much of the activity is produced. In both
sets of cases, the failure to coordinate leads to inappropriate amounts of the given
activity being produced. The connection between these two classes of problems
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For more on the failures of reward theories and the strengths of coordination theories for
property rights in the context of IP see infra Part III.
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This is a different middle ground view of the role of property rights than the one explored
earlier between the open market and the firm. See supra notes 144-146, 163-171, 173-178, and
250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context of the tradeoff between
market and firm).
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Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998). See also, Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 23-24 (1973) (providing the
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See supra notes 107, 173-178, and accompanying text.
270
See supra note 103, and accompanying text.
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See Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S.
ECON. J. 438, 441, 447 (1983). For more on rent seeking and rent dissipation see supra Part
II.A.2.
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based on their common failure of coordination is important because, as discussed
earlier, property rights can provide this coordination.272
While property rights can have benefits, they of course also have costs.
Chief among these are the transaction costs that are needed to create, exchange,
manage, and avoid property rights.273 Related to these costs are the information
costs of determining what the rights are and what value they have, and to
whom.274 There also can be rent dissipation costs associated with the desire to
obtain property rights.275 Finally, recent important and innovative work by
Michael Heller has spawned a rich literature on a different problem associated
with property rights (although often in a mistaken fashion) that he termed the
“tragedy of the anticommons,”276 as discussed in the following.
(b) Anticommons, Permit Thickets, and License Raj
Heller’s landmark contribution to the property literature regarding
anticommons was originally based on his study of real property in the postsocialist economies of Eastern Europe, but he has also applied it to IP. As
described by Heller:
Consider new areas for property law, such as the problem of spurring private
investment in biomedical research or creating well-functioning markets in postsocialist economies…. By drawing the wrong property boundaries around
resources, by fragmenting ownership too much, it turns out that privatization can
destroy resource productivity in enduring ways. To capture these unexpected
results from excessive privatization, I have proposed the idea of anticommons
property, an image that goes beyond the old trilogy [private, commons, and
state] and crystallizes emerging real-world property relations that had previously
remained invisible….[A] resource is prone to underuse in a tragedy of the
anticommons when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a
scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use. In theory, in a
272

See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing coordination problems generally and the ability for
property rights to help solve them).
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See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing transaction costs).
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Much of the important recent work on the information costs associated with property
rights has been done by Henry Smith. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 163; Merrill & Smith, supra
note 163; and Smith, supra note 253. For more on information costs generally, see supra Part
II.A.3.
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See Anderson & Hill, supra note 271 (elucidating how the rent seeking costs associated
with obtaining property rights can dissipate the gains from creating those rights, and providing
case studies). See also, Levmore, supra note 4 (noting that rearrangements of property rights can
have the same effect). While in some cases the rent dissipation will be directly through the
resources expended to race, in other cases the rent dissipation will also trigger problems of public
choice. For more on public choice see supra PartII.C.3.
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Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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world of costless transactions, people could always avoid common or
anticommons tragedy by trading their rights. In practice, however, avoiding
tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive
biases of participants, with success more likely within close-knit communities
than among hostile strangers. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights
into usable private property is often brutal and slow…. I developed the idea
initially from closely observing privatization in post- socialist economies. One
promise of transition to markets was that new entrepreneurs would fill stores
that socialist rule had left bare. Yet after several years of reform, many
privatized storefronts remained empty, while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of
goods, mushroomed up on the streets. Why did the new merchants not come in
from the cold? One reason was that transition governments often failed to endow
any individual with a bundle of rights that represents full ownership. Instead,
fragmented rights were distributed to various socialist-era stakeholders,
including private or quasi-private enterprises, workers’ collectives, privatization
agencies, and local, regional, and federal governments. No one could set up shop
without first collecting rights from each of the other owners.277

Heller seems to suggest that what he terms “fragmentation,” or excessive numbers
of rights holders, is key to the anticommons effect because the transaction costs of
dealing with so many claimants will dominate.278
But fragmentation itself is not the key to the anticommons effect that is
observed in post socialist economies. What really drives the problem is the lack
of what Anderson and Hill call a “residual claimant.”279 To provide a brief
summary definition at the outset, a residual clamant in the context of the
anticommons problem caused by many holders of a right to respond “no” to
requests for permission essentially means an individual who is able to extract
private value from such a request by electing to respond with a “yes.” But to
more fully understand the nature of the issue, further elaboration is required.
As Buchanan and Yoon elucidated, there actually exists “a formal
symmetry between the overusage of a resource because of common (multiple)
access and the underusage because of multiple exclusion rights”280
In
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Anticommons supra note 277, at 700; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999).
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See Anderson & Hill supra note 271 (using the term “residual claimant” while exploring
the related problem of rent dissipation during races for a common prize).
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Anticommons, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 12 (2000). For an interesting taxonomy applying this
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highlighting this symmetry, they then point out that in both cases (commons and
anticommons) the heart of the problem can be tied to the nature of the holders of
the right (to use or exclude, depending on whether the tragedy is one of commons
or anticommons). More particularly, according to Buchanan and Yoon, the
problem lies in whether the holders have “noneconomic motivations” in that they
are those “who cannot or may not desire to, capture directly pecuniary gains,”
meaning that their goals may not be “primarily distributional but instead may
reflect different objectives.”281 Indeed, Buchanan and Yoon warn of the
potentially pernicious impact in either case (commons or anticommons) of the
“genuine zealot…[who] may be insensitive to proffered compensations.”282 At
bottom, the concern Buchanan and Yoon highlight is that the crux of the problem
for both commons and anticommons relates to the ability of those engaged in the
group activity to coordinate with each other, but when the individuals have
noneconomic motivations they are unlikely to so coordinate unless they happen to
share some other coordinating attribute, such as being close-knit.283
In contrast, as discussed previously, coordination is a central problem
studied by NIE and one general response to coordination problems can be
property rights.284 While at first blush given the way Heller presents the
anticommons problem it would seem that property rights are more a part of the
problem than a part of the solution, it turns out this just is not so. Property rights
provide individuals with the economic motivation to engage in trades with each
other. Indeed, the easier it is for the holder of a property right to engage in such a
trade and the greater the value that the individual can extract from the trade (the
greater the residual claim), the greater the motivation and ability the individual
has to engage in it.285
What really drives the anticommons problem in the post-socialist
economies is both the lack of residual claim and the lack of clarity that are
281

Id. Buchanan & Yoon (citing the example of an environmental regulator whose
permission is needed to put an asset to use but whose permission should not be bought). To be
sure, without being motivated by direct pecuniary gains, a regulator may be economically
motivated along the lines of the political favors discussed in the public choice literature. See
supra Part II.C.3 (discussing public choice).
282
Id.
283
Heller suggests the coordination benefits of being “close knit.” See text accompanying
note 277, supra. See also supra notes 160-161, and accompany text (discussing the coordination
benefits of family and other close personal ties within the context of “crony capitalism”).
284
See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing coordination problems and the role of property rights in
easing them). See also supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text (focusing on property rights
and coordination as a tool for mitigating both commons problems and rent dissipation problems).
285
See R. Quentin Grafton & Dale Squires, Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A
Study of Common Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679 (2000) (providing empirical data showing
how various institutional changes towards the treatment of private property rights as fully tradable
assets are essential for facilitating efficient use of common pool resources).
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associated with the pertinent rights of exclusion.286 As Richard Epstein and Bruce
Kuhlik have recently pointed out in response to the perceived anticommons
problem relating to IP, the distinguishing feature of the anticommons in the postsocialist economy is that efforts by the bureaucrats to engage in open trading of
their permission for personal gain are likely to trigger various forms of criminal
liability for graft, bribery, public corruption, etc.287 What is more, in such a
sequential bribe situation there is a greater degree of uncertainty that each bribe
will either be needed or effective. This is in part because those being bribed can’t
openly coordinate. It is also because some of those who’s permission would be
needed might not even be open to being bribed. They might justifiably be
steadfastly acting to prevent an activity they see as bad.288 Alternatively, they
may derive more benefit – perhaps sense of control or power or even just some
other kind of perhaps perverse pleasure – from simply being able to say “no” than
from what otherwise might be obtained in exchange for saying “yes.”289
Put differently, the anticommons problem in the post-socialist
environment, indeed just as the anticommons problem in general, is tied to the
inability of those who hold rights of exclusion to openly negotiate to extract value
for a decision to give reliable permission rather than withhold permission or give
faulty permission. At bottom, there is a huge difference between the openly
tradable nature of property on the one hand and what Epstein refers to as a
pernicious “permit thicket” as in the case of the post-socialist economy on the
other hand.290 Interestingly, the anticommons problem is not unique to the postsocialist economy and indeed is nicely captured by a well known expression used
in India after throwing off British rule, also called “Raj,” where it was said that
Raj had been replaced by “License Raj” in the form of excessive and
unpredictable requirements for permits and licenses from the many branches of
286

The importance of certainty for facilitating private ordering is explored supra notes 198208, and accompanying text.
287
See, e.g., Richard Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman, Chicago John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper (2d Series) No. 209, at 4 (“But the state bureaucrat is not the owner of
any asset whose value will remain unlocked unless he brings it to market”). Nevertheless,
individual regulators have incentives to try to extract such value, which explains the results of the
empirical study of the public choice “tollbooth” theory of regulation discussed in the text
accompanying notes 240-246 supra.
288
This would be consistent with the public interest view of regulation. For more on the
public interest theory of regulation see supra text accompanying note 245.
289
Consider for example the well known childhood tease, or prank, sometimes known as
“Want a lick?… Psych!” involving the offering a lick of an ice cream cone to a peer and then after
inducing anticipation, but before delivery, withdrawing the cone to prevent the lick while
exclaiming “Psych!” or some more colorful equivalent.
290
See Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 287 (citing Richard. A. Epstein, The Permit Power
Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407 (1995)).
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the central government in order to conduct many important business activities.291
At bottom, the essential lesson of anticommons is that it can be seen as a coin
having two poisonous sides: the pernicious “permit thicket” or “License Raj”
implications for taxing and retarding development on the one hand; and the
“tollbooth” implications of extortion by agencies on the other hand.292
D. Wrapping-up Problems Explored through NIE
The many problems explored above and their interrelationships are quite
complex. As a result, the above treatment is necessarily too brief, and therefore
in many respects inaccurate. But it is offered in the hope that it sufficiently helps
elucidate the general nature of these problems and how they relate to each other to
inform the below discussion of the extensive literatures on normative IP theory
and positive IP law, which for the most part have relied upon many of these
problems in a rather piece-wise fashion.
Before proceeding to a more focused discussion on IP there are a few core
lessons that should be drawn from the above treatment. First, on a general level,
the details of different institutional choices matter in that they have different
implications for a large number of costs and problems. Second, on a very
granular level, the treatment above will be used below to show how many of the
problems that have attracted attention in the IP literature turn out to be properly
viewed as inapposite, overstated, or even having implications opposite of those
offered by the literature. Third, on a conceptual level, property rights in general
and IP in particular are not offered as perfect solutions to every problem. The
case is not being made for property or IP, uber alles.
Rather, the point is that property rights and IP can provide an important
additional and middle-ground tool for optional use by individuals engaged in
private ordering beyond those offered by the extreme poles of either the free, open
market without them on the one hand or the hierarchy of family, firm, or
291

I thank participants in the faculty workshop held at Wolfson College, Cambridge
University, June 28, 2004, for pointing out this term to me. For more on the problem of License
Raj in India see, e.g., JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 49-51
(1993) (discussing the system of permits and licenses needed in India for both outside investment
and for internal economic development). See also, Emran, M. Shahe, et al., After the “License
Raj:” Economic Liberalization and Aggregate Private Investment in India (2003) (available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=411080) (same); Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A
Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1608 (1997) (“This system,
known in India as License Raj, means that the center retains control over the distribution of
permits and licenses for new areas of economic development through the relevant central
ministry”).
292
See supra notes 240-246, and accompanying text (discussing “tollbooth” theory of
regulation in the context of agency capture and public choice).
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government on the other hand.293 But, to play this role, IP rights must be
designed to facilitate private ordering. To achieve this role effectively, they must
operate as rights of exclusion around which coordination can take place. To do so
efficiently, they must be structured to mitigate the costs of rent dissipation,
information, transactions, and public choice.
As discussed in more detail below, it therefore makes sense as a matter of
normative theory for IP rights to be designed to achieve this coordination role.
Indeed, other popular normative theories of IP – reward and prospect or rent
dissipation – fail to teach how the regimes could be structured to be either
effective or efficient in achieving the various goals posited by those theories.294
In addition, there are reasons to think that the regimes of patent law and
trademark law can be both effective and efficient in achieving this coordination
role, while least for the entertainment industry the copyright regime may be
neither effective nor efficient in achieving this effect, and indeed may not be
needed.295
III. LESSONS FROM NIE FOR LAW & ECONOMIC THEORIES OF IP
While the large body of literature involving law and economic theories of
IP has taught a great deal about some of the specific issues it explores, this paper
objects to the approach of much of that literature as focused too narrowly on only
some of the issues explored in the above review of NIE, and too often only in
some settings. As discussed more fully below, one central lesson for IP from NIE
is that in the real world each of these issues is at play, and often in several
different settings. Put differently, each issue must be considered in relation to the
others, and all in the context of private ordering as it occurs in the real world over
time. At bottom, the views explored here are more consistent with private
ordering than those in the literature, which may instead be seen as justifications
for various forms of more extensive government regulation.296
The overall theme of this paper is that government, law, contracts,
property rights, organization, and norms can complement each other to overcome
barriers that otherwise prevent the subject matter of IP from coming to market.
This stands in contrast to most of the literature on the law and economics of IP,297
293

For elaboration on the role of property rights as a middle ground see supra notes 144146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context
of the tradeoff between market and firm). See also supra note 267(exploring property rights in the
context of the tradeoff between market and government).
294
See infra Part III (discussing theories of IP).
295
See infra Part IV(discussing positive law IP regimes).
296
Again, as discussed supra in note 163, the term private ordering is used here in a broader
sense than in some of the NIE literature.
297
See infra Part III.A (discussing reward literature).
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which has focused largely on only one of the major obstacles at a time, such as
elucidating the transaction costs or monopoly costs of property rights, as part of a
larger effort to advocate a shift towards the elimination of property rights in IP to
leave what some call greater “open commons” or “public domain.”
The approach of this paper differs in considering the set of problems from
the NIE literature that are explored above to answer questions about improving
the delivery of IP subject matter in the real world. For example, in addition to the
transaction costs explored in other works on innovation, this paper also considers
those costs without IP rights as well as each of the other problems relating to the
individual level, inter-individual level, and institutional level, as explored
above.298 That is, it performs a more comprehensive comparative institutional
analysis of options for bringing ideas to market so as to avoid indulging a nirvana
thesis, which would strive towards the theoretical utopia rather than those options
available in the real world.299
In making this comparative institutional analysis, the paper reveals how
the Copyright system fails to offer sufficient coordination benefits, and in addition
generates too many costs.300 In contrast, patent and trademark do offer
appropriate coordination benefits and impose sufficiently few costs.301 In
addition, the particular coordination benefits offered by patent and trademark may
be able to meet any need that otherwise would exist for coordination by copyright,
at least in the entertainment industry.302 Thus, the paper shows how patent and
trademark may obviate the need for copyright in this setting.
A. Problems of Reward Theories and the Incentive Access Paradigm
The bulk of the law and economics literature on IP regimes in this country
focuses on the government’s role in providing targeted incentives to specific
creative individuals to solve the public goods problem associated with intellectual
works while at the same time mitigating the monopoly distortion and transaction
costs associated with the IP right to exclude.303 The concern driving this
298

See supra Part II (reviewing set of problems explored by NIE).
See supra notes 20-31, and accompanying text (discussing comparative institutional
analysis).
300
See infra Part IV.A (discussing social costs and benefits of copyright).
301
See infra Part IV (discussing social costs and benefits of patent and trademark).
302
See infra Part IV.B (discussing possible use of patents and trademarks in place of
copyrights to facilitate commercialization in the entertainment industry).
303
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,
466 (2004) (“The conventional theory of intellectual property rights posits that such rights exist to
stimulate the creation and distribution of intellectual goods”) (citing Lemley, supra note 61, at 993
(1997) (“Intellectual property [rights are] fundamentally about incentives to invent and create.”).
Although there are a number of incentive-based theories for IP that are mentioned in the literature
– including “incentive to invent”, “incentive to disclose” or “teach,” “incentive to innovate,” and
299
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perspective is that the subject matter protected by IP will be under-produced
because it is characterized by the Arrow Information Paradox, which is to say it
has public good qualities or has positive externalities.304 Under this view,
incentives to produce are provided through specific rewards for specific creative
work. For example, patents are offered as incentive to invent; and copyrights as
incentive to generate creative expression. Importantly, the literature does not see
rewards merely as some kind of ancillary effect of IP; it sees reward as IP’s
central goal. What is more, under this view, the reward and its recipient must be
carefully regulated to mitigate monopoly effects and transaction costs.305 As
summarized by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley when discussing patents, for
example, “[t]he central problem considered by modern analysts has been the
conflict between the social goals of achieving efficient use of information once
produced versus providing ideal motivation for production of information.”306
Glynn Lunney has called this conflict, or balance, between incentive and access
the “incentive access paradigm.”307
“incentive to design around” – there are essentially three dominant theories today: (1) some
version of the “incentive to invent” and “disclose” theories treated together under the rubric of
“reward;” (2) the “prospect” theory; and (3) the commercialization theory. For a recent review of
the patent literature on incentive theories and a collection of sources see CHISUM, ET AL. supra
note 5, at 58-90 (reviewing various incentive theories for the patent system). See also, Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1017, at 1024-46 (1989) (same); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories Of
Patents – The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (same). For recent
reviews of the copyright literature on incentive theories and a collection of sources, see Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996)
(reviewing and collecting sources and suggesting that incentives may draw efforts away from
other productive activities); Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, George Mason Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 03-03 (2003) (available on line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=374580
(reviewing and collecting sources and highlighting the opportunity cost issues discussed by
Lunney as well as showing how additional works on the margin may contribute little while at the
same time causing rent dissipation).
304
For more on public goods problems and the subject matter of IP see supra Part II.C.4(a).
305
See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics
of Intellectual Property, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 8 (1991) (“The patent offers the incentive of the
statutory right to exclude as a means for inducing creative activity.”). Several types of regulatory
responses to IP rights are generally justified by this concern. Examples include liability rule
treatment, misuse, fair use, etc.
306
Hirshleifer & Riley, supra note 53, at 1404 (emphasis in original) (citing Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources of Invention, supra note 60, and Fritz
Machlup, Patents, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 461
(Macmillan, Free Press, 1968)).
307
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 483 (1996) (reviewing the incentive access-paradigm and highlighting an additional cost
of IP is the opportunity cost of deploying resources towards IP that could instead have been
deployed elsewhere).
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Although the reward literature contributes much to our understanding of
IP, it has a number of serious limitations. One perspective is to see these theories
as focusing on the role of government in providing both subsidy and regulation
rather than in providing less invasive forms of intervention, such as setting rules
and resolving disputes.308 That is, the government is seen as needed on the one
hand to prop up potential holders of IP and then on the other hand to keep them in
check. Another perspective is to see the reward literature as paying too much
attention to direct incentives for creators, to monopoly power, and to transaction
costs, all on only some settings, while paying remarkably little attention to these
same issues in other settings, as well as overlooking a host of other important
issues including, for example, coordination problems and public choice
problems.309
Indeed, the reward theories may be seen as premised on a false perception
of tension between incentives and access. Under this view, the inventive side of
the paradigm is inapt because IP rights are not and should not be offered to
provide direct incentives to invent or create. Similarly, the access side of the
paradigm is also inapt because IP rights are more successful than rewards, by
design, in facilitating access. These objections to both components of the
paradigm are explored in more detail below.
1. Imprudent Incentives
The incentive side of the paradigm is inapt because it is not clear that
endeavoring to provide direct incentives is even prudent. Put differently, one
central objection to reward theories is tied to the problem of rewards themselves.
That is, rewards may not be needed, may not be effective, or may have bad sideeffects. Rewards may not be needed to the extent that enough of the desired
activity may occur without added incentive of the reward.310 Rewards may not be
effective to the extent that the desired activity might not be responsive to

308

For a general discussion of the role of government see supra notes 215-219 and
accompanying text.
309
For a review of each of these problems see supra Part II.
310
See supra notes 114-117 (discussing the irrelevance of inframarginal externalities). For
example, individuals may be driven by self-satisfaction, search for knowledge, reputation, etc.
Indeed, although the positive shift in 1980 to allow patents in basic biotechnology did lead to
some increase in amount of inventive activity being done in the field, the amount before was still
quite substantial. This is not surprising given that in a field with large lumber of people having
sufficient creative ability working to solve a problem it is likely the solution will be found. See
JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 215 (1966). For more on the norms of
science and the incentive they provide towards discovery see, e.g., Robert K. Merton, The Role of
Genius in Scientific Advance, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 2, 1961, at 306.
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additional incentive.311 Rewards may have bad side effects to the extent that the
social costs of investments made to get them may be greater than the social value
of the activity rewarded.312
A related problem with reward theories is that the correlation between the
amount of reward and the merit of the awarded activity is unclear. On the one
hand, for example, empirical works by Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele
and by Michael Kremer have shown that at least for patents the patentee often
does not receive the full social surplus created by the patented invention.313 On
the other hand, for example, earlier work by the present author has pointed out the
difficulties in developing a theory of just deserts as a basis for government to
allocate any reward among potential claimants, whether the reward is a patent or
cash.314
Understanding the relationship between the reward and the activity being
rewarded is important because it would inform determinations about how to set
the reward. If set too low, then there may be insufficient positive response. If too
311

This may be because the activity is only responsive to alternative inducements such as
self-satisfaction, search for knowledge, reputation, etc. See, e.g., Besen & Raskind supra note
305, at 6 (“Another critical element in deciding how to strike the balance between encouraging
innovation and dissemination is the extent to which creative activity responds to economic
rewards. The less that innovation depends on the resources invested and the potential economic
rewards, the more limited is the case for granting substantial rights to creators.”).
312
This may be because they may trigger rent dissipation. For more on rent dissipation
generally see supra Part II.A.2. For more on rent dissipation within the context of IP see infra
Part III.B. This may also be because of the opportunity cost associated with the efforts made
towards winning the reward. See Lunney supra note 307 (discussing role of opportunity costs).
313
See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-8 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
6956, 1999); See, e.g., MICHAEL KREMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING
INNOVATION 1-5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6304, 1997). Social
surplus is the amount of total social welfare generated by the invention minus the costs of making
the invention, such as research by the inventor and the inventor’s competitors. Social welfare is
the aggregate value of all utility that individuals obtain from the invention.
314
See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 713-14, n. 77 (citing LEO KATZ,
ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 (1996)). As
pointed out when discussing the problem of two or more authors or inventors:
Concerning the distinction between acts and omissions, one might ask what
level of contribution is required on the part of a supervising faculty member for
co-authorship or co-inventorship. What is sufficient: active advice, or passive
permission and non-interference where others would have refused to allow a
project, or its continuance? Also consider how the rules of praise should
evaluate the problems presented by cases of mere thought, transferred intent, or
unreasonable hopes; any of which might nonetheless correlate with inventive
success. To what extent should originality, effort, genius, or utility drive our
decisions to allocate rewards?
Id. (citations omitted).
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great, the marginal excess may generate too little marginal positive response or
may generate too many negative side effects.315 While simple metrics such as too
big or too small may turn out not to matter, at least some dimension of the reward
will matter and yet the reward theories offer no guidance as to how to set the
reward along that dimension, whatever it may be.316
Some of the reward theorists do suggest techniques for solving some of
the problems of determining the reward while at the same time mitigating the
monopoly power and transaction costs problems associated with the IP property
right by suggesting as alternatives to IP rights various forms of cash reward, prize,
buyout, or subsidy.317 To be sure, these reward or prize proposals are each more
ingenious than the other in developing methods for finding, at least on average
and in theory, the “right” price for rewards. And while Michael Abamowicz
provides extensive and thoughtful analyses of many of their shortcomings, for
several of these he also provides potential solutions.318 Nevertheless, in the final
analysis the best case for these proposals leaves them as adjuncts to the IP system,
not as complete replacements,319 and so their availability does not supplant the
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For example, too little positive response might occur because those responding to the
rewards might have decreasing marginal desire or ability to respond. Similarly, for example, too
many negative side effects might occur if the opportunity costs of the resources being spent
responding are too high or if their rent seeking costs are too great.
316
This problem is described as “screening” in earlier work by the present author and its
resolution is one of the strengths of the commercialization theory, and its companion registration
theory: these theories turn out to have great explanatory power for the positive law rules
governing when valid IP rights are available. See, Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8
(elucidating the normative case for these positive law rules for patents). For more on these
positive law rules see infra Part IV.
317
For an excellent review of these proposals including in-depth critiques see Michael
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003). For convenience, these
proposals can be summarized in very brief form as follows: (1) patents are bought out by the
government with prices informed by test marketing (Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum,
Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q., June 1995, at
213); (2) awards are given in the place of patents with the amount of reward set by later developed
data from actual demand (SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, supra note 313); (3) patents are
bought out with prices informed by probabilistic auctions (KREMER, supra note 313); (4)
subsidizing purchases of subject matter covered by patents as a tool for improving effectiveness of
price discrimination by patentees (Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government
Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997));
and (5) the use of retrospective prizes in exchange for efforts to decrease monopoly effects of
patents (Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes).
318
See Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note 317.
319
See, e.g., Id., at 115 (ultimately concluding that its proposal “would complement rather
than replace the patent system”).
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need for comparative analyses of the IP systems like the one offered in this
paper.320
Yet, to the extent these reward or prize proposals are taken to be
replacements for the IP system there would be some objections to overcome that
are worth considering here. First, the benefits such proposals offer for
determining the amount and type of reward may be illusory. The systems are
quite complex and so their transaction costs – both on the market side and the
government side – should be carefully explored. On the market side these might
influence the types of private ordering that would be able to occur around the
rewards.321 On the government side, it would be important to elucidate the ways
in which at bottom these approaches do not boil down to the very Pigouvian
subsidies that were the target of criticism in the path-breaking treatment by Coase
of the eternality problem. That is, the rewards in these proposals are being
offered to mitigate the problem raised by the positive externalities associated with
the subject matter protected by IP (also seen as a public goods problem or Arrow
Information Paradox problem).322 Yet, as Coase pointed out, property rights can
compare favorably to Pigouvian taxes and subsidies as tools for mitigating the
problem of externalities.323 As explored more fully below in the discussion of
commercialization, the general nature of the reasons to suspect that prizes may
not compare favorably to property rights includes concerns about both
commercialization and screening.324 Unlike property rights, rewards implicate a
number of problems for both commercialization and screening, as discussed
immediately below.
2. Ineffective Access
The access side of the paradigm is similarly inapt because it is not clear
that access is a problem under property rights or that access is improved in the
long term without property rights. The reward literature places great emphasis on
the risk that the right to exclude associated with property rights in IP will lead to
insufficient access to the subject matter protected by IP essentially because of the
potential monopoly distortion and transaction costs associated with the IP right to
320

In addition, the best case for each of these proposals involves mechanisms of non-trivial
complexity for which a careful evaluation of its implications for each of the various costs outlined
supra in Part II would be an area of fruitful further study.
321
For more on the particular role property rights can have for facilitating private ordering
among diffuse individuals see supra Part II.B.4. For an application to IP see infra Part III.C.
322
For more on externalities generally see supra Part II.B.1. For more on the public goods
problem in particular see supra Part II.C.4(a).
323
See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
324
For more on these issues see the discussion of the commercialization theory infra Part
III.C.
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exclude. As explored below in the discussion of the commercialization theory
and its implications for these and other social costs in the context of IP, the
reward theory concerns about these costs are in a sense both overstated in that the
costs are not as great a feared and understated in that property rights can be
essential for mitigating them.325
Nevertheless, in response to the risk of monopoly effect and transaction
costs, reward theories advocate enforcing IP rights only as forms of liability rules,
as distinct from property rules, by creating various forms of compulsory licenses,
and exemptions from infringement (such as fair use or experimental use) to leave
what some call an “open commons” or “public domain.” Such liability rule
treatment is advocated as a tool for providing adequate incentives to patentees
while reducing the distortionary effects of an absolute right to exclude.
Various forms of liability treatment have been offered. For example,
Ayres & Klemperer advocate a patent litigation system characterized by
uncertainty and delay, which they show could serve as a form of compulsory
license, or liability rule.326 Others simply advocate various exemptions to
infringement, such as for what they call fair use.327 As explored further below,
the approach offered in this paper, which builds on earlier work by the same
author, elucidates why access may not be improved by these proposals for
liability rule treatment and indeed may be made worse.
The distinction between treatment of IP as a form of property rule or
liability rule that is relevant here was elucidated in the seminal work by Guido
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed.328 According to this view, an entitlement
enjoys the protection of a property rule if the law condones its surrender only
through voluntary exchange,329 so that holder of such an entitlement is allowed to
enjoin infringement and in some cases to obtain enhanced damages as a deterrent
to future infringements.330 An entitlement has the lesser protection of a liability
rule if it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay some court-determined
compensation.331 The holder of such an entitlement is only entitled to a court’s
325

See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing monopoly effects, transaction costs, and some
additional particularly salient NIE lessons on social costs for IP).
326
See, Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that sufficient incentive to invent can be provided without the
monopoly power associated with a property right).
327
See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward A Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (offering fair use exception because of excessive transaction costs
causing too many market failures in the transactions over IP rights as property rights).
328
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
329
See id. at 1105.
330
See id.
331
See id. at 1105-6.
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assessment of actual damages caused by the specific act of infringement.332 Put
differently, the bargaining over liability rules is done against the backdrop of a
possible court ordered price while the bargaining over property rules is done
against a backdrop of a possible court order to not infringe (or to pay some form
of enhanced damages as a deterrent to future infringement).
One lesson from the work by Calabresi and Melamed is that attention must
be paid to which locus of decision-making about the true value of the underlying
asset is the lowest cost provider of a correct decision.333 A liability rule can be
more efficient if a collective, public, or governmental determination of the true
value of the asset would be cheaper than a private evaluation reached by
agreement of the parties; and conversely a property rule should be used if the
private evaluation would be cheaper.334 Thus, soon after the Calabresi-Melamed
framework was elucidated, Richard Posner pointed out that where private
ordering implicates high transaction costs the case for liability rules is stronger.335
Yet, as Mitchell Polinsky pointed out, where decisions by a court are more costly
the case for property rules is stronger.336 Applying this framework to IP, Robert
Merges has pointed out that use of a property rule rather than a liability rule may
be best because private parties have a comparative advantage over courts in
valuing IP.337
But there are at least two additional problems relating to coordination that
are raised by the distinction between property rules and liability rules. The first
relates to social costs directly caused by the failed coordination among potential
infringers. The second relates to the failed access indirectly caused by the
decreased ability for the IP owner and those with whom it could otherwise
transact to coordinate with each other to bring the invention to market.
332

See id.
To be sure, important additional considerations not directly applicable here have also
been offered. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden Of Determining Property
Rules And Liability Rules: Broken Elevators In The Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 268, n. 8
(2002) (elucidating analytical framework for assessing “the relative burden (or costs, or difficulty)
faced by judges when attempting to determine property rules and liability rules”).
334
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 328 at 1106. See also James E. Krier & Stewart J.
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
440, 447-49 (1995) (pointing out symmetries in the many problems elucidated in the literature).
335
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29 (1st ed. 1972) (“where transaction
costs are high, the allocation of resources to their highest valued uses is facilitated by denying
property right holders an injunctive remedy against invasions of their rights and instead limiting
them to a remedy in damages”).
336
See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1111 (1980) (pointing out that “the
argument could easily go either way”).
337
See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 328).
333
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Where there are large numbers of potential infringers (which is the case
for IP) liability rules make bargaining between the entitlement owner and the
infringers more difficult. The use of a liability rule may create a prisoner’s
dilemma or collective action problem among potential infringers in which each
individual’s dominant strategy is to infringe in order to garner more of the
potential gains from exchange for itself.338 And yet the property owner will not
have adequate incentive to bargain with these infringers because such bargaining
will not yield effective protection from others. The point is elaborated further by
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell:
Consider the situation of an owner and a particular potential taker who values
the car less highly than does the owner (but above the level of damages). The
owner would like to bargain with the taker and pay him not to take the car.
However, it would be irrational for the owner to pay this taker not to take the
car, for he would subsequently have to pay another potential taker not to take the
car, and then another and another. Therefore, the potential taker will tend to take
the car even though the owner values it more highly. The general point, in other
words, is that when courts err and set damages too low, bargaining by owners
will be effectively infeasible, and socially undesirable takings will occur.339

Several negative impacts follow. First, as elucidated in earlier work by the
present author:
Each infringer may calculate the impact of his marginal output on price without
taking into account the output from other infringers. Such uncoordinated acts of
infringement may cause collective profits—those reaped by the patentee directly
and through damages awards from infringers—to fall below the total costs of

338

Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 733 (citing David Haddock et al., An
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990)).
339
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 765-66 (1996). Kaplow and Shavell further point out:
Our conclusion from the present argument is that a property rule enjoys a strong
advantage over the liability rule, assuming, as is plausible, that the probability of
underestimation of owners’ values would be substantial under a liability regime.
We emphasize that this conclusion does not depend upon the assumption that
there is systematic underestimation of owners’ values under a liability rule.
Even when one assumes that courts’ estimates are on average correct, but are
sometimes too high and sometimes too low, the liability rule will be inferior
because the occasions in which damages are too low will involve the multipletaker problem we have identified. (When damages are too high, there will be
few takings, so the liability rule in such instances will be similar to a property
rule.)
Id. at 766.
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creating and commercializing the invention, resulting in a destruction of
wealth.340

Thus, there is an increase in social costs directly caused by the failed coordination
among potential infringers.
Second, as recognized by Haddock, McChesney, and Speigel, the threat of
this potential onslaught of infringements induced by a liability rule will
discourage investments in the subject matter covered by the IP right ex ante.341
As a result, the use of a property rule is particularly important for the impact it has
on each potential infringer in ensuring there simply is no incentive to infringe ex
ante, as compared with the type of benefit or compensation it might give the
holder of the IP right ex post.342 That is, a fundamental distinction between
property rules and liability rules is tied to the distinction explored earlier between
static and dynamic efficiency.343 Property rules facilitate ex ante private ordering.
This is the heart of the commercialization theory of IP, discussed below.344
Finally, it is important to realize that perfectly strong property rule
protection for IP is not possible in the context of the existing system of
commercial law for several reasons. First, as Ayres and Klemperer point out,
uncertainty in how the rights will be enforced in court functions the same as
enforcing those rights with liability rules,345 and largely because of the reward
theories themselves there is substantial uncertainty in the rules governing the rules
for obtaining IP rights,346 transacting over IP rights,347 and enforcing IP rights.348
Second, “the ability for an infringer to be kept effectively judgment proof through
corporate and bankruptcy laws may also operate as a form of liability rule gloss

340

Kieff supra note 7, at 733 (“As Ayres and Klemperer recognize, if there are fixed costs of
entry or exit, or if infringers have higher marginal cost than the patentee, then market entry by
infringers will generate extra costs for society.” (citing Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 326, at
1015).
341
Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 733 (citing Haddock et al. supra note
338, at 16-17).
342
Id., at 734 (citing Haddock et al. supra note 338, at 13).
343
See supra Part II.C.2(a).
344
See infra Part III.C.
345
See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 326.
346
See, e.g., Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 7 (criticizing impact of reward theories
on rules for obtaining patents).
347
See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of
Intellectual Property, Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 275, forthcoming __ G.W. LAW REV. __ (2004) (criticizing impact of reward
theories on rules for transacting over IP and on antitrust enforcement of IP-based transactions).
348
See, e.g., Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7 (criticizing impact of reward
theories on rules for enforcing patents and elucidating the importance of property rights protected
by property rules for enforcing patents).
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on the present property rule regime.”349 Third, “[o]therwise infringing uses that
are by or for the federal government enjoy sovereign immunity protection that
effectively results in a compulsory licensing regime.”350 Put differently, at least
some extent of liability rule treatment is always available for IP.
At bottom, it is not clear that the access side of the incentive access
paradigm is apt. More specifically, it is not clear that access would be improved
by the use of rewards or IP backed merely by liability rules instead of property
rules. In addition, as explored more fully below in the discussion of the
commercialization theory of IP, property rights may indeed be important in
ensuring that at least in the dynamic sense there is sufficient access in the first
place.351
3. Allocation and Screening
A final limitation of reward theories is that they seem to view an IP right
as somehow having a one-to-one correlation with a good or service that is sold in
a market.352 As a result, while on the one hand seeing the transaction costs of
property rights as an obstacle to the cumulative nature of intellectual endeavors,
the reward theories overlook that this very cumulative nature makes it remarkably
difficult to allocate merit among various contributors to an intellectual
endeavor.353 Consider for example “that the typical car or computer sold in a
349

F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 307, 313 (2002)
(Invited symposium piece for National Association of Environmental Law Societies annual
meeting entitled “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future,” held March 15-17, 2002, at
Washington University School of Law) (citing Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at
733-34, n.154). For more on the interface between IP and bankruptcy see, F. Scott Kieff & Troy
A. Paredes, Toward an Understanding of Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate
Control, __ WASH U. LAW. Q. __ (forthcoming 2004).
350
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994), under which the government provides a limited
waiver of its sovereign immunity for acts of infringement by or for the federal government and
instead allows suits against the government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for a reasonable
royalty). State governments similarly enjoy immunity under the 11th Amendment. See Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (state
immunity from patent infringement suits); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (state immunity from Lanham Act trademark
infringement and unfair competition suits); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir.
2000) (state immunity from copyright infringement suits). The point here is that anyone interested
in achieving liability rule treatment for an IP right can achieve that result by prevailing on a
government agency to arrange for the infringement.
351
See infra Part III.C (discussing commercialization theory).
352
See, Merges, supra note 2, at 1859-60 (criticizing common view in the literature as
assuming a one-to-one correlation).
353
The seemingly humble statement of the cumulative nature of intellectual works is often
attributed to Sir Isaac Newton’s pronouncement after discovering calculus that “If I have seen
further it is by standing upon the shoulders of Giants.” Letter of Sir Isaac Newton to Robert
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single market comprises a huge bundle of patent and other intellectual property
rights.”354
For example, in the model offered by Shavell and van Ypersele, the
reward is determined by looking to market demand,355 yet they do not suggest
how to disaggregate demand for licenses to intermittent windshield wiper
technology used in cars, for example, from the demand for cars. Put differently,
“[e]very market having large demand would generate droves of reward claimants
each asserting to have made some contribution.”356 What is more, “no market
participant would have an adequate incentive to provide the government with
information relating to [the validity of the reward].”357 Only in the rare cases of
two individuals claiming to have invented the same exact thing does one
individual have an incentive to challenge the claim of the other.358
Put simply, when IP is the focus of a reward, the reward provider must
determine how to allocate the reward, and it is likely there will be excessive
claimants. When IP rights instead are protected by property rules, the allocation
is made among those holding the various IP rights through whatever contracts
they entered into so as to obtain commercialization. What is more, in contrast to
the difficulties in setting appropriate reward discussed above,359 the positive law
rules for obtaining the IP rights can serve as remarkably inexpensive screening
tools for determining who will even get such a right.360

Hooke, February 5, 1575/1576, as quoted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS:
A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 31 (1965) (unpacking the great deal of historical baggage associated
with this famous phrase, which is often attributed to Newton, and demonstrating that Newton may
actually have borrowed this phrase from Bernard of Chartres of the early Twelfth Century, who
himself may have appropriated the phrase from Priscian, a Sixth Century grammarian, with many
other intervening players at each stage). For a colorful and wide-ranging list by Justice Story of
examples of the cumulative nature of intellectual endeavors within the context of a copyright case,
see, Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D.Mass.1845) (“In truth, in literature, in science
and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new
and original throughout…. What are all modern law books, but new combinations and
arrangements of old materials, in which the skill and judgment of the author in the selection and
exposition and accurate use of those materials constitute the basis of his reputation, as well as of
his copyright?”).
354
Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 7, at 62, n.29.
355
SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, supra note 313.
356
Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 713.
357
Id.
358
Id., n. 75 (noting that so-called “interference” proceedings among two or more claimants
to the same patent typically involve less than 0.25% of all patent applications that are filed with
the Patent Office).
359
See supra Part III.A.1.
360
See infra Part III.C.
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B. Problems of Prospect and Rent Dissipation Theories
Recognizing that the lure of rewards may induce excessive rent seeking
behavior leading to rent dissipation,361 in his 1977 piece on the so-called prospect
theory of the patent system, which builds upon work by Yoram Barzel and others,
Edmund Kitch argued that the use of property rights in the form of IP rights like
patents could avoid or mitigate the rent dissipating effect otherwise associated
with those rewards.362 A similar view of IP called the rent dissipation theory was
offered by Mark Grady and Jay Alexander in 1992.363 The thrust of the prospect
or rent dissipation approach is premised on the view that that property rights can
facilitate coordination among competing users of a target asset so as to avoid
overuse of other assets in the race to obtain the target.364 Kitch suggests that
patents operate similarly as a tool to decrease both pre-patent and post-patent rentseeking.365 But reviewed in earlier work by the present author, there are a number
of important limitations on the rent dissipating views of IP.366
1. Extent of the Rent Dissipation
Although rent dissipation can be a problem in theory, recent work by
Michael Abramowicz adroitly points out a number of factors that may mitigate
rent dissipation effects in practice.367 These factors include risk aversion;
opportunity costs; diversity among those racing; the time it takes to get the
reward; and externalized costs or benefits those racing impose on others, such as
the income to those who sell goods and services needed by those racing or the
costs to those who are bothered by the activities associated with racing.368
361

For more on rent seeking and rent dissipation see supra Part II.A.2.
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
265–67 (1977) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348
(1968)).
363
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV.
305, 305-310, 316-322 (1992) (going further than the building upon the prospect theory by
suggesting that the particular contours of the positive law rules for obtaining and enforcing patents
are and should be adapted to minimize rent dissipation both pre patent and post patent).
364
Kitch supra note at 256 (citing Barzel supra note 362).
365
Id. See also Grady & Alexander supra note 363.
366
Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 63-66 (pointing out limitations in prospect
and rent dissipation theories). For clarity, this part of the argument is presented again in this paper
in slightly expanded form, rather than more condensed form by way of citation.
367
Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, supra note 303, at 10-18 (collecting
sources and showing how each of these factors may operate to mitigate rent dissipation effects).
368
Id. at 11-12. A more palpable, albeit mythological, example of these positive externalities
of racing might include the joy children experience when they drink the Tang® and use the
Velcro® that many think were brought to society through the NASA-sponsored space race; the
corresponding negative externalities might include the cavities some children get from increased
362
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In addition, rent dissipation presumes there is a single prize, or at least a
discrete number of prizes.369 But those attempting to solve a problem may not
arrive at the same solution; they may get to different solutions and there may be
even more solutions available.370 Although multiple solutions to a given problem
may be wasteful when the good is not really needed, which is an interesting
possibility explored at some length by Abramowicz,371 when the utility of the
good is substantial, the benefits of multiple solutions may dominate.372 That is,
although more may not always be better, it also may not always be worse.
Consider the multiple, independently patentable and non-infringing solutions to
exposure to this sugared drink and their difficulty tying knots after growing up with shoes kept on
by hook-and-loop fasteners instead of laces. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for
Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 351, 378 n.95
(1993):
The creation of “spin off” inventions has often been urged as one of the benefits
of government-funded research. See George J. Howick, The NASA Technology
Utilization Program, in UTILIZING R & D BY-PRODUCTS 69, 78–82 (Jerome W.
Blood ed., 1967) (describing NASA program and examples of spin-off
inventions, including inorganic paint, walking wheel chair, maintenance-free
lubricated bearings, and sight-controlled switches). Some other examples of
commercial products arising out of the space program include, smoke detectors,
graphite, an artificial pancreas, heated ski goggles and hang gliders, but not
velcro, teflon or tang.
369
Although it is often useful when modeling a problem to reduce it to a manageable form to
construct the model, the single-solution element of the rent-seeking models cannot be extrapolated
to provide meaningful guidance for policymakers without at least consideration of whether in the
real world the set of possible solutions to a given problem (prizes) is limited, and whether we are
nearing such a limit.
370
See infra note 373 and accompanying text.
371
Abramowicz, supra note 303, at 2-9. Interestingly, the fair use defense and the utility
exception to copyrightable subject matter may combine to leave uses that are needed effectively
beyond the enforceable reach of any valid copyright rights.
372
An increase in the number of available solutions will increase the chance of each person
gaining access to any one solution. This is one reason why the patent system does not require the
claimed invention to be “better” than the prior art; it need only be new and nonobvious. As thenjudge Warren Burger wrote, quoting Judge Giles Rich:
Progress is most effectively promoted by protecting those who enrich the art as
well as those who improve it. Even though their inventions are not as good as
what really exists, such inventors are not being rewarded for standing still or for
retrogressing, but for having invented something. The system is not concerned
with the individual inventor’s progress but only with what is happening to
technology.
Comm’r of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber-Scheideanstalt, 397 F.2d 656, 667 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Burger, J.) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393,
393, 402 (1960), reprinted in Nonobviousness – The Ultimate Condition of Patentability 2:1, 2:9
(John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (admonishing that we must avoid “the unsound notion that to be
patentable an invention must be better than the prior art.”).
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the problem of pain and inflammation: aspirin, acetaminophen (Tylenol®),
ibuprofen (Advil®, Motrin®), selective COX-2 inhibitors (Vioxx® and Celebrex®),
and various steroids.373 Some patients can only take some of these drugs, and
some patients can take all, but not at all times. In the real world we cannot know
ex ante whether more solutions are going to be redundant, or whether they will
both increase consumer choice and provide access to more consumers who could
not consume the earlier solutions.374 Competition, after all, can be a good thing.
In the least, such increased competition for research and development just
might not be a bad thing. The path breaking work by Robert Solow for which he
was awarded the 1987 Nobel Prize in Economics,375 demonstrated that most of
the economic growth in the United States in the first half of this century could be
explained by investments in research and development and education rather than
by increases in capital and labor.376 What is more, while the rent dissipating
models themselves are premised upon decreasing returns to scale for research and
development,377 the path breaking work by Paul Romer shows that such
investment in research and development and education is unlike other forms of
investment in that it does not experience decreasing returns to scale.378 To be
sure, though, it still is the case that resources invested towards these activities
would not be invested elsewhere, and this opportunity cost must also be
considered.379
373

It is not always the case that an independently patentable invention will avoid
infringement of earlier patents. Patentability of the second invention turns on a very different set
of questions than its possible infringement of the first patent. The patentability analysis of the
second invention will turn largely on the scope of information in the art at the time that invention
is sought to be patented, which includes the disclosure in the first patent. For more on the rules of
patentability over the prior art, see CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 323–706 (treatise and casebook
teaching and collecting sources). The possible analysis of infringement of the first patent by the
second invention will turn on the claims of the first patent. For more on the rules of patent
infringement, see id. at 829–1041.
374
In areas where we can make good judgments ex ante about which avenues of research are
most likely to be productive, it may be possible to fund the work prospectively. The government
grant-making processes such as those at NIH and NSF basically operate this way by empanelling
experts in the field to review grant applications.
375
See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1987, available on line at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1987/index.html.
376
See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39
REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957).
377
See, e.g., Loury supra 49, at 408 (noting that an assumption of the model is diminishing
returns to scale of research and development).
378
See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Return and Long–Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002
(1986). Increasing returns to scale means that the more that is put in, the more that is gotten out –
and the “bang-for-buck” does not decrease as more and more buck is added.
379
In his seminal review of the patent system Fritz Machlup pointed out:
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2. Effectiveness of the Tools for Mitigating Dissipation
The prospect and rent dissipation theories present themselves with the
very problem they attempt to solve. As Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith
pointed out soon after Kitch, the more effective the patent is in coordinating
activities of those in the industry after the patent has issued,380 the greater will be
the problems of racing towards the patent application before filing.381 Kitch’s
response was to argue that the coordination costs are likely to be low in such early
stages because there are likely to be only a small number of players then.382 But
this response does not fully answer the problem. As Abramowicz correctly points
out, the behavioralism and transaction costs may be high in such a community
because the members may have significant cognitive biases.383 The information
and transaction costs to coordinating also may be high if the racers do not know
about each other.384
What is more, the central limitation of the rent dissipation and prospect
theories is that they do not offer a way to use the social cost lessons of
prospecting to design legal rules for obtaining patents that can operate ex ante to
mitigate the social costs of prospecting. Instead, Kitch argues that the prospect
theory explains why the commercial success associated with a patented invention
It is easy to conceive of the possibility that such allocation [of productive
resources to research and development] is too meager. But can there ever be too
much? Is not more research and development always better than less? Is it
possible that too much is devoted to the inventive effort of the Nation? This
depends on what it is that is curtailed when inventive activity is expanded. More
of one thing must mean less of another, and the question is, what it is of which
there will be less.... Whenever permanent economic policies – not just war or
depression measures – are discussed, sound economists must start from the
principle that no activity can be promoted without encroaching on some other
activity. More of one service or product must mean less of another.
Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study No. 15, prepared for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1958). See also, Lunney, supra note 307 (pointing out the importance
of considering opportunity costs).
380
Kitch, supra note 315, at 276.
381
Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus:
A Comment, 23 J.L. & Econ. 197, 202-03 (1980).
382
Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & Econ.
205, 205-06 (1980).
383
Abramowicz, supra note 303, at 184 n.251 (collecting sources on cognitive biases of
overconfidence and overoptimism).
384
They may not know each other because the field may be so new that the community of
people working in it is not defined. Or, the potential members of the community may generally be
known, but without the freedom to divulge their work to each other that is given by a patent, they
may not know enough about each other to coordinate. This latter type of coordination problem is
known generally as the Arrow Information Paradox. See supra note 60.

KIEFF

NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT

82

should be an important factor in determining whether it is patentable.385 Similarly,
the rent dissipation theory urges a finely tuned patent system that will grant and
enforce patents only when the balance of these pre-patent and post-patent racing
costs tips just the right way.386 Yet, the rent dissipation theory does not provide a
framework for making such determinations ex ante, at the time a private party
would decide whether to file a patent application or at the time the Patent Office
would examine it. Instead, it only identifies a select few reported judicial
decisions that, according to the summary accounts of Grady and Alexander, turn
out to be ex post examples of results that may have avoided rent dissipation.387
The importance of being able to make determinations about patentability
and patent scope around the time of the application has been emphasized recently
in a number of areas of the literature. Polk Wagner, in his work on the patent
infringement doctrine called the “doctrine of equivalents,” elucidates the
importance of information-forcing penalty default rules as inducement to potential
patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the
patent.388 In addition, Clarissa Long, in her work on the often overlooked
signaling function of patents, shows how in certain circumstances the
information-signaling function of patents may be even more valuable to the rights
385

Kitch, supra note 315, at 282–83 (discussing commercial success). Later in the same
work, Kitch may be advocating that the test for patentability over the prior art should merely be
novelty, without nonobviousness. See id. at 284 (“Thus substantial novelty is an economically
rational test of patentability.”). Such an argument would accord with the social cost saving
benefits of the registration theory outlined in Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 76-81.
386
See Grady & Alexander, supra note 363, at 322-47 (offering a complicated method for
making patentability determinations using a host of factors, many of which are determined long
after a patent application is filed, such as the importance of the patent in controlling downstream
rent-dissipating effects).
387
Id. at 343-47 (discussing only a few cases in summary). Furthermore, one of the few
cases Grady and Alexander rely upon as illustrative of the rent dissipation theory, General Mills v.
Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967), does not accord with any of the prevailing trends in
the case law over time. An electronic search using the Westlaw® KeyCite® service did not reveal a
single case after 1974 that cited Pillsbury on this issue and further revealed that, if anything, the
case is miscited by a commentator as announcing a per se rule against patents in the field of
culinary arts. See Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or
How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1477, 1482 n.30 (1991)
(“Food items are patentable, but the culinary creativity of chefs is not the type of creativity which
meets the standards for patentability.”).
388
R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 161-67 (2002) (arguing for a shift in focus from the allocation of
liability during infringement (ex post) towards rules that generate incentives both during and
before inventors apply for patents (ex ante) so as to better understand information-forcing default
penalty rules like the limitation on the doctrine of equivalents known as the “doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel,” which holds out the possibility of lost patent scope as an
inducement to potential patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the
patent.).
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holder than the substantive rights conferred by patent law.389 Put simply, ex ante
predictability is essential both for facilitating the private ordering of the property
owner and those with whom it contracts, and for mitigating the information costs
of third parties.390
At bottom, the prospect and rent dissipation theories of IP make important
contributions by elucidating the ways that property rights can facilitate
coordination among competing users of an asset so as to avoid over use of other
resources. It seems from the literature that patents may indeed have this net
beneficial impact in the real world.
But several implications of these theories are less clear. First, it is not
clear whether other factors operate sufficiently to mitigate rent dissipation.391
Second, it is not clear whether the racing effect really generates rather than
dissipates rents in this setting because at least over the medium term we may be
sufficiently far from the limit of knowable information that we can continue to
enjoy the broader dynamic economic growth associated with new technologies as
elucidated by Solow and Romer.392 Third, it is not clear whether the theoretical
benefit of coordination among competing users actually is realized by the use of
property rights here.393 Fourth, unlike the commercialization theory discussed
below, the prospect and rent dissipation theories do not provide any concrete
teaching about how best to shape the contours of an operating positive law
institution associated with the IP rights it posits that would be predictable by both
property owners and third parties ex ante.394
C. Commercialization Theory, Coordination, and Social Costs
The commercialization theory of IP views IP backed by property rights
and property rules as just one more institutional option in the set of industrial
organization tools for coordinating economic activity among individuals.
Coordination can occur in many ways, each with its own costs and benefits:
transactions among atomistic individuals in the open market without IP rights;
transactions among those connected by personal or social bonds, such as family or
religion; transactions among atomistic individuals in the open market with the
389

Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 625-28 (2002) (exploring the
signaling function of patents generally, including the potential role of the patent document itself to
convey information that would not be as credible when revealed in other contexts).
390
See supra Part II.C.2(a) (highlighting importance of predictability to the property owner
and those with whom it contracts); supra note 253, and accompanying text (work by Henry Smith
highlighting importance of information costs to third parties).
391
See supra notes 367-368, and accompanying text.
392
See supra notes 369-378, and accompanying text.
393
See supra notes 380-384, and accompanying text.
394
See supra notes 286-387, and accompanying text.
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benefit of IP rights; transactions within the hierarchy of a firm; transactions
involving the direct aid of the government such as a Pigouvian subsidy, or
transactions within the hierarchy of government such as at a government lab.
The commercialization theory of IP views IP rights as filling an important
niche left open by the other coordination options. Property rights can fill this
niche by offering a middle ground option. That is, they offer the coordination
benefits of hierarchy on the one hand and the strong incentives and information
benefits of the market on the other hand. They offer a tool for collective action
that relies upon and indeed facilitates private ordering. And to do so effectively
and efficiently, of course, they require ex ante predictability on the one hand and
they must, and indeed often do, mitigate a number of social costs on the other
hand. The discussion that follows elucidates the general outline of the
commercialization theory with an emphasis on connecting it to the major themes
in the IP literature.
1. Overview of the Theory
The commercialization theory and its component registration theory are
explored at some length within the context of patents in two earlier works by the
present author,395 and so only an overview is provided here.
The
commercialization theory of IP views IP rights backed by property rules as
important tools for facilitating the downstream commercialization of the subject
matter that is protected by IP rights, after that subject matter has been made.396
This downstream commercialization requires coordination among the many
complementary users of the IP subject matter including developers,
manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, advertisers, marketers, etc.397
Providing a focal point, or beacon,398 the publicly recorded IP right helps each of
these individuals to find each other,399 and then by cracking the Arrow
395

Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, and Kieff, Registering Patents, supra

note 8.

396

See, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 707-712 (discussing
commercialization role of patents).
397
Id. (discussing these many players and their incentives to interact). See also supra Part
II.B.4 (discussing coordination).
398
For more on the role of focal points in coordination see supra notes 172-174, and
accompany text.
399
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 99-100 (pointing out that the publicly
recorded patent documents help coordinate commercialization by giving notice of the property
right over wish bargaining or avoidance can occur). Compare, Richard A. Epstein, Notice and
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) (proposing “that
under a unified theory of servitudes, the only need for public regulation, either judicial or
legislative, is to provide notice by recordation of the interests privately created”). As discussed
infra Part IV, patent and trademark function more efficiently along this dimension than copyright.
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Information Paradox otherwise facing them, helps them negotiate with each
other.400 At the same time, therefore, IP rights facilitate the creation and
maintenance of both diversity and socialization among individuals within the
market by providing these diverse individuals with incentive and means for
coordinating with each other.401 In addition, as elucidated by the registration
component of the commercialization theory, the positive law rules for
determining when a valid IP right may be obtained protect reasonable investmentbacked expectations (and thereby decrease the risk of asset specific investments
and opportunism) by making sure that the right to exclude does not block
activities individuals otherwise are doing, and they do so with relatively low
administrative and public choice costs.402
The commercialization theory explores the comparative role of property
rights in IP as a tool for facilitating the commercialization of the subject matter it
protects. Under this view, IP can be seen as offering a type of middle ground
among several alternative institutional alternatives: atomized individuals in the
free market without IP rights, families or other close-knit groups, the firm, and the
government. As a middle ground between the open market and the firm, property
rights for IP can offer the coordination benefits of the firm and the benefits of
strong incentives of the market.403 At the same time, property rights for IP
mitigate the risks of asset specificity and opportunism that are associated with full
integration within a firm – for example, it can be easier for an inventor to walk
away from a patent license with a firm than also to have to surrender a basic
employment relationship with the firm.404 Property rights for IP also avoid the
weakening of incentives that can be associated with integration within a firm and
that can be especially pernicious where innovation is concerned.405 In addition,

400

See, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 710 (discussing importance of
property right for encouraging “holder of the invention and the other players in this market to
come together and incur all costs necessary to facilitate commercialization of the patented
invention.”). See also supra Part II.C.4(a) (discussing the role of property rights in cracking the
Arrow Information Paradox).
401
See supra notes127-130, 150-153, and 174-176, and accompany text (discussing the
importance of coordination for facilitating both socialization and the specialization and division of
labor, as well as diversity among market individuals in terms of both resources and preferences).
402
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 76-98 (pointing out that the prior art rules
for patents protect investments by third parties with low administrative and public choice costs).
403
See generally, supra notes 144-146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text
(exploring property rights in the context of the tradeoff between market and firm).
404
See supra note 251, and accompany text (noting the importance of public enforcement of
property rights and contracts as an option for avoiding the need for coordination within a firm,
which would lead to increased asset specificity and opportunism).
405
See supra note 149, and accompany text (discussing the problem of weakened incentives
within a firm and the particular problem this poses for innovation).
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property rights for IP can avoid the public choice costs of government.406 They
also allow more open participation than families or other close-knit groups.407
While achieving all of these benefits, property rights for IP also can protect third
parties in two important ways: low information costs,408 and protection of
investment-backed expectations and the concomitant asset specificity and
opportunism.409 At bottom, given the availability of certain enforcement through
civil litigation backed up by government courts,410 IP rights can facilitate private
ordering through coordination without the need for any additional formal
hierarchy of a firm or government agency. In the end, therefore, the
commercialization theory as elucidated here connects the theory of IP rights to the
set of problems explored through NIE.411
What is perhaps most striking about the commercialization theory given
the extent to which it is simply not discussed in most of the modern IP literature,
is that as a matter of historical fact, it was the central motivation behind the
framing of at least the present patent system, the 1952 Patent Act, if not also the
present trademark system, the 1946 Lanham Act.412 While the commercialization
theory is discussed to some extent in the contemporary IP literature, as elaborated
below, a number of issues meriting response have been raised. First, the theory is
often misperceived on its own terms. Second, the theory addresses many of the
problems generally identified with IP rights.
2. Common Misperceptions on the Theory
The focus of the commercialization theory is on the incentives for diffuse
individuals to decide individually to act in a way that ends up being

406

See supra note 267(exploring property rights in the context of the tradeoff between
market and government).
407
See supra notes 160-161, and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of “crony
capitalism”).
408
See supra note 253 (discussing work by Henry Smith on the importance for property
rights regimes to consider third party information costs).
409
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 (discussing the importance of the positive
law rules for validity of the IP right (in that case patents) for protecting third-party investmentbacked expectations).
410
The importance of certainty for facilitating private ordering is explored supra notes 198208, and accompanying text.
411
For a review of this set of problems see supra Part II.
412
Id., at 736-747 (reviewing the central role of the commercialization theory in the history
of the framing of the 1952 Patent Act, which provided what essentially remains as our present
patent system, by the same group that had only soon before framed the Lanham Act, which
essentially remains as our present trademark system ).
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coordinated.413 While rewards may provide an incentive to act to the individual
reward recipient, rewards do little compared to property rights to bring that
individual together with all other complementary users to successfully engage in
the complex commercialization process.414 Regrettably, this simple mechanism
of the commercialization theory’s coordination function is often misunderstood in
the literature in several respects.
First, the link between the commercialization theory and the prospect or
rent dissipation theories is often overstated.415 Put simply, the commercialization
theory focuses on the ability for IP to coordinate efforts among complementary
users of the asset to increase (or avoid insufficient) use of resources, whereas
prospect theory focuses on the ability for IP to coordinate efforts among
competing users of an asset to decrease (or avoid excessive) use of resources.416
Therefore, efforts to respond to the prospect and rent dissipation theories’
concerns about overuse (rent dissipation) are inapposite to commercialization
theory.
Second, the link between the commercialization theory for IP and the
theory of property rights, generally, is often overlooked. That is, much of the
literature overlooks the coordination function in its entirety and simply lumps the
property rights aspects of the prospect theory by Kitch with the property rights
aspects of the work by Demsetz on internalizing externalities.417 As elucidated in
413

Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 707-712 (discussing role of patents in
coordinating complementary users of an invention so as to facilitate inventions
commercialization).
414
Id. Compare the focus on providing direct incentives to the holder of the IP rights under
the reward theories. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 130 (discussing role of IP as an “incentive
the right gives the owner”). For more on reward theories, which focus on such direct incentives,
see supra Part III.A.
415
See, e.g., Lemley supra note 2, at 141, n. 42 (referring to commercialization theory as
“elaboration” of “prospect” theory). In addition, unlike the prospect and reward theories, the
commercialization theory, and its companion registration theory, has explanatory power for the
positive law rules of the of the IP legal institutions.
416
See supra note 397, and accompanying text (elucidating the basic coordination function
of the commercialization theory). See also Kieff, Registering Patents supra note 8, at 62-66
(discussing prospect and rent dissipation theories in relation to commercialization theory). For
game theory examples of the formal link between the role property rights can have in these two
different settings – described in that paper as racing games and mating games – see Dale T.
Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 968 (1982).
417
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
“Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 497 n.121 (1998) (citing work by Demsetz and
noting: “Similar reasoning underlies Edmund Kitch’s proposed ‘prospect’ approach to patents.”);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1040 (1989) (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and noting: “The
prospect theory offers a justification for patents that is in keeping with broader theories of property
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earlier discussions, the prospect theory does focus on the role of property rights in
mitigating rent dissipation.418 And Demsetz did also initially focus on property
rights as a tool for internalizing externalities.419 But as Demsetz, himself, later
realized:
In retrospect, it now seems to me that the theory of property rights implicit in
this explanation places too much weight on externalities (where, in the case
discussed, the externality is the neglected impact of hunting today on the cost of
hunting tomorrow). The “Toward” that begins the essay’s title, therefore, should
be taken seriously. Externality here refers to an effect on the production
transformation opportunities facing others, such effect being a result of actions
taken by someone who does not bear the value consequences of this effect.
Hunting today causes a change in the production opportunities facing hunters
tomorrow. As circumstances make the externality more costly to bear, private
rights adjust to reduce the seriousness of the externality. This is an important
pattern of property right development. Nonetheless, private-ownership
arrangements would exist even if there were no externality problems of the type
being discussed.

Simply put, and as discussed earlier in Part II.B.4, property rights can be seen not
merely as tools for internalizing externalities (they may have this effect and it
may be needed), but more importantly as tools for facilitating coordination among
the complementary users of an asset that is protected by a property right.
To be sure, property rights are not the only tool for facilitating
coordination. For example, coordination can take place with the help of more
organic, previously existing institutional frameworks, such as family ties, or what
Haber describes as “crony capitalism.”420 Coordination can take place with the
help of more engineered institutional frameworks, such as the firm, as Coase and
Williamson highlight in their important work on the theory of the firm.421 But the
point about property is that it provides yet an alternative method for achieving
coordination.422 Each method of course has costs and benefits, and the
commercialization theory of IP is focused on offering property rights in IP as just
one additional option to the facilitate private ordering associated with downstream
rights elaborated by Harold Demsetz . . . .”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 309 n.108 (1996) (citing work by Kitch and
Demsetz and noting: “For neoclassicists, therefore, intellectual property is less about creating an
artificial scarcity in intellectual creations than about managing the real scarcity in the other
resources that may be employed in using, developing, and marketing intellectual creations.”); Rai,
supra note 186, at 121 n.236 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz).
418
See supra Part III.B
419
See supra Part II.B.1.
420
See supra notes 160-162, and accompanying text.
421
See supra notes 163-171, and accompanying text.
422
See supra notes 173-178, and accompanying text.
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commercialization of the subject matter that is protected by IP, after that subject
matter has been made.423
Third, the commercialization theory also has been confused erroneously
with the work of Schumpeter in being focused on the IP holder’s assertion of
control.424 While the commercialization theory is focused on who will have an
incentive and ability to negotiate with whom, it is agnostic on the question of who
will end up controlling those negotiations. In fact, control will be a function of a
great many factors other than who owns the IP. For example, the parties’ relative
wealth effects, bargaining positions, negotiating skills, other resources, holdout
prices, alternative options, etc., will each impact the bottom line issue of control.
In a world in which each market player may bring its own skill sets, IP sets, and
other assets and opportunities to bear on development of a particular IP subject
matter, the end result of who will control subsequent development and use of that
subject matter is unclear, and indeed is left to the market and private bargains. At
bottom, the commercialization view of IP focuses on the importance of IP backed
by a property right as a tool for facilitating such a division of labor and other
forms of specialization.425
Fourth, the importance the commercialization theory places on the
distinction between ex ante and ex post may be confused by the different use of
those terms recently by Mark Lemley.426 Under the commercialization theory, for
IP to serve the commercialization function, the rules about how IP can be
obtained and enforced must be knowable to all market actors ex ante, in advance
of their decisions about whether to act. This means that regulation and liability
rule treatment may be suspect to the extent they have the effect of re-writing
agreements or changing rules ex post.427 When used in this context, the terms “ex
ante” and “ex post” are used in their general sense,428 which is different than how
they are used in the recent work by Mark Lemley.429 Lemley uses the term “ex
423

Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 707-710.
See, e.g., Lemley supra note 2, at 139, n. 35 (discussing role of patentee as coordinator
due to the control exerted through the patent and citing Kieff supra note 8 and JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, 100-02 (discussing coordination
through the control of a monopolist)). See also Lemley at 140 (suggesting that when the
government assigns the IP right it is effectively selecting who will have “control over an area of
research and development rather than trusting the market to pick the best researcher”).
425
See supra notes127-130, 150-153, and 174-176, and accompany text (discussing role of
property rights in facilitating specialization and division of labor).
426
See Lemley, supra note 2.
427
For a discussion of a number of such ex post changes and the problems they present see
F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property,
Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 275,
forthcoming __ G.W. LAW REV. __ (2004).
428
See supra Part II.C.2(a) (discussing differences between ex ante and ex post).
429
See Lemley, supra note 2.
424
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ante” in a special narrow sense to refer to the time period before any specific
creative work is made.430 Similarly, he uses the term “ex post” in a special
narrow sense to refer to a time period after any specific creative work is made.431
The commercialization theory relies on the term “ex ante” in the more general
sense to refer to a time period before any given act occurs, with a focus on the
importance of predictability. Similarly, it relies on the term “ex post” in the more
general sense to refer to a time period after any given act occurs, again with a
focus on predictability. That is, as these terms are used for purposes of the
commercialization theory, the focus is on the ability for private actors to predict a
legal result before deciding whether, or how, to act on any specific issue. Under
the commercialization view of IP, predictability ex ante is essential in facilitating
private ordering.
Fifth, some have suggested that “if patent law’s concern is to ensure
commercialization of inventions, then it is both overinclusive and
underinclusive.”432 The point is well taken, as far as it goes; but it may not
account for the full reach of the commercialization theory. On the question of
overinclusiveness, Abramowicz points out that “sometimes first-mover
advantages will outweigh second-mover advantages.”433 This is correct. But only
where a sufficient number of the complementary users of the asset believes ex
ante that this is the case with sufficient conviction to take on the coordinating role
will coordination so easily take place without the property right. This can and
likely does happen. But the point of the commercialization theory is that IP rights
can make it easier for this to happen in many more settings. On the question of
underinclusiveness, Abramowicz points out the need for commercialization of
subject matter that does not meet the positive law rules for IP protection.434 But
point of the registration component of the commercialization theory of IP is that
the positive law rules for obtaining IP are normatively important for protecting the
reasonable investment backed expectations of potential commercialization efforts
by third parties.435 Put simply, these positive law rules about IP validity are
430

Id. at 130.
Id.
432
Abramowicz, supra note 317, at 174. See also Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8,
at 68, n. 57 (noting that “participants in the Spring 2001Workshop Series of the John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School [raised] a similar
objection”).
433
Id.
434
Id. at 174-75 (“Patent law is underinclusive because commercializers of unpatentable
inventions also face the prospect of copying”).
435
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 68-70, and 76-98 (responding to
Abramowicz by noting that the registration theory component of the commercialization theory
elucidates the importance of the positive law rules for obtaining IP rights for protecting third party
investments in a way that mitigates administrative costs and public choice costs).
431
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essential for making the IP system work well. The extent to which they leave
behind some subject matter is a reason to explore the use of other tools to help
coordination in those areas, such as perhaps the firm, or the government. IP does
not solve all problems and it is only offered as an additional tool for helping to
solve some.
At bottom, the commercialization theory sees the IP right backed by the
credible threat of an injunction as playing an essential coordinating role for all the
players in the commercialization process.436 Those wishing to buy title to or
permission under the IP right must negotiate with the IP holder. As long as the
existence of the IP right and the identity of the IP holder are readily discernible,437
each of the putative participants in the commercialization process will have an
individual incentive to seek out and negotiate with that person, and through that
person with each other.438
3. Some Particularly Salient NIE Lessons on Social Costs for IP
While the above discussions of the major law and economic theories of IP
– reward, prospect, and commercialization – have gone far in elucidating the
implications of many of the NIE problems explored supra in Part II, a few themes
that are particularly salient to the debates over property rights in IP have not yet
been expressly addressed here. These include the output restricting impacts of
property rights due to problems of monopoly effects, transaction costs,
behavioralism, anticommons, as well as the efficacy of government and problems
of public choice. While the reward literature in particular has emphasized the
concerns about output restriction, the commercialization theory elucidates why
they concerns may be significantly less severe than perceived and indeed why in
some cases property rights may be essential for mitigating them. The
commercialization theory also elucidates why the concerns about government and
public choice must not be overlooked.
436

By focusing on the right to exclude, the commercialization theory of IP differs in
important ways from the general theory of property in land and goods, which typically consider
more than the right to exclude. Adam Mossoff provides an excellent historical account of property
theories that emphasizes the failure of approaches that focus only on the right to exclude. See
Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 376
(2003) (“The concept of property is explained best as an integrated unity of the exclusive rights to
acquisition, use and disposal; in other words, property is explained best by the integrated theory of
property.”). But see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 747–48 (1998) (suggesting right to exclude is central feature of property).
437
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 (discussing notice function of IP).
438
See supra note 153, and accompanying text (discussing transitive nature of these
interactions). See also, supra notes 172-174, and accompany text (discussing the focal point role
in coordination).
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(a) Monopoly Effects
As discussed above in the context of reward theories, much of the
literature on IP rights is consumed with concerns about limiting the potential
monopoly power associated with property rights in IP.439 But actual empirical
data is inconclusive on whether, for example, patents have been used to facilitate
cartel behavior.440 Although a dominant concern of the reward literature on IP is
that IP rights can confer power over price of the type generally associated with
monopolies, the connection this literature draws between IP and monopolies in
essence may be backwards. That is, as discussed below, IP rights often just do
not confer monopoly power; and yet they can be essential anti-monopoly weapons
– their availability can serve as an effective anti-monopoly vaccine for a market.
IP rights often do not confer monopoly power in large part because there
is rarely a one-to-one correlation between any particular IP asset and a market.441
In addition, IP rights face competition from alternative technologies, extant and
potential.442 At bottom, for example, even a patent on the better mousetrap faces
competition from existing spring and glue traps, the threat of future traps, and, of
course, cats.443
What is more, IP rights can facilitate market entry, at least so long as they
are backed by property rules. As a result, they can be powerful anti-monopoly
weapons.444 Indeed, the commercialization theory suggests that if meaningful IP
439

See supra Part III.A.
See, C.D. Hall, Patents, Licensing, and Antitrust, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 59 (1986).
441
See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8 at 729-731 (reviewing reasons why
IP rights confer insufficient market power to be monopolies and collecting sources). See also
supra note 212 (discussing relationship between IP assets and markets).
442
Id.
443
See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 61, providing the following overview:
Because the term monopoly is applied to an entire market, we begin our
analysis of monopolies by looking at markets. Markets tend to order themselves
around consumer demand—producers sell what consumers will buy. In general,
consumers buy to satisfy their needs or desires. In the context of a particular
consumer problem, like mouse infestation, for example, consumers need or want
solutions; and producers sell these solutions, perhaps in the form of mouse traps
or cats. We already know that a patent excludes others from making, using,
selling, or offering for sale a particular invention. We now see that in the context
of a market for solutions, a patentee can prevent others from selling a certain
solution, though not all solutions to a given problem. Indeed, it is often said that
necessity is the mother of invention, and the necessity caused by an inability to
gain access to a particular patented solution—perhaps because the price is too
high or perhaps because of an injunction—may very well give rise to the
development of alternative non-infringing solutions.
Id.
444
Id. at 744 (discussing role of IP rights as anti-monopoly weapons).
440
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rights had been available in the computer software industry in the 1970’s and
80’s,445 by the time of the Microsoft antitrust suit the industry likely would have
been characterized by a medium number of medium-sized players rather than a
single large player.446 “According to Judge Frank, in this context the David Co. v.
Goliath, Inc., competition is dependant upon investment in David Co., which will
not occur unless it is armed with the patent slingshot.”447 At bottom, the gains IP
rights may offer for competition and market entry across markets at any one time
as well as across time may well offset the potential for individual dead weight loss
in cases where an IP right truly conveys a monopoly in some point in time for
some market. In part, this point here is tied to the distinction between dynamic
and static efficiency, which is to say that the static inefficiency associated with
monopoly dead weight loss may be outweighed by the dynamic efficiency gains
associated with innovation and entry.448
In addition, IP rights can and often do operate to facilitate price
discrimination, which can mitigate the dead weight loss efficiency considerations
of monopolies.449 As explored in earlier work by the present author, the use of
property rights in IP
is also consistent with another basic work by Demsetz in which he demonstrated
that (1) private producers can produce public goods efficiently given the ability
to exclude nonpurchasers and (2) price discrimination is consistent with
competitive equilibrium for such public goods.450

Indeed, because of the doctrines of indirect infringement, IP rights facilitate price
discrimination through tying in a great many more cases than otherwise, including
for example where tying is not facilitated by technological constraints.451
At bottom, while IP rights do give some power over price and therefore
are associated with some dead-weight loss in theory, the actual monopoly effects
445

Patents were not available because of judge-made exceptions to patent law that had crept
into the law in the late 1960’s. The utilitarian nature of the industry made it an unlikely candidate
for benefiting in the anti-monopoly sense from copyright and trademark protection.
446
Id. (giving example of computer software industry as one in which the putative monopoly
power of Microsoft was correlated with a time of no meaningful IP protection in that industry).
447
Id. (citing Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir.
1942) (Frank, J. concurring)).
448
See supra note 209, and accompany text (pointing out the importance of exercising
restraint for certain forms of antitrust enforcement designed to protect static efficiency so as to
facilitate innovation and promote dynamic efficiency).
449
See supra note 214, and accompanying text (discussing role of price discrimination in
mitigating output-restricting effects of monopolies).
450
Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 727 (citing Harold Demsetz, The
Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970)). See also supra notes 213-214,
and accompany text (discussing price discrimination as limit on monopoly power).
451
Id., at 727-730 (exploring use of IP rights as tools for facilitating price discrimination).
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of IP are overstated and the anti-monopoly benefits of IP are overlooked. Indeed,
the lessons of the literature on “second-best” and the basic comparative
institutional analysis of NIE452 are that there are many reasons why it may be
prudent to avoid letting anti-monopoly concerns drive us to respond too
aggressively to every occasion of power over price. In this sense, for example,
the reward literature’s concern over mitigating monopoly effect of IP can be seen
as unduly exalting static efficiency over dynamic efficiency.453 Put simply, in the
real world the benefits of this type of market power for capital formation and
dynamic competition may outweigh its theoretical cost in the form of static deadweight loss.
(b) Transaction Costs, Behavioralism, and Anticommons
While the commercialization theory sees the nature of IP as a right backed
by the credible threat of an injunction to be the core benefit of IP in providing
coordination, it recognizes that this coordination requires transactions. As
explored in Part II.B.2, such transactions have both good and bad components to
them. They can be seen as costs.454 They also can be seen as benefits.455 But one
lesson of NIE is to engage in comparative institutional analyses and so in the
context of IP the comparison is between the various institutional options for
achieving coordination that were surveyed earlier – e.g., open market without IP
(commons), IP, family, firm, government.456 The focus of the commercialization
theory highlights the coordination benefits of IP.
Yet, one of the central focuses of the reward theories is on the transaction
costs associated with IP compared to a commons.457 Thus, it is appropriate to
compare the transaction costs of exchanges over property rights in IP against the
transaction costs of exchanges over what would otherwise be the subject matter of
IP but within a realistic commons, such as the putative commons of basic
academic knowledge.458 Yet, as explored in other work by the present author,
452

See supra notes 20-28, and accompanying text (discussing comparative institutional
analysis).
453
See supra Part II.C.2(a) (highlighting difference between static and dynamic efficiency).
454
See supra notes 120-126, and accompanying text (reviewing transaction costs).
455
See supra notes 127-131, and accompanying text (reviewing transaction benefits).
456
See supra notes 403-407, and accompanying text (positioning IP among various
institutional choices for achieving coordination).
457
See supra Part III.A (discussing reward theories and their incentive-access paradigm).
458
See, e.g. Rai, supra note 186 (arguing that IP rights impose greater transaction costs than
the basic scientific norms in the open “commons” of academics); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE. L.J. 177
(1987) (exploring the potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of
basic biological research); see also, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (exploring an
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even this so-called “commons” is riddled with its own form of less commercial
but nonetheless important property rights known informally as “kudos,” which
include more personal and less fungible assets generally associated with academic
and public sectors such as reputational benefits, fame, promotions, awards, titles,
etc.459 Earlier work by the present author has elucidated through comparative
institutional analysis why for exchanges in that setting of a putative commons
compared with the same setting having added IP rights, the transaction costs of
exchanges are likely to be worse without IP than with IP because IP brings
increased wealth and diversity to that market.460 One of the lessons of NIE
explored earlier is that transaction costs are likely to be more pernicious in thinner
markets than in thicker markets,461 That is, transaction costs are likely to be
worse in thinner markets than in thicker markets and the use of IP thickens the
market.462 As also discussed earlier, recent work by Buchanan and Yoon adds to
this analysis by pointing out that exchanges in such a commons also are more
likely to fail because of what they call the “non-economic motivations” associated
with such assets.463 Put simply, there are reasons to think that transaction costs
are likely to be higher for a commons compared to for IP.
Somewhat related to the concerns over transaction costs in the reward
literature are similar concerns about behavioralism. More specifically, in
response to concerns about behavioralism leading to failures in transactions over
IP rights, commentators have called for regulation for IP rights through the
imposition of liability rule treatment and greater antitrust enforcement.464 To be
sure, like all actors in the real world, IP owners are not perfectly rational. That is,
people are only boundedly rational in that they suffer cognitive biases, framing

experimental use exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviating potential negative
impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic biological research); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (offering preliminary observations
about the empirical record of the use of patents in the field of basic biological research and
recommending a retreat from present government policies of promoting patents in that field);
Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 277 (arguing that patents can deter innovation in
the field of basic biological research).
459
Kieff, supra note 185.
460
Id.
461
See supra notes 133-134, and accompanying text.
462
Kieff, supra note 185, at 703-4.
463
See supra note 281, and accompanying text.
464
See, e.g., Lemley supra note 2, at 133 (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048-72 (1997) (discussing
implications of relaxing rationality assumption for IP); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market
Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 857 (1992)
(pointing out costs of rationality assumption).
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effects, employ heuristics, etc.465
On the one hand, identification of
behavioralism concerns does suggest reasons to be skeptical about the ability for
individuals to actually achieve for themselves what is in their own best interest,
and behavioralism has justified resort to liability rules, regulation, immutable
contract terms, etc. On the other hand, the individuals the government will use to
affect these responses – legislators, regulators, and judges – are, of course, human
beings, too, and so will also suffer the limits of behavioralism.466 What is more,
these government decisions will be subject to public choice problems, discussed
below.467
At bottom for IP, the behavioralism limits of the market are important
costs to consider about the market. To the extent the alternative to IP is simply
lack of IP, then the countervailing considerations are the coordination benefits the
commercialization theory highlights.468 But to the extent regulation of the IP is
the alternative, then behavioralism limits for the government actors associated
with the regulation are also important countervailing considerations to consider.
What is more, to the extent the regulation will occur ex post, then interference
with ex ante incentives is an additional countervailing consideration to letting
behavioralism concerns justify deviation from basic property treatment for IP.469
Finally, regulation brings with it the inevitable costs of government, including the
tollbooth and rent-dissipation problems of agency capture, as well as the real
concomitant problems of permit thickets, License Raj, or anticommons.470
Ironically, much of the recent literature advocating enhanced regulation of
IP rights is tied to misplaced reliance on anticommons concerns.471 These
concerns are misplaced for several reasons.
In contrast to the real anticommons problem of the post socialist economy
discussed earlier,472 the dominant private value that an IP owner obtains from the
IP right to exclude use is by openly trading permission for use in exchange for

465

See supra Part II.A.4 (reviewing behavioralism problems as explored through NIE
literature).
466
See Paredes, supra note 70 (pointing out countervailing behavioralism problems for
government actors, as well as public choice problems, and collecting sources).
467
Id. See also, infra Part III.C.3(c) (discussing public choice).
468
See supra notes 396-412, and accompany text (overview of coordination benefits of
commercialization theory).
469
See supra Part II.C.2(a) (discussing importance of ex ante analysis).
470
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing public choice problems of rent dissipation and
tollbooths). See also supra Part II.C.4(b) (discussing the problems of permit thickets, License Raj,
and anticommons).
471
See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 458 (initiating literature on
anticommons for IP); Kieff, supra note 14, at (reviewing Supreme Court cases expressing
anticommons concerns about IP).
472
See supra Part II.C.4(b) (discussing anticommons problem).
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money or other consideration.473 As discussed earlier the economic motivations
associated with such “residual claims” are precisely what mitigate anticommons
concerns.474 Indeed, even the potential for a drive to suppress the subject matter
protected by IP is mitigated by the uncertainty that higher untapped value may lie
in wait.475 Put simply, the resulting social value of IP rights is that they
encourage their owners to discover and market methods for pushing use towards
the full competitive level so the IP rights will not create anticommons problems,
in biotechnology, software technology, or even for more mundane technologies
like nails and screws.476
What is more, the reward literature on IP gets the concerns about
anticommons backwards. Not only are anticommons problems for IP overstated,
the response generated by these concerns of liability rule treatment and regulation
are likely to generate true anticommons problems. There is a huge difference
between the openly tradable nature of property on the one hand and the pernicious
“permit thicket” or “License Raj” on the other hand. At bottom, residual claim,
tradability, enforceability, and private information are each reasons that IP rights
are successful in avoiding anticommons effects.
Interestingly, the realization that IP rights do not trigger anticommons
concerns does suggest that it is worth pushing on the analogy to real and personal
property rights and ask whether it makes sense for IP to be time-limited.477
Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are each time-limited to some extent,478 but
property rights in real and personal property do not simply expire. Recent work
by William Landes and Richard Posner has suggested a regime in which IP rights
473

That is, the IP owner may either actively license the IP to someone else who will in turn
sell the subject matter protected by the IP, or the IP owner itself may sell the subject matter
protected by the IP, which sale would include an implied license to the IP for its buyers. See F.
Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES
OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125 (2003); Kieff, supra note 185.
474
See supra notes 279-285, and accompanying text.
475
See Kieff supra note 8 at 726 (commercialization risk and potential for future
development provides incentives to license broadly).
476
See Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, supra note 473.
477
I thank Bruce Owen at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research for
suggesting this exploration. Conversation with Bruce Owen February 25, 2004. Lemley seems to
suggest this notion offhandedly but does not explore it, and indeed seems critical of it. See
Lemley supra note 2, at 131 (suggesting commercialization view may support “perhaps unlimited
duration” for IP rights).
478
By statute, patents expire after 17 years, on average (20 years from filing, and
examination takes three years, on average). For a brief discussion of the change from a 17 to 20
year patent term, see CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 898-900. Also by statute, copyrights expire
after a time certain. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (life of the author plus 70 years for works by
individual authors, or the shorter of 95 years after publication or 120 years after creation for works
made for hire, anonymous works, and pseudonymous works). Trademarks last only so long as the
mark is used in commerce in a consistent fashion.
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might be infinitely renewable; under their proposal the default for failure by the
IP owner to act is that the IP passes into the commons.479 The commercialization
benefits of IP suggest that it might be worth considering why the default position
is commons, rather than continuing status as property. When owners of personal
and real property are negligent custodians of their assets, the default position is
not that they fall into the public domain, but rather that they remain the subject of
private ownership. To be sure, the original owner typically loses title, but
ownership itself is not destroyed and indeed is most often essentially put up for
auction.480 Perhaps IP, too, should be left the subject of private ownership and
merely put up for auction if left sufficiently fallow.
Implementing perpetual IP would not be conceptually difficult.481 IP
owners could be required to maintain updated records in a central filing office so
anyone thinking they can put the IP to higher and better use will be able to initiate
negotiations at low cost. If the records are not kept (and perhaps a fee to cover
their maintenance at a central office not paid), then the IP would be condemned
and put up for auction.
Some may suggest that surrender should also occur if the IP owner fails to
either practice the subject matter covered by the IP or license the IP for someone
else to practice. But it is not clear that such an approach would be good. The
relative restrictive power of a property right in real or personal property is greater
479

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 471 (2003).
480
Foreclosure sales, and tax sales are the most common type, but even adverse possession
can be thought of as a type of auction open for bidding by the first to become adverse possessor.
481
Indeed, trademark rights already are potentially unlimited in duration, so long as they
remain in consistent use. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d, 1042, 1046–55 (CCPA 1982)
(opinions by Judges Rich and Nies concurring in result and reviewing the life-cycle of a trademark
– beginning with initial use and ending only with abandonment or genericness); see also Daphne
Leeds, Trademarks – The Rationale of Registrability, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 666 (1958).
For patents and copyrights, the term may be limited by the language of the constitutional grant of
power under which these regimes are presently promulgated, wherein Congress is given the power
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8. In contrast the trademark laws are promulgated under the
general Commerce Clause power of Article 1 that is now recognized to be quite expansive.
Compare In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 (1879) (holding trademark laws to be improper
exercise of Commerce Clause power because they regulate activity that is not sufficiently
interstate) with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that even growing wheat for
personal consumption in one’s own back yard has sufficient nexus to interstate commerce that it
may be regulated by Congress using Commerce Clause power). Thus, the patent and copyright
could be similarly viewed as at least within Constitutional power if passed pursuant to the same
commerce clause power. For an interesting recent treatment of this option see Thomas B.
Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004).
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than that in IP because the total subject matter protectable by real and personal
property is limited – there is only so much stuff and real estate available in the
world – while the total subject matter protectable by IP rights has a limit that is
not even known. Only to the extent we think we are approaching the limit of
knowable IP subject matter – inventions, creations, and symbols – is the
restrictive power of IP potentially as great as that for real and personal property.
Importantly, perpetual property rights in real and personal property is the norm
precisely because we think that best allows for private actors to consistently
evaluate and shift real and personal properties towards their highest and best use.
Just as an empty plot of land is not automatically transferred into a commons for
lack of use, perhaps neither should IP be left to the commons. And just as
concerns about transaction costs or anticommons do not allow the user of a plot of
land to elect not to treat the claims of labor and suppliers as undue and thereby
avoidable when building on that plot, such concerns perhaps should not worry
those wishing to use subject matter covered by IP.
Nevertheless, earlier work by the present author has identified at least one
reason why extended term for IP may be problematic.482 But this has nothing to
do with transaction costs and anticommons but rather with coordination and
commons.483 The concern is that over time there may become fragmentation of
ownership. This is less of a problem for real and personal property than it is for
IP. Real and personal property may have private value to co-owners absent
cooperation by other co-owners, as long as there is not too much interference by
the co-owners. For example, one owner may still play baseball on a co-owned
empty lot without active cooperation from the other co-owners. Because IP only
includes the right to exclude, not the right to use, a co-owner may not sue to

482

I perhaps incorrectly agreed with concerns in the reward literature about transaction costs
and anticommons concerns. Kieff supra note 8, at 734-735 (expanded term may exacerbate
anticommons problems). But I also suggested that increasing term might trigger commons
problems of the very type IP and commercialization are designed to avoid:
Indeed, the possibility of fragmented ownership presents a particular problem
for [IP]. The [IP] right is only a right to exclude, not a right to use. In addition,
each co-owner of a patent can decide not to exclude third parties, by giving a
partial assignment or license, without accounting to any other coowner. As a
result, an assignment by a co-owner will dissipate the entire value of the patent
for all other owners. For this reason, it is well recognized that co-ownership in
patents can create a tragedy of the commons.
Id. at 735 (citing ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1228-36 (2d ed. 1997).
483
Id.
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enforce that right without joining in the lawsuit all other co-owners.484 Put
differently, inaction by a co-owner is tantamount to a free license to the world.
In the end, the idea of perpetual ownership for IP certainly requires further
consideration before adoption. The point of raising it here is because it is helpful
in elucidating the implications of the commercialization theory in operation. The
focus of commercialization is making sure that all of the different complementary
users of the IP subject matter can coordinate with each other. It sees the role of IP
as the focal point, or beacon, that brings these diverse actors together. At bottom,
what provides them with incentives to indeed come together is the identification
of this beacon combined with its exchange attributes: residual claim, tradability,
enforceability, and private information.
(c) Public Choice
Public choice problems have, at least until recently, almost entirely
escaped attention in the IP literature. Nevertheless, public choice problems do
matter and should be considered because they are linked inextricably to
government action, and so must be weighed as countervailing considerations to
the extent regulation is offered as an alternative to IP.485 Indeed, the recent
recognition of public choice problems in the body of IP literature that discusses
copyright term extension only scratches the surface.486
484

See, Schering Corp. v. Roussel–UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed.Cir.1997) (‘‘one coowner has the right to impede the other co-owner’s ability to sue infringers by refusing to
voluntarily join in such a suit.’’)
485
For more on public choice generally see supra Part II.C.3.
486
The recent IP literature often discusses the recent Copyright Term Extension Act
(“CTEA”) as an example of public choice pressure from the entertainment industry. While this
may be so, it gravely underestimates the public choice problems in IP general, and in copyright in
particular. For more on the problems in copyright see the discussion infra Part IV.A. For
examples of the public choice view of the CTEA, see, e.g., Free Mickey Mouse: Lawrence Lessig
Wants Less Copyright Protection, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2002; Michael H. Davis, Extending
Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I Stayed Too Long?,” 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 1005 (2000)
(arguing that the CTEA provided “not an incentive, but a gift or windfall”); William Patry, The
Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
907, 932 (1997) (“[t]he real impetus for term extension” was to benefit “a very small group:
children and grandchildren of famous composers whose works are beginning to fall into the public
domain, thereby threatening trust funds”); Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of
the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 128 (2002) (CTEA “pads the wealth
of the widows and children of the original copyright holders” and is a “massive giveaway of
public domain resources”); Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension
Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 232-36 (2002) (setting forth basic public choice view of
CTEA). Larry Lessig has gone so far as to refer to the statute itself as the “Mickey Mouse
Protection Act” in reference to perceived public choice pressure brought by Disney. Doug Bedell,
Professor Says Disney, Other Firms Typify What’s Wrong with Copyrights, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, at 3D.
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For IP, the problems of public choice are quite real. For example, when
decisional frameworks in IP have been left open to sui generis determination, as
opposed to being guided by applicable statutory framework, courts and agencies
have acted swiftly to eviscerate IP.487 Even if any of market power, transaction
costs, anticommons, or behavioralism is a concern that ought to drive regulation
of IP, the central problem that public choice adds to the mix, and one which is
often overlooked by the literature, is that too often these concerns have been
invoked in particular cases to restructure particular arrangements ex post for the
benefit of one particular constituency or set of constituencies.488 Only if the
government actions called for in the literature were to totally eliminate IP or to
regulate it through revisions to statutory or regulatory decisional frameworks that
were sufficiently predictable, would these types of public choice problems be
potentially mitigated, including their negative impact on ex ante incentives and
private ordering.
487

Examples in the patent context include the agency and court decisions to prohibit patents
in software and modern biotechnology, which were finally reversed by later court decisions. See,
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer.”) and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–18 (1980)
(holding living organisms not per se unpatentable).
488
For at least the computer software example, the agency capture story is well known,
beginning with the decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding software to be
not eligible for patent protection). As described by Judge Rich:
I find it more significant to contemplate the identities of the troops lined up for
battle in Benson and observe which side obtained the victory. On the one side
was the Government, against patenting programs or software, supported by the
collective forces of major hardware (i.e., computer) manufacturers and their
representative associations who, for economic reasons, did not want patents
granted on programs for their machines. On the other side was Benson et al. and
their assignee and assorted lawyers and legal groups who were in favor of patent
protection for programs or software. The anti-patenting forces won the victory…
In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 774 (CCPA 1974), reversed by Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219
(reversing on other grounds than those discussed in the excerpt). The majority opinion in Benson
relies heavily on the 1966 report by a Presidential Commission on the patent system, which also
evidenced public choice issues. As described by former Patent Office Commissioner Gerald
Mossinghoff:
The 1966 report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System was
largely a battle between AT&T, which strongly supported the patenting of
software, and IBM, which bitterly opposed it. IBM’s position as a mainframe
manufacturer and seller was that software should be unpatentable and should be
given away free of charge. AT&T, as primarily a software developer, felt
precisely the opposite.
Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of the Software Patent
Saga, 8 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 307, 336 n.63 (1999) (citing interview with the Honorable Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, in Arlington, Va. (Sept. 13,
1999)).
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Put differently, if in any given case a party may invoke concerns about
market power, transaction costs, anticommons, or behavioralism as a justification
for avoiding IP, then we should not be surprised to see many cases in which
parties make precisely such charges, successfully.489 What is most troubling
about the concerns expressed in the literature about market power, transaction
costs, anticommons, or behavioralism, is that no attempt is made to suggest a
decisional framework for determining ex ante when these concerns will be
enough to trigger government action. This leaves open the possibility of a return
to the time when the decisional framework by courts was so obtuse that either no
IP right could satisfy them,490 or so unpredictably able to be satisfied that the
effective value of all impacted IP rights simply collapsed towards zero.491

489

See Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem, Hoover Institution Essays on
Public Policy (1993), 7-13:
The general rule is that government undertakes an activity that seems desirable
at the time. Once the activity begins, whether it proves desirable or not, people
in both the government and the private sector acquire a vested interest in it. If
the initial reason for undertaking the activity disappears, they have a strong
incentive to find another justification for its continued existence.
***
Again, let me emphasize, the problem is not that bureaucrats are bad people.
The problem, as Marxists would say, is with the system, not with the people.
490
For example, the test for patentability has at different times become so rigid for some
courts that no patents were held valid within their jurisdiction. The standard had become so vague
and yet so difficult to satisfy throughout the U.S. by the early 1940’s that Justice Jackson
remarked “[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get its hands
on.” Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Even
after the statute was amended in response to these cases, the problem persisted in the Second
Circuit as late as the 1960’s. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The Creation of the Federal
Circuit, in CHISUM ET AL. supra note 5, at 30, 30-31 (former Patent Office Commissioner
Mossinghoff recounting that during the confirmation hearings for then-Second Circuit Judge
Thurgood Marshall’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Judge Marshall responded to a question
about patents by saying “I haven’t given patents much thought, Senator, because I’m from the
Second Circuit and as you know we don’t uphold patents in the Second Circuit”).
491
This is in effect the “permit thicket,” “License Raj,” or true anticommons problem
discussed earlier. See supra Part II.C.4(b). The problem is more colorfully described by Dickens
within the context of IP:
At the Patent Office in Lincoln’s Inn, they made ‘a draft of the Queens bill’, of
my invention, and a ‘docket of the bill’. I paid five pound, ten, and six, for this.
They ‘engrossed two copies of the bill; one for the Signet Office, and one for the
Privy-Seal Office’. I paid one pound, seven, and six, for this. Stamp duty over
and above, three pound. The Engrossing Clerk of the same office engrossed the
Queen’s bill for signature. I paid him one pound, one. Stamp-duty again, one
pound, ten. I was next to take the Queen’s bill to the Attorney-General again,
and get it signed again. I took it, and paid five pound more. I fetched it away,
and took it to the Home Secretary again. He sent it to the Queen again. She
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At bottom, public choice problems are an important countervailing
consideration to the regulatory proposals suggested throughout the reward
literature in response to concerns about IP, including concerns relating to power
over price, transaction costs, anticommons, or behavioralism. In the comparative
institutional analysis, the question to always consider is not merely whether a
particular problem can be fixed, but rather, all things considered, the state of
affairs in general is improved by following the particular prescription to fixing
that particular problem.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FROM NIE FOR COMPARING IP REGIMES
While the positive law IP regimes of patent, trademark, and copyright,
each comprise substantial bodies of law, a thorough discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this article, several core features of each essentially establish
the overarching approach to their institutional framework. The point of the
discussion here is that these core features have particularly significant
implications for a comparative institutional analysis across these different
regimes.
This comparative institutional analysis employs the central lessons from
NIE that were explored earlier.492 In summary, these lessons include that property
rights and IP can provide an important additional and middle-ground tool for
optional use by individuals engaged in private ordering beyond those offered by
the extreme poles of either the free, open market without them on the one hand, or
the hierarchy of family, firm, or government on the other hand.493 To facilitate
private ordering effectively, IP rights must operate as rights of exclusion around
which coordination can take place. To do so efficiently, they must be structured
to mitigate the costs of rent dissipation, information, transactions, and public
choice.
The following comparative outline of the IP regimes suggests that the
patent and trademark regimes generally function well along these metrics because
they employ relatively crisp forms of property backed up by property rules, based
signed it again. I paid seven pound thirteen, and six, more, for this. I had been
over a month at Thomas Joy’s. I was quite wore out, patience and pocket.
Charles Dickens, A Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent, in Charles Dickens and the ‘Poor Man’s Tale of
a Patent’ 15, 18–19, 29 (Jeremy Phillips ed., 1984) (including appendices about the
“circumlocution office” described to be “(as everybody knows without being told) the most
important Department under Government”).
492
See supra Part II.
493
For elaboration on the role of property rights as a middle ground see supra notes 144146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context
of the tradeoff between market and firm). See also supra note 267(exploring property rights in the
context of the tradeoff between market and government).
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on relatively easy to apply decisional frameworks in their organic statutes on both
validity and enforceability. At bottom, these systems facilitate private ordering
while mitigating social costs by basically operating in accordance with the
commercialization theory, as discussed above.494 In contrast, the copyright
regime does not facilitate private ordering, and indeed seems to operate in
accordance with the dysfunctional reward theories, as also discussed above.495
Of some note in this comparative institutional analysis is that these
different IP regimes evolved through remarkably different legislative histories.
Through what may have been mere historical happenstance,496 the patent and
trademark regimes both grew out of a concerted effort about the same time, the
1940’s, by the same bar association, the New York Patent Law Association.497
Focused not on any particular set of clients, owners or infringers, but rather on
crafting a coherent system, these efforts produced institutional frameworks that
generally cohere and as a result are effective and efficient at achieving their core
goal, which is commercialization, as discussed below.498 In contradistinction,
statutes shaped through interest group politics, including the copyright statute, are
plagued by a host of public choice legislative compromises. The copyright
regime that resulted from this process turned out to be significantly less effective
and less efficient in facilitating coordination. Thus, an important area for further
research would include a careful comparison of the operative legislative histories
of these different regimes to determine the reasons why they seemed to have
taken such different approaches and led to such different results.

494

See supra Part III.C (reviewing commercialization theory).
See supra Part III.A (reviewing reward theories and their limitations).
496
Id. at 740:
Heady with success in implementing the Lanham Trademark Act [our present
trademark system] a few years earlier, in 1948, the New York Patent Law
Association had Giles Rich draft for introduction in Congress a bill [that
eventually became the 1952 Patent Act, our present patent system].
497
The organization is presently called the New York Intellectual Property Law Association.
For a historical review of the organization see, Gregory J. Battersby, et al, A Seventy-Five Year
History of NYIPLA, available on-line at http://www.nyipla.org/public/01_history.html.
498
The point here is not that these statutes are perfect. The drafters of these statutes, like all
human beings, are characterized by human foibles including, for example, behavioralism. Rather,
the point is that because of the way they were organized during the drafting process, the individual
incentives they each faced happened to be more consistent with their efforts being directed
towards drafting a statute that coherently achieved the coordination function to which they had
subscribed than with their efforts being directed towards helping any one class of client. At a
minimum, they were largely isolated from public choice pressures.
495
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A. The Basics of Positive Law IP Regimes
As explored in earlier work by the present author, the positive law rules
for enforcing and obtaining patents are effective and efficient in achieving
coordination benefits while minimizing social costs.499 Coordination is needed
for inventions because their commercialization is a costly, risky, and complex
process in which second-mover advantages can dominate, and which requires
many diverse actors besides inventors, including, for example, capitalists,
developers, laborers, managers, and advertisers.500
The rules for enforcing patents facilitate coordination among all of these
individuals by helping the patent itself serve as a coordinating focal point, or
beacon around which to gather.501 This beacon effect is achieved by allowing
patentees to elect to sue or license502 anyone who directly infringes,503 induces
infringement,504 or contributes to infringement.505 Of course, money often can be
made best by avoiding lawsuits, and instead negotiating against the backdrop of
their threat. And the diverse contracting that is facilitated by these positive law
rules is important for pushing output of the patented invention towards the full
competitive level.506
The positive law rules for obtaining patents mitigate social costs in several
respects. The disclosure rules facilitate this private ordering by giving public
499

Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8 (exploring law and economics of
positive law rules for enforcing patents); Kieff Registering Patents supra note 8 (exploring law
and economics of positive law rules for obtaining patents).
500
Id. supra note 8 at 707-08 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
PUB. NO. OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
3, 20-96 (1995) (collecting sources and setting forth as principle findings and describing in detail
how successful commercialization is not simply a matter of developing technology first or getting
to market first and instead requires intellectual property protection to create an environment
conducive to securing complimentary assets, skills, capital, manufacturing, marketing, and
support)).
501
See supra note 398 (discussing focal point or beacon effect of patents).
502
See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 736-38. Before the 1952 Act,
courts had used the misuse doctrine to erode the ability for intellectual property owners to price
discriminate or engage in restricting licensing. Section 271(d) expressly states that such conduct
shall not be misuse. See also Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)
(recognizing impact of Section 271(d) and its reason for inclusion in the 1952 Patent Act). To be
certain this was clear, Congress acted again in 1988 by adding subparts 4 and 5 to Section 271(d)
of the Patent Act to expressly provide that neither a refusal to license nor a tying arrangement in
the absence of market power is patent misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5) (added by Pub. L. No.
100-703, 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988)).
503
Section 271(a) (direct infringement).
504
Section 271(b) (inducement of infringement).
505
Section 271(c) (contributory infringement).
506
The diverse contracting that is allowed facilitates both price discrimination and
coordination among complementary users. See, Kieff & Paredes, supra note 427 at 9-11.
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notice of the property right.507 They also help protect third parties’ reasonable
investment backed expectations by helping these third parties to avoid inadvertent
trespass.508 Third parties’ reasonable investment backed expectations also are
protected by the rules about patentability over the prior art, which protect any
verifiably prior investments.509 Importantly, these patentability rules are all
enforced with rules biased in such a way that they involve remarkably low
administrative, public choice, and both Type I and Type II error costs.510 Indeed,
because patentees are the ones who are lowest cost processors of the information
needed to assess validity information costs are mitigated when property the
owners themselves are given such strong incentives to make these determinations,
and recent empirical models suggest these incentives do work.511 As elucidated
by Anderson & Hill, this type of owner-driven system for establishing property
rights tailor-made to the needs of the owners is the best candidate for mitigating
the rent-dissipation that otherwise can accompany the establishment of property
rights.512
When put to the test in practice, patent law seems to work. For example,
the 1980 shift in positive patent law that opened patents to the field of modern
biotechnology is at least consistent with the conclusion that patents do indeed
work to facilitate coordination. Only in the U.S. and only since 1980 have patents
been available in modern biotechnology.513 And only in the U.S. and only since
1980 has the biotechnology industry been characterized by not only the large
companies often collectively called “Big Pharma,” but also by a steady pool of
roughly 1,400 small and medium-sized companies that is also consistently turning
over.514
507

See Kieff Registering Patents supra note 8, at 99-105.
See Id.
509
See Id. at 76-99.
510
See, F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex
Technological Questions of Patentability over the Prior Art, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125 (2003).
511
See AMALIA YIANNAKA & MURRAY FULTON, PRIVATELY OPTIMAL PATENT BREADTH
th
UNDER THE THREAT OF PATENT VALIDITY CHALLENGES, presented to the 8 International
Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology Research (ICABR): International Trade and Domestic
Production, held in Ravello (Italy), July 8-11, 2004 (available on-line at
http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/conferenze/icabr2004/papers/Yiannaka.A.pdf) (showing how
patentees integrate concerns about validity challenges into their own decision-making ex ante).
512
See Anderson & Hill, supra note 271, at 443 (showing how less centralization in the
definition and enforcement property rights helps to improve efficiency by avoiding rent
dissipation).
513
See Kieff supra note 473 (discussing shifts in positive law).
514
The increase in small and medium sized firms, which is unique to the U.S., after the
addition of patents in the U.S., is consistent with the antimonopoly power of patents explored
earlier. See supra Part III.C.3(a).
508
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To be sure, the patent regime is not without problems. Indeed, several
recent areas of patent law provide comparatively poorer mixes of cost and benefit.
For example, overhaul to the statutory regime governing the interaction between
patent law and Food and Drug law called the Hatch-Waxman Act515 raises a host
of public choice, administrative, and market power problems.516 Also, the
uncertainty governing the process of patent claim construction may be frustrating
the patent system’s important ex ante incentives for private ordering by both
patentees and infringers.517 In addition, the increasing reliance in infringement
matters on the doctrine of equivalents is similarly frustrating the patent system’s
important ex ante incentives for private ordering by both patentees and
infringers.518 Lastly, the recent trend by the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice Antitrust Division to pursue actions against patentees on
so-called “upstream” technologies in the name of mitigating problems of market
power, transaction costs, and anticommons problems, are actually evidence of
agency capture that can not only frustrate market entry but also upsets private
ordering overall, as all players in the market realize over time that terms like
“upstream” and “downstream” are so relative that they simply may be synonyms
for “things to be bought” and “things to be sold” by any private party able to gain
the agency’s attention.519 But each of these bodies of contemporary patent law
515

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. 156 & 271.
516
See, e.g., FTC report entitled “Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration” (July 2002)
(describing problems with Hatch-Waxman Act and collecting sources).
517
For an excellent collection of recent empirical work on claim construction by R. Polk
Wagner, see www.claimconstruction.com.
Importantly, the uncertainty here is not the
individualized uncertainty associated with what some see as high reversal rates on appeal but
rather the lack of coherence, or predictability, that the entire body of claim construction law seems
to be generating. Ironically, the empirical work by Wagner suggests that although the body of
legal rubrics that are available for claim construction may not yield predictability, simply knowing
the identities of the members of the appellate panel at the Federal Circuit may yield at least case
specific predictability at the time of oral argument.
518
The point here is that patentees may be able to gain more flexibility in claim scope while
at the same time providing more certainty to infringers by relying on the established disclosure
rules of Section 112 than on the doctrine of equivalents. See Kieff supra note 14, at 8-9
(discussing Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 1153, 117 S.Ct.
1352 (1997) (holding that patent claims that are not infringed literally may still be infringed under
the judge-made rule called the “doctrine of equivalents” to allow patentees flexibility) and Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002)
(holding that the doctrine of equivalents is cabined by the judge-made rule called “prosecution
history estoppel” to allow third parties more certainty in knowing what will infringe a patent)).
519
For an excellent and easily accessible review of such recent FTC activities see Stanley M.
Gorinson, James L. Ewing, IV, and Peter M. Boyle, Federal Antitrust Enforcers Focus on
Intellectual Property Abuses, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW TODAY 38 (Aug. 2003) (discussing
Rambus and Unocal cases). For more detailed discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the
problem with these actions see Kieff & Paredes supra note 427.
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could, and should, be reversed, through case or statute, as appropriate; and indeed
none was provided for in the institutional framework of the 1952 Patent Act,
itself. Put differently, the patent system of yesterday may be better in several
respects than the patent system of today.
As also explored in earlier work by the present author, the positive law
rules for enforcing and obtaining trademarks are also effective and efficient in
achieving coordination benefits while minimizing social costs.520 Coordination is
needed for the symbols protected by trademarks because the commercialization of
these symbols is also a costly, risky, and complex process in which second-mover
advantages can dominate and which requires many diverse actors besides the one
first making appropriate use of the symbol in commerce, including for example,
capitalists, business partners, and advertisers.521
The rules for enforcing and determining validity of trademarks facilitate ex
ante private ordering because, as with patents, they turn on facts equally
knowable to all market actors in advance.522 Also as with patents, the rules
allowing the trademark holder to elect to sue or license anyone who would be
guilty of direct, contributory, or induced infringement are important in ensuring
that use of the protected subject matter is pushed towards fully competitive
levels.523 In addition, as with patents, the validity and disclosure rules of
trademark help protect third party investments, both ex ante, and ex post. For
example, ex ante investments are protected through rule giving a cause of action
to a prior user of a mark that is made famous by a subsequent user.524 Similarly,
ex post investments are protected by the limited scope of trademark rights in the
first instance by, for example, the doctrine that prevents trademark rights from

520

Kieff supra note 8 at 751-754 (exploring law and economics of positive law rules for
obtaining and enforcing trademarks and their role in commercialization).
521
Id.
522
Key evidence typically takes the form of survey data from ordinary customers.
523
Because the need to make commercial use of the subject matter protected by trademarks
is less compelling than for patents – because functionality is a bar to trademark protection – the
impact of any remaining distortion caused by market power is less severe. That is, there is still the
potential for static economic dead weight loss, but the alternative moral claims about output
effects are mitigated.
524
See, e.g., Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th
Cir. 1977) (protecting small prior user’s mark using theory sometimes called “reverse confusion”
because the public is lead to confuse the first-user’s mark with the more famous second-user’s
mark and think that the first is the second rather than the more typical confusion case in which a
second user’s mark is confused with that of a first user). In some cases, both users may be
allowed to operate in different markets. See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d
904 (7th Cir.1968) (holding that the national chain Burger King is allowed exclusive use the mark
throughout the nation except in the town of Matoon, IL, where a prior user in that particular
location is allowed to continue exclusive use).
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covering functional elements.525 And as with patents, the contours of the rights
staked out by trademarks are largely set by the rights-holders themselves, which
mitigates the rent dissipation that otherwise can accompany the establishment of
property rights.526
While the trademark system generally works well in facilitating
coordination over non-functional aspects of products and services, several recent
changes in trademark law have eroded this function in important ways. Consider
for example, the recent Dastar decision to substantially limit false advertising
claims as a matter of law when they touch on subject matter that relates to other
IP regimes,527 as well as the recent Moseley decision to limit dilution causes of
action to cases of actual dilution rather than also including likelihood of
dilution.528
The approach the Court took in Dastar runs the risk of eviscerating as a
matter of judge-made law the carefully crafted balance struck by the legal
institutional framework set forth in the Lanham Act.529 The Court’s approach
interferes with private ordering by both producers (who can no longer bring
causes of action that are important for coordination) and by consumers (who lose
the benefit of truthful advertising for planning and making purchase decisions).530
The approach the Court took in Moseley also runs the risk of eviscerating
as a matter of judge-made law the carefully crafted balance struck by the legal
institutional framework associated with the Lanham Act.531 Limiting causes of
action for dilution to cases in which actual dilution has occurred may eliminate
525

See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(Rich, J.) (reviewing functionality doctrine and collecting sources).
526
See Anderson & Hill, supra note 271, at 443 (showing how less centralization in the
definition and enforcement property rights helps to improve efficiency by avoiding rent
dissipation).
527
See Kieff supra note 14, at 1722-26 (discussing Dastar decision).
528
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 115 (2003) (interpreting statute to be
limited to causes of action for only actual dilution, not likelihood of dilution, which is in contrast
to the causes of action available for confusion that include both those for likelihood of confusion
and actual confusion).
529
See Kieff supra note 14, at 1722-26. More recently, Laura Heymann has provided an
excellent and detailed treatment of the importance of allowing trademark-type false advertising
causes of action relating to potentially copyrighted works. See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of
the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, The George Washington
University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 101, forthcoming at 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (2005).
530
Id.
531
Although not expressly set forth in the statute itself, dilution was very much part of the
institution of trademark law associated with the Lanham Act. Compare Sara Stadler Nelson, The
Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003) (criticizing the long
persistence of dilution in the institution of trademark law since just before the framing of the
Lanham Act).
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the effectiveness of the cause of action for dilution. Eliminating dilution would
frustrate the coordination benefits of trademarks by providing marginally
decreased protection for exactly those marks around which coordination and
commercialization were marginally most successful.532 Protecting these marks in
this way recognizes that individuals sometimes are motivated to buy simply by
fashion concerns – such as to appear a certain way, to appear to be motivated in a
certain way – rather than by concerns about source of a particular good or
service.533 That is, availability of a dilution cause of action makes it profitable for
firms to invest in making marks fashion statements in their own right.534 In turn,
these marks offer consumers the opportunity to make the ultimate consumption
choice – to buy with frivolity what simply is desired but not needed.535
As there is no suggestion in the Court’s opinions or elsewhere that
Congress lacks sufficient power to promulgate a statute that could be worded
slightly differently so as effectively to overrule both Dastar and Moseley,
coordination concerns suggest such an effort may be well worth perusing. Indeed,
it would bring these two areas of trademark law back into conformity with the

532

See Kieff supra note 8, at 752-53. As pointed out by Judges Rich and Nies, two leading
scholars of both the history and theory of trademark law, there is not and should not be any
principle of trademark law that requires imposition of a penalty for the originality, creativeness,
attractiveness, uniqueness, or even fame of one’s product. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042,
1046-55 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (opinions of Judge Rich and Judge Nies concurring separately in result).
They note that the opposite rule
has led courts to an esoteric and extraneous inquiry focusing on what motivates
the purchasing public to buy particular goods, the product itself or the source. . .
. The reason the public is motivated to buy the product . . . is of concern to
market researchers but is legally immaterial to the issue of whether a particular
designation is generic…. It would be unfortunate were we to discourage use of a
spark of originality which would transform an ordinary product into one of
grace.
Id.
533
See supra note 91 (discussing fashion).
534
See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 752-53 (noting that “the amount
of investing in potentially famous marks will rise” and citing William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 304 (1988)).
535
Id., at 753. To be sure, it is recognized that the consumers might argue that because their
collective attention in the mark is at least as responsible for the mark’s fashion status, the mark
should be owned by them, not the one commercializing the mark. Id., (citing Jessica Litman,
Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1730).
The commercialization theory, however, explains that it makes sense to treat the mark as private
property owned by the one who engaged in commercialization because such treatment facilitates
the coordination necessary to promote the mark to this level of recognition. Nevertheless, it also
is recognized that investments of this type – by both producers and consumers – have their own
opportunity costs. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, supra note 303
(pointing out in the context of copyrights that there may be too much investment of this type).
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institutional framework associated with the Lanham Act as framed.536 Such
changes would also further the coordination goals of the system. Put differently,
as with the patent system, the trademark system of yesterday may be better in
several respects than the trademark system of today.
In contrast to patents and trademarks, the basic statutory scheme for
copyrights grew out of a classic public choice bargain among large interest
groups. These groups have regularly returned to the legislative process to reshape the framework and reach new compromises each time technology or other
factors sufficiently have changed the interests of those groups.537 While such an
approach does do a reasonable job integrating into the statute many of the
collective preferences of those present in the negotiations at that time, it does less
well integrating concerns of others, or even of the same parties at later times.538
More specifically, as the basic economics of the drafting constituencies’
businesses change over time due to changing technologies, norms, etc., it should
not be surprising that each iteration of the legislative bargain often will be too
intensely focused on responding to prior allocations. That is, there is a lag
between the change in technology and the change in economics and a subsequent
536

For a review of the history of the institution of trademark law associated with the Lanham
Act, see, e.g., Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks--From
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks
and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1979);
and Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks--Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969).
537
See generally, Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, 23, 135-63 (2001) (reviewing “unique”
public choice history of copyright and explaining how since 1909 all but two of the frequent
revisions to copyright law were essentially written by collective bargaining among some of the
impacted industries and citing the following as the only two exceptions: (1) The Computer
Software Copyright Act of 1980, Sec. 10, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, which revised
Section 117 to expressly extend copyright protection to computer programs on the
recommendation of the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), a committee of experts focused on copyrights in computer software; and (2) The
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, which amended Section 110(5) to limit the number of institutions
required to pay performance royalties for nondramatic musical works)). See also, Niels
Schaumann, Intellectual Property Symposium: The Impact of the United States Supreme Court on
Intellectual Property This Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1617, 1619, n.8 (citing same
two exceptions). Even these two revisions that putatively did not emerge directly from interest
group pressures may themselves have been driven by concerns for interest groups. For example, I
thank Mike Meurer for pointing out the interest Congress may have had in appearing to be
sensitive to the needs of small restaurants and coffee shops when passing The Fairness in Music
Licensing Act of 1998. See also, David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 1233, 1281 (arguing that the statute “smacks of special interest legislation for the benefit
of a defined class”).
538
In part this is a race to the bottom story and so does not argue that such a process will
always yield this bad result but rather it explains how one contributing factor may have played a
role in this case.

KIEFF

NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT

112

lag between the change in economics and efforts to renegotiate the legislative
bargain. This is an important difference between the drafting approach used for
the patent and trademark regimes on the one hand and the copyright regime on the
other and this difference leads to comparatively greater public choice costs for the
copyright regime as well as comparatively less ex ante coordination benefit.
But more important than this historical explanation for how the copyright
regime came to fare comparatively less well than the patent and trademark
regimes, a comparative institutional economic analysis of the regimes themselves
shows why the copyright regime does fare less well. On this measure, as
described more fully below, copyright is less successful in achieving coordination
benefit because it is too clumsy in operation. What is more, the copyright regime
may not be needed to achieve coordination benefits in the first place, at least for
the entertainment industry. Put differently, the copyright regime may seen as
resembling a bridge over a river that is not only redundant of other crossings, but
that also has essentially collapsed under its own weight.
Copyright is famously difficult to understand, even for business actors
within the system.539 Even though copyright involves assets over which private
parties are more informed than government actors (and so property rules dominate
liability rules)540 the system employs a host of liability rules, as well as exceptions
to infringement (such as fair use and home recording for self use and for
distribution to friends and family) and exceptions to those exceptions (such as the
Napster case holding liability for sharing with peers where done over the
internet).541
In addition, evolved rules on preemption and misuse leave property
owners unclear as to what coordinating deals can be struck.542 That is, taking the
strong form of the preemption arguments at face value would suggest that efforts
to sell songs through services like i-Tunes under contracts limiting subsequent
distribution may be trying to impose acceptance of restrictive contract terms that
are as a matter of law preempted and therefore void as against public policy.543
Then, taking the strong form of the misuse arguments at face value such an effort
539

According to Rob Glaser, Chairman of the company MusicNet, “It’s as if Franz Kafka
designed this system and employed Rube Goldberg as is architect.” Amy Harmon, Copyright
Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at C1.
540
See supra notes 328-344, and accompanying text (discussing relative roles of property
rules and liability rules).
541
Consider compulsory licensing at positive rates in many areas like re-transmissions
(Sections 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122) and jukeboxes (Section 116). Also consider compulsory
licensing for free for those uses determined to be fair (Section 107 on Fair Use and Section 122 on
copies for the blind).
542
See Kieff supra note 14, at 5-7 (discussing preemption); Kieff & Paredes supra note 427
(discussing misuse).
543
See Kieff supra note 14, at 5-7 (discussing preemption).
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to impose illegal terms in a contract over material that relates to copyright would
constitute misuse of a type that would at a minimum make any otherwise valid IP
rights involved in the transaction unenforceable and at a maximum subject the one
imposing the contract terms to antitrust liability including, potentially, treble
damages and attorney fees.544
Even the rules on validity and scope of copyright itself are comparatively
murky.545 What is more, unlike for patents and trademarks, they essentially are
set as immutable rules (not even default rules) through the central regime rather
than by the individual claimants, and therefore are most likely to be associated
with rent-dissipation.546
The mere fact that cases like Napster and Aimster were brought is
evidence that the regime simply is failing to allow sufficient private ordering to
occur to meet new customer needs.547 Cases like this can be seen as evidence of
large numbers of consumers manifesting some willingness to pay some positive
price by going through the hassle costs of participating in the services but electing
instead to pay no monetary price because no effective sales venue was provided.
Put differently, these cases can be seen as evidence of producers being motivated
not to sell in these markets at least in part by the fear that such business models
would not be afforded legal protection, and instead might generate legal liability
under doctrines of misuse or antitrust.548 Indeed, for some time the fear of
rampant copying by consumers has driven producers to seek and obtain statutory
changes providing criminal liability for copyright infringement in certain
circumstances. The fear of this criminal liability imposes an added cost on
consumers.
544

See Kieff & Paredes supra note 427 (discussing misuse).
Consider, for example, the murky rules about what constitutes a derivative work or an
adaptation. Also consider the basic question of whether putative copyright subject matter is
protectable expression or unprotectable idea. On the difficulty with the so-called idea/expression
dichotomy, see Gregory Aharonian, Problems with Copyright and Trade Dress, available on-line
at http://www.patenting-art.com/copyprob/cpyqst-e.htm (quoting F. Scott Kieff at the conferences
“Promoting Markets in Creativity: Copyright in the Internet Age” held June 10, 2003 in
Washington, D.C. (“The ‘idea/expression’ dichotomy is so ill-defined that lawyers have no idea
how to express it”)).
546
See supra notes 512 & 526, and accompanying text (similarities in approaches for patents
and trademarks).
547
See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (suit
against service that facilitated peer to peer sharing of copyrighted music); In re: Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (same).
548
To be sure, other motivations such as fear of copying also operate here. Therefore, an
important area of further research would include a determination of which motivations are
operating and to what extent, such as through the gathering of empirical evidence of legal
positions explored by players in this industry. Gathering such data is likely to face several
obstacles, however, because it seeks to elucidate information that would be both protected by the
attorney-client privilege and potentially very damaging.
545
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At bottom, the uncertainty, coordination, administrative, and public choice
costs associated with the copyright system may be operating to frustrate its ability
to facilitating coordination through private ordering. At the same time, these
same features of the regime impose remarkably high costs on both consumers and
producers.
For producers, costs include the risk of antitrust liability. For
consumers, costs include the inability to gain access to copyrighted works as well
as the threat of criminal sanction.
B. Beginning the Case against Copyright
There are several important differences between the institutional
economics of the patent and trademark regimes on the one hand and the copyright
regime on the other. While the patent and trademark regimes achieve
coordination benefit with low social cost, as designed, the copyright system has
grown largely out of collective bargaining as a descriptive matter while being
motivated by reward theories as a normative matter. The present copyright
regime does reward many of the constituencies present in the legislative
bargaining, but it fails to achieve effective coordination because of excessive
uncertainty and regulation. The basic differences between the approach of patents
and trademarks on the one hand and copyrights on the other hand, suggest the
possibility that the types of coordination needed for at least the entertainment
industry may be facilitated sufficiently without a copyright regime at all, as long
as well functioning trademark and patent regimes are present.
Key to the proposed model industrial organization system for the
entertainment industry, such as publishing, film, and television, is the realization
that commercialization costs today in the entertainment industry are largely those
associated with advertising, reputation, and business networks.
Due to
technological changes, physical plant costs of distributing in this industry need
not be as large as before.549 Yet, as discussed earlier, trademark law works well
to allow some coordination and some pricing above marginal cost of the type
necessary to facilitate commercialization of goods and services facing such
reputation and network costs. Thus, as discussed below, a model approach might
be suggested under which the industry would rely essentially on trademarks (and
to some extant patents) rather than copyrights. Put differently, the model begins
the conversation of a modest proposal: 550 for the entertainment industry to reply
trademarks and patents instead of copyrights.
549

An internet server of sufficient bandwidth will be sufficient if advertising and other
network costs have been effectively deployed.
550
It is recognized that the proposal is more extreme than modest, just as was Jonathan
Swift’s “modest proposal” that the problems of Irish poverty be solved through the sale of Irish
babies as food for the wealthy English, JONATHAN SWIFT, A Modest Proposal, in GULLIVER’S
TRAVELS AND OTHER WRITINGS 439, 441 (L. Landa ed. 1960). A less extreme proposal is Marie
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Implementing effective coordination in the entertainment industry absent
copyright may be conceivable. First, major advances in these industries, although
likely rare, would be eligible for patent protection (a new projector, a new chord,
etc).551 Second, while non-commercial infringements may not be actionable
under trademark law,552 content providers can adapt to nevertheless make
coordination and commercialization profitable against the backdrop of effective
trademark protections. For example, trademark suits would be viable against
commercial infringers. To the extent needed, these rights can be strengthened by
re-instating dilution law, or by reversing Moseley.553
Content providers may be able to take several different steps that in
concert with consumer prescriptive norms and preferences may yield a landscape
of descriptive norms in which coordination and commercialization are profitable.
First, as Demsetz pointed out, private producers can produce public goods
efficiently given the ability to exclude non-purchasers, and price discrimination is
consistent with competitive equilibrium for such public goods.554 That is, content
providers can establish networks that sell, or even give away, content along with
other bundled goods and services, such as updates,555 replacements, library
management tools and services, etc.556 By effectively educating consumers on
such practical, commercial, benefits of purchasing through licensed sources,
content providers may be able to maintain profitable networks. Indeed, further
strengthening of the content provider’s position – and further protection of
consumers – may be obtained by reversing Dastar’s elimination of certain false
advertising suits.557
Antoinette’s “let them eat cake” remark offered in response to inability for the impoverished
population in France to afford even bread.
Legend has it that as the people were rioting in the streets in Paris just before the
French Revolution, Marie Antoinette turned to her assistant and asked, “What is
wrong? Why are the people fighting in the streets?” “They have no bread to eat,
your majesty” came the response. “No bread?” gasped Marie. “Let them eat
cake.”
Molly Townes O’Brien, Questioning the Power of Consumerism to Reform Public Education, 75
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 233, n.1 (2001) (“The story is said to have originated with Jean Jacques
Rousseau in his Confessions, Book 6 (1782) and is generally understood to be fictional.”).
551
See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 728-828 (discussing statutory subject matter).
552
That is, file sharing will still likely occur.
553
See supra note 528.
554
See Kieff supra note 8, at 727 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970)).
555
This method is used frequently for software.
556
Apple I-tunes is one approach to selling. The Wallmart approach is more like bundling
since they are (supposedly) selling below cost and so are essentially bundling with advertising in
much the same way that Demsetz suggested that television signals could be bundled with
advertising.
557
See supra note 527.
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Second, the role of consumer norms must not be overlooked.558 If artists
and publishers make clear which works are “authorized” and therefore associated
with some pay-back to the originators of the work, then the customers may be
willing to pay more for those works. Again, at the very least, suits under 43(a)
will be available against commercial competitors, even when there is only falsity,
as opposed to confusion as to source. In much the same way that cult followings
like to support their object of allegiance, general consumer norms may – at least
at the right prices – be willing to pay simply to support their preferred performers
and distributors.559 Indeed, much of the direct income generation that already
occurs in the entertainment industry is based on marketing of products and
services that are only linked to core content, a strategy known as
“merchandizing.” The ability to capture revenues though such tying, however,
requires the availability of suits for false advertising and dilution, as well complex
contractual arrangements. Importantly, transaction costs are lower when tying is
done through merchandizing or through advertising (as is done with broadcast
television content that is itself provided for “free” when tied to the sale of
advertising time). Instead of the content provider having to transact directly with
each user, the transaction can be with the tied merchandisers or advertisers.
At bottom, the analysis offered here is designed to explore a hypothetical
industrial organization model under which coordination may be achieved for
entertainment industry by using the regimes of trademark and perhaps patent; but
not copyright. Such a model may be associated with lower social costs than the
present copyright system. If so, then the participants in this industry can get
more, at lower cost, by eschewing, or perhaps even jettisoning, copyright.
To be sure, the model offered here is only a model, and only of most
relevance for an industry where the commercialization costs are largely those
associated with advertising, reputation, and networks, such as the entertainment
industry. As a result, a number of areas of further study must be considered
before the model could even be tested seriously. For example, a comparative
study of the relative importance of trademark and false advertising rights as
compared with copyright rights to established networks in the real world would
provide some insight as to the model’s practical appeal.
In addition, objections to the model may include pointing out that even on
its own terms it does little to address the copyright needs of low volume
industries, such as sculptors and painters. While reputational effects help in
those sectors, absent copyright, they may not be sufficient to drive trademark and
false advertising issues, particularly with regard to the type of factual data about
558

For more on norms see supra Part II.C.1.
Compare, Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004) (suggesting that authors may respond particularly well to
reputation incentives).
559
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overall consumer behavior that are needed to mount a successful case using those
causes of action. Nevertheless, reputational effects may be sufficient to drive
other methods through which income can be extracted such as the selling of
authentic signatures on mementos or authentic artifacts associated with the works
of art. For example, both of these techniques have been employed by the artists
Christo and Jeanne-Claude, whose works themselves – such as the wrapping of
the Reichstag, which culminated in a pubic display in 1995 – are simply not able
to be sold.560
Before the model could be implemented in a working legal system a
number of additional obstacles would also need to be overcome. For example, as
indicated in the model itself, the trademark system would need to be rolled back
to the way it was before Dastar and Mosley – both false advertising and dilution
would be needed. In addition, a number of administrative and public choice costs
are raised by the need to determine the carve-out from copyright that the model
proposes for certain industries.
Importantly, the model is not so much offered as the beginning of the end
of copyright; but rather as a tool for elucidating some highlights of the differences
in institutional frameworks between the major positive law IP regimes. If nothing
else, it is hoped that the present study elucidates the tie between social costs and
reward theories that is emblematical of the copyright system.
V. CONCLUSION
The complexity of modern copyright may frustrate the ability of the
system to achieve the coordination benefits IP rights can deliver, and that patents
and trademarks generally do deliver. This same complexity of modern copyright
causes the costs of the copyright system to be remarkably high. A radical
conclusion would be that the case today for copyright simply fails. A more
modest conclusion would be that the comparative institutional analysis explored
in this paper shows how copyright may be become more obsolete in view of
patent and trademark if copyright were to become even more complex than it
already is. Although it seems radical, the elimination of copyright may not be bad
for the central constituents involved with modern copyright – producers and
consumers. Indeed, these same market actors may find their own norms – extant
or potential – may be combined with the institutions of trademark and patent, at
least as they recently existed, to become both more effective and less expensive in
facilitating the private ordering that is necessary for the commercialization of
creative works.
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See The Art of Christo and Jeanne-Claude, available
http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/ (web site authorized by the artists).

on-line
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Several core lessons can be drawn from the analysis offered here. NIE
teaches that the details of different institutional choices matter in that they have
different implications for a large number of costs and problems. Using the
lessons from NIE this paper elucidates how many of the problems that have
attracted attention in the IP literature turn out to be properly viewed as inapposite,
overstated, or even having implications opposite of those offered by the literature.
The paper elucidates how property rights in IP can provide an important
additional and middle-ground tool for optional use by individuals engaged in
private ordering beyond those offered by the extreme poles of either the free, open
market without them on the one hand or the hierarchy of family, firm, or
government on the other hand.561 The paper also shows how IP rights must be
designed to facilitate private ordering if they are to play this role effectively. That
is, IP rights must operate as rights of exclusion around which coordination can
take place. To do so efficiently, they must be structured to mitigate the costs of
rent dissipation, information, transactions, and public choice. By elucidating how
at least the patent and trademark systems of yesterday operated to achieve
commercialization effectively and efficiently, the paper thereby offers an
overarching normative case for IP. The paper also elucidates why institutional
choices for IP regimes that have been motivated by other theories of IP have been
both less effective and less efficient.
At bottom, the paper shows how the set of tools from NIE can be used to
conduct comparative analyses of institutional options for IP. It is hoped the
approaches offered here help frame debates over future choices for these regimes.
*****
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For elaboration on the role of property rights as a middle ground see supra notes 144146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context
of the tradeoff between market and firm). See also supra note 267(exploring property rights in the
context of the tradeoff between market and government).

